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DOES THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
END WITH THE ICC? THE "ROAMING ICC": A MODEL
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT FOR A STATE-CENTRIC WORLD
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Christopher "Kip" Hale*
"If women, children, and old people would be murdered a hundred miles from
here ... wouldn 't you run to help? Then why do you stop this decision of your heart
when the distance is 3,000 miles instead of a hundred? " Raphael Lemkin
1
I. INTRODUCTION
Getting the world to agree on any issue of global importance is an extremely
arduous task.2 Almost all international agreements require years of negotiations,
* Managing Editor, 2006-2007, Denver Journal of International Law and Policy. A previous draft of this
Note placed in the 40"' Leonard v.B. Sutton International Law Writing Contest. I thank the Denver
Journal of International Law and Policy for giving me the chance to publish an extension of this Note
and for accepting this Note for publication. I profusely thank Professor Ved Nanda not only for his help
with this particular paper, but for being the inspiration that spurred me to the field of international law.
Lastly, but not least, I also thank those that helped me in the editing of this rather large Note. Your help
is much appreciated.
1. SAMANTHA POWER, "A PROBLEM FROM HELL": AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 26-7
(Harper Perennial ed., 2003) (2002). Raphael Lemkin was a fascinating person and an even more
fascinating story that should inspire anyone who works in any area of international criminal law to work
even harder for the advancement of the field. Lemkin's story starts as a young Jewish lawyer who used
his academic credentials to escape Nazi controlled Poland. He ended up in the U.S.A, where he
spearheaded efforts to bring attention to the atrocities being committed by Nazis, which at the time
where relatively unknown to the world. This quote comes from a speech he gave in North Carolina
while touring the U.S.A. trying to drum up support for U.S. military intervention against Germany-
before the U.S. entered the World War Two- in order to stop the Nazi concentration camps. Lemkin
invented the crime of and coined the term "genocide". After World War Two, he worked tirelessly to
persuade Nuremberg Tribunal officials to recognize "genocide" in any way, shape, or form. Then,
Lemkin set out on a crusade to make genocide an international crime by working without sleep or
distraction during the negotiations of the Genocide Convention, becoming an absolute pest to
international diplomats, constantly pleading with them to form a formidable genocide treaty. After the
signing of the Genocide Convention, Lemkin went almost directly to work, trying to persuade the U.S.
Senate to ratify the treaty. Tragically, but most unsurprisingly, Lemkin died of a heart attack in 1959
while waiting in a public relation's office, waiting to lobby for the ratification of the Genocide
Convention almost 11 years after the U.S.A. signed the treaty. See id. at 17-78.
2. See e.g., Alison Purdy, The Kyoto Protocol, Guardian, Feb. 16, 2005, at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/climatechange/story/0,12374,1415660,00.html; Fact Sheet, infra note 334
(exhibiting an example of the world's inability to agree on important world issues).
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thousands of miles traveled, hundreds of hours drafting, not to mention the money
needed to bring about these agreements. Taking into consideration the laborious
and costly nature of international relations in tandem with the divergent positions
of many States on international criminal law, the 1998 Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) that established the International
Criminal Court (ICC) must be viewed as a tireless, monumental success.3 Despite
the United States' (U.S.) ongoing unwillingness to partake in the ICC,4 it cannot
be ignored that the time, effort, and money that went into fashioning the Rome
Statute resulted in 104 nations becoming ICC State Parties.5 As a result, the ICC is
currently functional, and most importantly, already adjudicating alleged
international criminals. 6 However, the ICC has the lofty goal of ending
international impunity, 7 and it is only natural to question if the ICC is sufficiently
capable of achieving such a gargantuan feat?
For any international criminal system to pledge that all future international
criminals will receive punishment, the most basic requirement that such an
international criminal system must fulfill is the guarantee that not one criminal will
find State sanctuary from prosecution anywhere in the world. Accordingly, only an
international criminal enforcement mechanism backed by all nations could make
such a guarantee, because an international criminal only needs one safe haven to
escape justice. The ICC falls well short of obtaining full international support
considering that some of the most powerful countries-U.S., Israel, Russia, China,
and India-are not State Parties to the ICC. At present, the lack of full worldwide
support significantly reduces the likelihood that ICC can deliver on its mandate,
particularly its goal of catching and punishing all international criminals.
From this shortcoming of the ICC, it becomes evident that a true international
criminal system demands the inclusion and participation of every sovereign State.
An international criminal enforcement mechanism without an all-inclusive global
identity cannot solve a dilemma that rises to the level of international crime. Far
from being simply a semantic critique, any and all legitimate goals of an
international criminal system, be it international peace and security, deterrence of
international crime, or the end of international impunity, cannot be realized with
only partial cooperation, because an international criminal system short of full
universal support lacks the integrity and reliability necessary to fulfill its purpose.
8
3. See Rome Statute of the ICC, infra note 207. The Rome Statute established the ICC, but the
Rome Statute did not enter into force, and thus create a working ICC, until the 60th country became a
State Party, which occurred on July 1, 2002. International Criminal Court, Establishment of the Court,
http://www.icc-cpi.intabout/ataglance/establishment.html.
4. See Fact Sheet, infra note 334 (exemplifying the U.S. opposition to the ICC).
5. Establishment of the Court, supra note 3.
6. See International Criminal Court, Situations and Cases, http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases.html.
7. United Nations, Establishment of an International Criminal Court,
http://www.un.org/law/icc/general/overview.htm.
8. A domestic analogy of this critique would be if there were laws against murder in only 38 U.S.
states. Such a gap in criminal coverage would illegitimize the U.S. criminal system and would cast
doubt on the U.S.' desire and willingness to punish murderers. Of course, the response to this critique
would be that unlike domestic law, this is the nature of international law, for any international legal
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Therefore, anything less than the membership of every single nation cannot
rationally be deemed an adequate international criminal enforcement mechanism.
Otherwise, the world is left with an international criminal system, like the ICC,
riddled with holes from which international crime thrives.
The purpose of this Note is to propose a theoretically different international
criminal tribunal, one with the potential to bring about full worldwide
participation. This Note's proposed international criminal system, called the
"Roaming International Criminal Court" (Roaming ICC), brings together the three
elements necessary to create a truly international criminal system: reality of the
Westphalian State-centric system of international law, 9 the philosophic and legal
beliefs of the opponents of the current ICC, and the philosophic and legal beliefs of
the proponents of the current ICC. The result is a plausible international criminal
system that will be the best equipped to face the challenges of prescribing,
adjudicating, and enforcing international criminal law in all instances. 10
This Note will methodically trace the evolution of international criminal law,
starting in Part II with an analysis and critique of universal jurisdiction. Considered
the backbone of international criminal law, universal jurisdiction weaves in and out
of all subjects in international criminal law. The purpose of Part II will be to define
universal jurisdiction and its many forms, compare and distinguish universal
jurisdiction from other areas of this Note, and finally conclude that universal
jurisdiction practiced by individual States or international tribunals cannot
represent an effective international criminal system.
Part III will focus on the most notable international criminal tribunals of
modem era: the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (Nuremberg), the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the
mechanism-be it international environmental law, international maritime law, or international trade
law-does not enjoy complete universal support. However, international criminal law differs from all
other types of international law, because international criminal law deals with the base, the unrighteous,
and the evil. There is a reason why the practice of law is often divided between criminal law and
everything else. Accordingly, the fight against the commission of international crimes requires the
world's undivided support at a minimum.
9. The terms "Westphalia" and "State-centric" should be considered interchangeable when used
in this Note. Moreover, variations on these terms will be used in this Note liberally, such as
Westphalian world order, Westphalian State-centric world of international law, State-centric world
order, Westphalian order of international law. More or less, all of these terms refer to the same idea.
Specifically, Westphalia refers to the treaties that ended the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), commonly
known in their collective form as the Peace of Westphalia. See Treaty of Peace of MOnster, Fr.-Holy
Roman Empire, Oct. 24, 1648, 1 Parry 271; Treaty of Osnabrilck, Swed.-Holy Roman Empire, Oct 24,
1648, 1 Parry 119. "[B]oth law and society looked different after the Peace of Westphalia established
the modem secular state and the society of such states [a]n international (inter-state) system
assumes a conception and a definition of a state; the Peace of Westphalia (1648) confirmed that
conception." DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 2-3 (4th ed. 2001). The
social, political, and legal power infrastructure of the world has State-centric since Westphalia; thus,
this State dominance of world power has been labeled the Westphalian world order.
10. See O'Keefe, infra note 14, at 747 n.50 (citing the multitude of humanitarian conventions,
which is evidence that the world community is capable of agreeing on important world issues, a
capability that must be used to create the Roaming ICC).
2007
DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). A quick overview of the
precedent set down by Nuremberg will help shed light on the analysis, both factual
and legal, of the ICTY and ICTR. International criminal law, by its very nature,
adjudicates the worst human behavior imaginable. Therefore, the sections devoted
to the ICTY and ICTR thoroughly examines the underlying conflicts and the facts
that led to the creation of these two ad hoc tribunals as a reminder of the very
reasons why the world must have a fully functioning, fully backed international
criminal system. Part III will conclude that ad hoc tribunals, while necessary for
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda conflicts, are not viable international criminal
enforcement mechanisms for the world at large.
Part IV will detail the creation of the ICC, the structure of the ICC, and the
benefits of the ICC over its ad hoc tribunal predecessors. However, is the evolution
of international criminal law supposed to end with the ICC? Part V will answer this
question in the negative, primarily because the current ICC is contrary to the
reality of a State-centric world of international law. The Westphalian system of
State domination over the international legal order, while certainly challenged and
altered in recent years, is not in jeopardy of radical change or of future demise. An
effective international criminal system must embrace the State-centric reality of
international law, in that it must be tailored to work in our State-centric world. In
promoting such a philosophical change in the international community's approach
to creating an international criminal system, Part V will introduce the Roaming
ICC and explain its benefits. As will be demonstrated, the central appeal of the
Roaming ICC is that it incorporates every single nation, appeases both sides of the
current ICC debate, and brings about an effective international criminal
enforcement mechanism to punish those that perpetrate the worst of human
behavior. '
1
II. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: ANALYSIS OF THE CONTROVERSIAL JURISDICTION
PRINCIPLE
The concept "universal jurisdiction" does not have a consistent definition,
which is a revealing sign of its limitations. As cited in a recent International Court
of Justice (ICJ) opinion, "[tihere is no generally accepted definition of universal
jurisdiction in conventional or customary international law"' 12 However, for this
11. Just as important as it is to discuss what this Note is about, it is just as important to discuss
what it is not about. The focus of this Note is not jurisprudential, in that the legality or illegality of
specific international criminal laws will not be discussed. Rather, this Note will instead focus on
philosophical legal ideas, particularly pertaining to jurisdictional issues associated with international
criminal law.
12. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v Belg.), 2002 I.C.J 3, 165 (Feb. 14)
(dissenting opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/121/8144.pdf [hereinafter Arrest Warrant]. For point of reference, customary
international law should be defined and differentiated from conventional international law. Customary
international law, historically and presently, is the centerpiece of international law. CARTER ET. AL,
infra note 385, at 120-121. Customary international law along with international conventions/treaties
and principles of law accepted by the world's legal systems are the sources of international law
recognized by the ICJ. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, available
at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?pl=4&p2=2&p3=0. Considering that there is not an
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Note's purposes, universal jurisdiction is a principle of law that enables and/or
requires a State to exercise jurisdiction over specific crimes without a connection
between the offense, offender, or victim and the State exercising jurisdiction. 13 In
the hierarchy of legal principles in international law used to justify the jurisdiction
of a State to act, the universal jurisdiction principle is often used only in the
absence of any other legitimate option. 14 Whereas other international legal
principles ground jurisdiction in a nexus between the actor, victim, place, or state
interest with the exercising state, universal jurisdiction is void of such a nexus. 15
Instead, universal jurisdiction focuses on the nature of the crime, in that the crime
is so repulsive and threatening to international security 16 that the mere occurrence
international legislative body that enacts laws for the world, it is an academic and legal pursuit to
identify international law. Convention/treaty law is relatively easy to identify, because it is written
down in a legal instrument. Customary international law is a far harder item to identify. The generally
accepted elements of customary international law-and the elements used to identify customary
international law-are state practice (objective element) and opinio juris (subjective element). North
Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 41-45 (Feb. 20), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/52/5561.pdf; CASSESE, infra note 59, at 156-60; CARTER ET. AL, infra note 385, at
124-25; International Law Association, Committee on Formation of Customary (General) International
Law, Final Report on the Committee Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General
Customary International Law 8 (2000), available at http://www.ila-hq.org/pdf/CustomaryLaw.pdf
[hereinafter CIL Report]. The Restatement on Foreign Relations best summarized how customary
international law is formed when it simply stated that "[c]ustomary international law results from a
general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation (opinio
juris)." Restatement of the Law (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102 (2) (1987)
(alteration added) [hereinafter RST Foreign Relations]. "State practice" can include diplomatic relations
between States, international acts or inactions of States, internal practices of State, decision by State
tribunals, decisions by international or regional tribunals, practice of international organs, treaties,
juristic writings, etc., but state practice need not be perfectly uniform or include absolute consent of all
nations to be bound in order for a customary international law to form. RST Foreign Relations, supra
note 12, § 102 cmt. b; CASSESE, infra note 59, at 162 ; CARTER ET. AL, infra note 385, at 121-22.
Depending on the subject matter of a proposed customary international law, state practice must be
practiced over a sufficient duration of time, uniformly and consistently applied, and generally practiced
worldwide. GURUSWAMY ET AL., International Environmental Law and World Order 102-04 (1999).
Finally, customary international law can develop out of a convention or treaty, and a convention or
treaty could be a codification of an already existing customary international law or crystalization of a
potential customary international law. CASSESE, infra note 59, at 167-69; CARTER ET. AL, infra note
385, at 127-28.
13. Universal jurisdiction has been defined in many ways. E.g., International Law Association,
Committee on International Human Rights Law and Practice, Final Report on the Exercise of Universal
Jurisdiction in Respect of Gross Human Rights Offenses, 2-3 (2000), http://www.ila-
hq.org/pdf/Human%20Rights%2OLaw/HumanRig.pdf; Gabriel Bottini, Universal Jurisdiction After the
Creation of the International Criminal Court, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L & POL. 503, 510 (2004) (defining
universal jurisdiction).
14. See Bruce Broomhall, Towards the Development of an Effective System of Universal
Jurisdiction for Crimes Under International Law, 35 NEW ENG. L. REv. 399, 400 (2001); Roger
O'Keefe, Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concepts, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 735, 744 (2004).
15. See Bottini, supra note 13, at 511-12; Broomball, supra note 14, at 400; O'Keefe, supra note
14, at 745-46. (explaining the differences between universal jurisdiction and other jurisdictional
principles).
16. Not any crime is subject to universal jurisdiction, but only a limited amount of criminal
conduct determined to be of such a degree that the commission of the criminal conduct itself translate
into a right of a State to act or use universal jurisdiction, if need be. See BROOMHALL, infra note 59, at
2007
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of the criminal act justifies legal response by any State or appropriate international
organization. 17 Despite being devoid of a traditional nexus, the legitimacy of
universal jurisdiction itself is not questioned, as the principle of universal
jurisdiction is a customary international law. 18
"... [T]he term 'universal jurisdiction' is shorthand for 'universal jurisdiction
to prescribe' or 'universal prescriptive jurisdiction'..."19 This definition highlights
an essential aspect of universal jurisdiction worth noting. When jurists and other
international legal commentators commonly used the term "universal jurisdiction",
it is in reference to the universal jurisdiction to prescribe, not to enforce. 20 For
example: universal jurisdiction, absent other jurisdictional principles, means that a
State prescribes genocide committed by a foreign tyrant in another State, against
foreign persons, and not in conflict with the prescribing State's national interests -
as a violation of their domestic law, conventional international law, and/or
customary international law-,but the State cannot enforce their domestic genocide
law and/or any type of international law prohibiting genocide unless the tyrant
comes within the State's territory or the State decides to try the tyrant in
absentia.2
107-08.
17. Princeton Project on Universal Jurisdiction, The Princeton Principles on Universal
Jurisdiction 28 (2001), http://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/univejur.pdf [hereinafter Princeton
Principles] (showing that the focus of universal jurisdiction is on the nature of the crime committed). In
addition to determining that universal jurisdiction is justified due to the nature of the criminal conduct,
international legal scholarship also adds that the need for a forum to adjudicate these heinous
international crimes and the consensus among States-gauged by customary or conventional
international law- regarding the reprehensibility of such criminal conduct also justifies the use of
universal jurisdiction. Final Report on the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction in Respect to Gross
Human Rights Offenses, supra note 13, at 2-3; Monica Hans, Comment, Providing for Uniformity in the
Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction: Can Either the Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction or an
International Criminal Court Accomplish this Goal?, 15 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 357, 360, 392-93 (2002);
Sriram, infra note 18, at 305, 375, 377; see Menno T. Kamminga, Universal Civil Jurisdiction: Is it
Legal? Is it Desirable?, 99 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoC. 123 (2005) (explaining that a justification for
universal civil jurisdiction is that the "unlawful conduct is a matter of international concern.").
18. Princeton Principles, supra note 17, at 29 (stating that a judicial body of any State may
exercise universal jurisdiction in connection with serious crimes under international law such as piracy,
slavery, war crimes, crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, genocide, and torture); Madeline H.
Morris, Universal Jurisdiction in a Divided World: Conference Remarks, 35 NEW ENG. L. REv. 337,
346-47 (2001); Chandra Lekha Sriram, Revolutions in Accountability: New Approaches to Past Abuses,
19 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 301, 314 (2003).
19. O'Keefe, supra note 14, at 745.
20. Id. at 750 ("The fact is that prescription is logically independent of enforcement. On the one
hand, there is universal jurisdiction, a head of prescriptive jurisdiction alongside territoriality,
nationality, passive personality and so on. On the other hand, there is enforcement in absentia, just as
there is enforcement in personam. In turn, since prescription is logically distinct from enforcement, the
legality of the latter can in no way affect the legality of the former, at least as a matter of reason."); see
Sriram, supra note 18, at 316 ("In essence, under universal jurisdiction, a state is competent to judge an
accused alleged to have committed certain international crimes and found in its territory"). Later on in
this Note, there will be a discussion on jurisdiction to adjudicate, which will add another layer of
jurisdictional analysis to this discussion. See infra section IV, 3.
21. Broomhall, supra note 14, at 400; O'Keefe, supra note 14, at 750. This example is an
oversimplification of "prescribe", because every country "prescribes" differently. Prescribe could
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Turning now to application, the practice of universal jurisdiction, as defined
by international legal scholars, is bifurcated into permissive and mandatory
forms.22 The distinction between permissive and mandatory universal jurisdiction
hinges on whether a State exercises universal jurisdiction from a customary or
conventional international law obligation. 23 As the adjectives connotate, the
difference between the practice of mandatory and permissive universal jurisdiction
is the degree of obligation imposed on States. Permissive universal jurisdiction
occurs when a State has the option to exercise universal jurisdiction under the
guise of a customary international law violation, and the State may enact domestic
legislation that conforms to customary international law. 24 Permissive universal
include legislative and/or judicial action by a State, depending on if the State already has domestic
legislation against, for example, war crimes that comports with customary or conventional international
law prohibiting war crimes. Jurisdiction to adjudicate, while an important issue in this discussion on
universal jurisdiction, is not addressed in this Note's section on universal jurisdiction, because
jurisdiction to adjudicate "generally follows jurisdiction to prescribe", in that if a State prescribes
genocide, it follows that the State can adjudicate genocide violators. SADAT, infra note 200, at 112-119
(discussing jurisdiction to adjudicate in the context of universal jurisdiction, international criminal law,
and domestic States). See infra section IV, 3. Additionally, the example used does not include a
situation where a State's authorities enter another State to enforce its own laws that the invading State
has prescribed as internationally criminal. A State going to such ends to enforce its laws
extraterritorially, however, is very unlikely in world affairs.
22. Broomhall, supra note 14, at 401-405; see Bottini, supra note 13, at 516-521 (describing the
interplay between universal jurisdiction pursuant to customary and pursuant to conventional
international law). It should be noted that traditionally, universal jurisdiction is not split up into these
two forms, but rather, universal jurisdiction is historically thought only to be permissive. Johan D. van
der Vyver, Personal and Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 14 EMoRY, INT'L
L. REV. 1, 72 (2000). However, Prof. Broomhall introduced the bifurcation of universal jurisdiction into
permissive and mandatory forms, highlighting the different impacts that customary and conventional
law have on the practice of universal jurisdiction. Some even argue that under customary international
law, universal jurisdiction is mandatory now, "[flrom this perspective, universal jurisdiction flows
directly from the fact that the core crimes of international criminal law rest on norms ofjus cogens that
give rise to obligations erga omnes." Broomhall, supra note 14, at 405; M. Cherif Bassiouni,
International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 64
(1996).
23. Broomhall, supra note 14, at 401. ("In ordinary usage, 'universal jurisdiction' encompasses
both permissive and mandatory forms, where a state may and where a state must exercise jurisdiction.
This largely parallels the distinction between the doctrine's manifestations under customary and under
conventional international law"). Although his terminology is different and his analysis of universal
jurisdiction possesses more nuances, Prof. Summers makes similar discussion about "conventional
universal jurisdiction" stemming from conventional international law and "customary universal
jurisdiction" coming from customary international law. See Mark A. Summers, The International Court
of Justice's Decision in Congo v. Belgium: How has it Affected the Development of a Principle of
Universal Jurisdiction that Would Obligate All States to Prosecute War Criminals?, 21 B. U. INT'L L. J.
63, 73-88 (2003).
24. Broomhall, supra note 14, at 400-01, 404-05; Hans, supra note 17, at 362. A State acting
under permissive universal jurisdiction, or said differently, acting under a customary international law
obligation, is not required to enact domestic legislation at all in order to ground jurisdiction for the
violation of a customary international law. The State or non-State actor can simply ground jurisdiction
over a defendant for violating customary international law without every having any domestic
legislation on point, theoretically speaking. See, e.g., Loi modifiant la loi du 16 juin 1993 relative A la
repression des violations graves du droit international humanitaire et l'article 144 ter du Code judiciaire,
2007
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jurisdiction is attractive in some respect, because it justifies a State in grounding
universal jurisdiction over a defendant for violations of customary international
law, or international law that the entire world is obligated to abide by and
uphold, 25 regardless of a complete consensus of States. 26 Yet, without a defined
entity consistently acting as the announcer and enforcer of customary international
laws, the murky contours of this type of international law discourages States from
enforcing such laws.27 Also, States can simply ignore customary international law
obligations with little to no repercussions 21 given that States have the discretion
not to use universal jurisdiction to prosecute a customary international law
violation.29
Alternatively, mandatory universal jurisdiction occurs when a State must
exercise universal jurisdiction under its conventional international law
obligations-which are obligations beset from conventions or treaties-and such a
State must enact domestic legislation that conforms to the conventional
international law that it has ratified. Commonly, a requirement to practice
Apr. 23, 2003, M.B., May 7, 2003 translated in 42 I.L.M 749 (2003); see Steve R. Ratner, Belgium's
War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 888, 889 (2003). However, due to the desire for
jurisdictional clarity, some States prefer or require that domestic legislation effectuating a customary
international law is enacted, and jurisdiction over the defendant is grounded in both the domestic law
and the customary international law. As will be discussed in the paragraph below devoted to traditional
application of universal jurisdiction, Prof. Sriram accentuates this point by focusing on the diversity of
laws that domestic courts rely on when exercising universal jurisdiction, and classifying States into two
categories accordingly. Prof. Sriram calls one "pure universal jurisdiction" and the other "universal
jurisdiction plus" Some States simply ground jurisdiction for the violation of customary or
conventional international law-assuming the conventional international law at issue is self-executing
and/or the country does not require domestic legislation in the ratification process of a
convention/treaty-and simply do not rely on domestic legislation on point, if it exists at all. Other
States will ground jurisdiction over an individual for a violation of customary or conventional
international law and for a violation of some domestic legislation on point. See Sriram, supra note 18,
at 306-311, 358-361.
25. It must be remembered that customary and conventional international law can play off each
other, with one helping creating the other and vice versa. See Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-
AR72, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 98 (Oct. 2, 1995),
available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/decision-e/51002.htm; Military and Paramilitary
Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 113-14 (June 27); supra note 12.
26. BROOMHALL, infra note 59, at 110; Michael Scharf, The Letter of the Law: The Scope of the
International Legal Obligation to Prosecute Human Rights Crimes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41,
52-59 (1996). This does not consider the persistent objector rule, which theorizes that States that
consistently express their opposition to and act in opposition to a potential customary international law
are not bound by that custom if it were to become recognized sufficiently as a customary international
law by the international community. However, the persuasiveness and authority behind the persistent
objector rule is not clear or supported adequately. CARTER ET. AL, infra note 385, at 124; CASSESE, infra
note 59, at 162-63.
27. METTRRAUX, infra note 113, at 14-18.
28. See, e.g., In the Dispute Between Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO) and the
Government of the Libyan Arab Republic Relating to Petroleum Concessions 16, 17, and 20, Apr. 12,
1977, 20 I.L.M. I (1981) (exemplifying the ability of a sovereign nation to walk away from customary
international legal obligations).
29. See Broomhall, supra note 14, at 401.
30. Broomhall, supra note 14, at 401; Hans, supra note 17, at 362-63. Again, the requirement to
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mandatory universal jurisdiction is included in conventions and treaties through an
aut dedere autjudicare ("either prosecute or extradite") provision, where a State
must prosecute a suspected violator of a conventional international law or extradite
the alleged offender to another State Party to the convention/treaty that will
prosecute the violation. 3' Furthermore, the same convention or treaty will require
the State to enact domestic legislation prohibiting the conduct at issue in the
convention or treaty.32 Notwithstanding the wholly theoretical difference between
aut dedere autjudicare provisions and pure universal jurisdiction,33 aut dedere aut
judicare provisions and the corresponding required domestic legislation
exemplifies how conventions and treaties can feasibly bind State parties to abide
by and practice universal jurisdiction, just like any contract binds the parties to the
terms of the deal. Nevertheless, this oversimplification of the convention and treaty
process glosses over the major drawback to mandatory universal jurisdiction,
which is the extreme difficulty associated with getting States to obligate
themselves, in writing, to practice universal jurisdiction. In addition, a sovereign
State agreeing to an aut dedere aut judicare provision in a convention or treaty
does not unequivocally bind a signatory party to prosecute or extradite, because
there is no true central enforcement mechanism to force a sovereign State to fulfill
its conventional international law obligations, nor has aut dedere autjudicare itself
enact complying domestic legislation depends on the domestic rules on ratifying that a State Party to a
convention or treaty uses. Some states, like Botswana and Slovakia, automatically make every
convention or treaty these countries sign enforceable domestic law. See Handbook for FCTC
Ratification Campaigns, Infact Report (Infact, Boston, MA), at 24, 37, available at
http://www.stopcorporateabuse.org/files/pdfs/Ratification%2Handbook-English2OO5.pdf. Other states,
like Canada, require domestic legislation in order for a convention or treaty that Canada signed to be
ratified and thus enforceable domestically. See Id. at 39. A majority of States, like the U.S.A., have
hybrid ratification procedures unique to those countries. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 2. All of
this could be moot if the convention or the treaty itself is self-executing, meaning that a country signing
a convention or treaty makes the convention or treaty enforceable law within the signing country. See
RST Foreign Relations, supra note 12, § 111 cmt. h.
31. See e.g., International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, pmbl, Dec. 17, 1979,
T.I.A.S. No. 11,081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 7, Dec. 10, 1984, 108 Stat. 382, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, available
at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/cat.htm (containing typical examples of these prosecute or
extradite provisions that are common in international treaties).
32. Broomhall, supra note 14, at 401; Hans, supra note 17, at 362-63.
33. Arrest Warrant, supra note 12, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, Kooijmans and
Buergenthal, para. 41; Bottini, supra note 13, at 516-17; Broomhall, supra note 14, at 401. Broomhall
emphasizes that mandatory universal jurisdiction "...is not truly 'universal,' but is a regime of
jurisdictional rights and obligations arising among a closed set of states' parties.. Under customary law,
states are (at least in the prevailing view) merely permitted to exercise universal jurisdiction over, for
example, piracy on the high seas or crimes against humanity. The phrase 'universal jurisdiction' more
accurately describes matters of custom than it does the jurisdiction that arises only inter partes through
a convention." Id. This is a theoretical difference, because in reality, a defendant could, under either
mandatory universal jurisdiction or permissive/pure universal jurisdiction, be charged by a foreign State
that has no other jurisdictional nexus with the defendant. So, regardless if the defendant is brought
before a domestic court pursuant to a customary or conventional international law obligation of said
State, the outcome is the same, and the defendant will argue that the domestic court does not have
jurisdiction over him/her.
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become unequivocal customary international law.
34
While the permissive/mandatory paradigm helps establish a strong theoretical
understanding of universal jurisdiction in application, this Note is primarily
concerned with what the empirical evidence of States practicing universal
jurisdiction reveals. First, the evidence shows that the lion's share of universal
jurisdiction activity, historically and presently, is by individual States acting as
pseudo-international legal bodies.35 It should not come as any surprise that
sovereign States, rather than international organizations or international tribunals,
practice universal jurisdiction more often considering the historical primacy of the
sovereign "State" in international law36 and that universal jurisdiction was initially
formulated for States to use to combat piracy.37 Therefore, traditionally, States
have a monopoly over the practice of universal jurisdiction. Second, the evidence
also supports the conclusion that when a State exercises universal jurisdiction, the
State will either justify jurisdiction over a defendant solely for violating the State's
34. A sovereign nation, being a sovereign, can choose neither to prosecute nor extradite, unless
aut dedere aut judicare reaches the level of customary international law. However, -'prosecute or
extradite" provision have not attained the status of customary international law, and this is the reason
why ICTY intervention in former Yugoslavia was somewhat legally objectionable, because the actors in
the former Yugoslavia conflict did not violate customary international procedural law, i.e. aut dedere
aut judicare. Michael J. Kelly, Cheating Justice By Cheating Death: The Doctrinal Collision for
Prosecuting Foreign Terrorists - Passage of Aut Dedere Aut Judicare Into Customary Law & Refusal
to Extradite Based on the Death Penalty, 20 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 491, 497-503 (2003) (offering
both sides of the argument that aut deder autjudicare itself is not customary international law). Even if
aut dedere aut judicare did gain customary international law status, this Note has highlighted that
customary international law obligations can simply be ignored by a sovereign State.
35. Broomhall, supra note 14, at 403 (explaining that universal jurisdiction usually means an
individual State prosecuting a suspect on behalf of the international community); see e.g., Fiona
McKay, Universal Jurisdiction in Europe: Criminal Prosecutions in Europe Since 1990 for War
Crimes, Crimes against Humanity, Torture and Genocide, REDRESS TRUST REP.,
http://www.redress.org/publications/UJEurope.pdf [hereinafter Redress Memo]; Ariana Pearlroth,
Universal Jurisdiction in the Europe Union: Country Studies, REDRESS TRUST REP.,
http://www.redress.org/conferences/country/ 20studies.pdf [hereinafter New Redress Memo]. These
two reports exemplify that universal jurisdiction is primarily practiced by sovereign States, because the
clear majority of present-day universal jurisdiction cases are undertaken by individual European
countries.
36. See MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1982)
(stating that "international law is primarily concerned with states"); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 287-88 (2003) (explaining that all things international law stem from the
State, because the State is the primary actor in the international arena); Sammons, infra note 49, at 114-
15.
37. See CASSESE, infra note 59, at 435-36. It should be stressed that the first evolutionary step in
international criminal law was sovereign States applying universal jurisdiction. As the Note progresses,
the move away from sovereign States being the only participants in international criminal law will be
shown by the introduction of the Nuremberg Tribunal, the ICTY, and the ICTR. In order for these
tribunals to practice international criminal law, these tribunals used a combination of universal
jurisdiction and the delegation of sovereign authority by the U.N. or international community to do so.
The most recent evolutionary step in international criminal law is the ICC, where a combination of




own domestic laws even if an international law on point exists, 3s or the State
exercises "universal jurisdiction plus", whereby the State justifies jurisdiction over
a defendant for violations of both its domestic laws and an international law on
point. 39 Extremely rare is the situation where a State uses universal jurisdiction to
gain jurisdiction over a defendant in order to apply an international law
exclusively,40 and even rarer, where universal jurisdiction is applied by a non-State
actor.4'
Sovereign States, historically and practically, are the predominant universal
jurisdiction participants; however, the international legal community argues
extensively whether international tribunals, both old and new, exercise or have
exercised universal jurisdiction through the delegation of the power to use
universal jurisdiction from sovereign States.42 Even though the purpose of this
Note is not to decide this issue definitively, the concept of "universal jurisdiction"
should not be conflated with international tribunals as one in the same.43
International tribunals practice "international jurisdiction", or delegated authority
from the international community to adjudicate international crimes. 44 The
38. S.R. RATNER & J.S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL Law 161 (2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 2001); O'Keefe, supra note 14, at 746
(discussing the reality that the practice of universal jurisdiction usually means that a domestic court take
jurisdiction over a person without a direct connection to the State (i.e. universal jurisdiction), but does
not apply international law, but the State's own domestic law).
39. Sriram, supra note 18, at 356, 360 (defining universal jurisdiction plus as "claims about the
universal nature of the crime are combined with reliance on ordinary domestic criminal legislation or
other principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction... Judges may seek to assert jurisdiction in accord with
specific provisions of domestic legislation that provide explicitly for extraterritorial application of
criminal legislation, or with domestic legislation incorporating provisions of treaties that provide for
such jurisdiction, or with domestic criminal legislation. In some of these cases, judges simultaneously
maintain that jurisdiction could be based in addition to, or solely on, universal jurisdiction").
40. See, e.g., Arrest Warrant, supra note 12, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/121/8126.pdf (exhibiting an example of a sovereign state using universal
jurisdiction to apply international law within a domestic court).
41. Potential non-State actors would be international tribunals. See next section on ad hoc
international criminal tribunals for more insight into international entities exercising universal
jurisdiction.
42. Bottini, supra note 13, at 513-14 (differentiating between universal jurisdiction and
international tribunals); Morris, supra note 18, at 350-51; Madeline Morris, High Crimes and
Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 26-30, 35-37
(2001) (arguing that States cannot delegate jurisdiction in regards to third parties, and the delegation of
universal jurisdiction to international tribunals is not binding or feasible); but see Damir Arnaut, When
in Rome... ? The International Criminal Court and Avenues for U.S. Participation, 43 VA. J. INT'L L.
525, 549-53 (2003) (making persuasive arguments that universal jurisdiction can be delegated to
international tribunals, specifically through treaty processes).
43. Bottini, supra note 13, at 513-14.
44. Id; see infra note 113; infra note 221. The question becomes, where did the international
community get the jurisdiction it just delegated to the international tribunal to adjudicate these
international crimes? Presumably, it could come from consent of the delegating State(s), or from the
UN's delegated authority to enforce international peace and security on behalf of Member States, or
from the customary/permissive or mandatory/conventional universal jurisdiction obligation that
individual States of the international community have that requires them to adjudicate such criminal
conduct. The latter would in fact be a situation where an international tribunal was exercising delegated
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possibility, however, that international tribunals could, or do, practice universal
jurisdiction should not be discounted.45 Nonetheless, international tribunals can,
do, and have grounded jurisdiction in a multitude of legal jurisdictional principles
other than the universal jurisdiction principle.46 Hence, it is best, conceptually, to
perceive universal jurisdiction as a means to an end, and international tribunals as
actors, just like States, that are able to use universal jurisdiction.47
For all its potential, universal jurisdiction remains an unrealized and
underused idea. 8 Some have suggested that the lack of sufficient investigation and
academic inquiry into universal jurisdiction is the reason preventing world-wide
acceptance and usage of universal jurisdiction. 49 However, the explanation for
universal jurisdiction's underutilization may be grounded in mere pragmatism.
The lack of a "link or nexus with the [exercising] forum" makes universal
jurisdiction facially undesirable to States. 50  Although universal jurisdiction
grounds itself in the moral responsibility of States to apprehend violators of such
abhorrent conduct, it simply does not possess enough legal persuasiveness, in
comparison to other jurisdictional principles, to enlist States into using universal
jurisdiction regularly. For some, universal jurisdiction poses a direct threat to the
Westphalian State-centric construct of international law, 51 and practicing universal
universal jurisdiction. See SADAT, infra note 200, at 116-117.
45. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 240
(1999) (stating that "the ICC can exercise universal jurisdiction when a situation is referred to it by the
Security Council"); Arnaut, supra note 42, at 551-53. Given the fact that the ICTY and ICTR have
jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes (more or less equally) and both ad
hoc tribunals stated that these international crimes do give rise to universal jurisdiction, an argument
can be made that the ICTY and ICTR are actually undertaking universal jurisdiction. Prosecutor v.
Tadid, supra note 25, 62; Prosecutor v. Ntuyahaga, Case No. ICTR-90-40-T, Decision on the
Prosecutors Motion to Withdraw the Indictment, 1 (Mar. 18, 1999). Not to mention, the ICTY and
ICTR are adjudicating violations of international law that occurred in places outside of the tribunals'
country of residence, done by foreign people, against foreign people, so by definition, it can be argued
that they are exercising universal jurisdiction.
46. See Morris, supra note 18, at 350 (discussing that international tribunals, specifically the ICC,
can ground jurisdiction in universality principle and other legal principles). An example of an
international tribunal grounding jurisdiction over an international crime without universal jurisdiction
would be the Nuremberg Tribunal, as a majority of scholars argue. See infra section III, A. Important to
know that in regards to the Roaming ICC proposal of this Note, the Roaming ICC is an international
tribunal that would not ground jurisdiction in the universality principle exclusively.
47. In order to understand this entire Note fully and correctly, it is imperative to keep this
paragraph in mind when reading the sections devoted to the ICTY and ICTR, the ICC, the Roaming
ICC.
48. See Leila Nadya Sadat, Redefining Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REv. 241, 245
(2001).
49. See Anthony Sammons, The "Under-Theorization" of Universal Jurisdiction: Implication for
Legitimacy on Trials of War Criminals by National Courts, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 111, 113-14
(2003) (stating that the "incomplete theoretical development of universal jurisdiction", due to a lack of
investigation by legal commentators and others, has led to the under-usage of the jurisdictional
principle).
50. Herv6 Ascensio, 'Are Spanish Courts Backing Down on Universality? The Supreme Tribunal's
Decision in Guatemalan Generals'. 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 690, 699 (2003).
51. Summers, supra note 23, at 83; see e.g. Arrest Warrant, supra note 12; Regina v. Bartle ex
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jurisdiction breaches conservative notions of sovereign authority, sovereign
immunity, and immunity for State officials. 2 Although these antiquated notions of
sovereignty are perceived to be the biggest roadblocks to proper enforcement of
international criminal law, universal jurisdiction must mesh with the reigning
Westphalian world order, or else be doomed to under-usage. Additionally,
questions surround the legal legitimacy of universal jurisdiction, specifically its
clarity, internal consistency, and adherence to other legal principles.5' The
disproportionate use of universal jurisdiction by developed countries against the
citizens of developing countries calls into question whether the doctrine is fair and
predictable, and whether universal jurisdiction instigates sovereign inequality.
54
Allowing universal jurisdiction to be practiced in domestic courts is called
undemocratic by some, because the practice of universal jurisdiction is principally
judge-made law that has little to no legislative input and may not reflect the
"...deepest commitments of their own political communities." 55 Finally, sovereign
States using universal jurisdiction have patently failed and will continue to fail at
bringing justice to the commission of international crimes. Relying on States to
conduct international criminal cases remains the linchpin problem for universal
jurisdiction.56 Sovereign states have the luxury of pursuing or ignoring
international law violations,57 and coupled with the lack of experience, resources,
cooperation, and numerous procedural obstacles that face a State court in
exercising universal jurisdiction,58 it is easy to see why universal jurisdiction is
often avoided. Although the State-centric model of universal jurisdiction fails to
parte Pinochet, [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L. 1999), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 581, 634-38 (1999) (separate
opinion of Lord Hutton) (discussing the conflicting, competing interests of having immunity for high
government officials versus the need for accountability for those that commit international crimes).
52. Arrest Warrant, supra note 12, at 22-23; Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The Changing
Character of Sovereignty in International Law and International Relations, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 141, 149 (2004) (arguing that state sovereignty is the most important facet of international order and
authority); Charles Pierson, Pinochet and the End of Immunity: England's House of Lords Holds that a
Former Head of State is Not Immune for Torture, 14 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 263, 269-70 (2000).
53. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 50-194 (Oxford Univ.
Press 1990); Sriram, supra note 18, at 368-69.
54. Sriram, supra note 18, at 369-71; Bottini, supra note 13, 554-57; see e.g., Redress Memo,
supra note 35, New Redress Memo, supra note 35.
55. Diane F. Orentlicher, Whose Justice? Reconciling Universal Jurisdiction with Democratic
Principles, 92 GEO. L. J. 1057, 1101-02, 1091-93 (2004); see also Bottini, supra note 13, 550-52
(explaining that universal jurisdiction violates the commonly held legal principle of due process of law,
because of differences in domestic criminal laws, disagreement over what crimes spur universal
jurisdiction, and the defendant in a foreign country, "may not possess any knowledge of their laws,
penalties, or criminal procedures. There are sometimes great differences among members of the
international community in the definitions of crimes, the determination and extent of the penalties,...").
56. Broomhall, supra note 14, at 399; see Bottini, supra note 13, at 506, 557-561 (discussing in
depth why universal jurisdiction lacks sufficient incentive to national authorities-which are present in
other jurisdictional principles-to proceed with a case).
57. See Bottini, supra note 13, at 514; Scharf, supra note 26, at 52-59.
58. BROOMHALL, infra note 59, at 118-126; See Broomhall, supra note 14, at 410-18 (listing all
the reasons a national court would refrain from taking on a universal jurisdiction case, such as finances,
evidence, security, witnesses, inexperience).
2007
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
fulfill the global need for an effective international criminal enforcement system,59
the continued use of universal jurisdiction by States should not be discouraged,
because such State practices will play a vital supplementary role in enforcing
international criminal law and developing an effective international criminal
system. 60
III. TRIBUNALS
A. Nuremberg Tribunal. Overview of the First International Criminal Tribunal
"The international court established to adjudicate at Nuremberg marked the
creation of the first such tribunal to evaluate war crimes and crimes against
humanity. ' '61 The jurisdictional theory of the Nuremberg Tribunal is not entirely
clear, for a majority of international legal scholars contend that the Nuremberg
Tribunal was simply the Allied forces (U.S., U.S.S.R., U.K., and France)
exercising their newly attained sovereign authority over Germany, or more
specifically, exercising criminal judicial functions as the newly established
government of the defeated Germany.62 However, one argument gaining
legitimacy is that the Nuremberg Tribunal constituted the first example of
sovereign States acting as the judicial agents of the international community
through "a type of universal jurisdiction theory." 63 This argument promotes the
belief that the Nuremberg Tribunal was an extension or adaptation of traditional
universal jurisdiction, particularly the idea of collective universal jurisdiction
whereby each Allied power could have exercised universal jurisdiction over the
Nazis for international crimes individually, but the Allied powers instead choose to
adjudicate the Nazi international criminals collectively; thus, combining each
Allied powers' ability to adjudicate "international crimes over which there exists
59. BRUCE BROOMHALL, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
112-127 (2003) (cataloguing numerous reasons States have abstained from practicing universal
jurisdiction); ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 452-53 (2d ed. 2005); SADAT, infra note 200, at
10.
60. See William W. Burke-White, A Community of Courts: Toward a System of International
Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 2-4, 16-20, 75-101 (2002) (detailing the benefits
and characteristics of a system of courts exercising universal jurisdiction); see e.g., Redress Memo,
supra note 35; New Redress Memo, supra note 35.
61. Laurie A. Cohen, Comment, Application of the Realists and Liberal Perspectives to the
Implementation of War Crimes Trials: Case Studies of Nuremberg and Bosnia, 2 UCLA J. INT'L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 113, 143 (1997); but see SADAT, infra note 200, at 27, fn. 22 (explaining that historical
examples of international criminal tribunals, prior to the Nuremberg Tribunals, do exists, but none of
them possesses the legal significance as that of the Nuremberg Tribunal); see also SCHABAS, infra note
331, at 7 (describing how the distinguished jurists and judge B. V. A. Rbling maintained that the Tokyo
and Nuremberg tribunals were not "'international tribunals in the strict sense' but were more aptly
described as "'multinational tribunals"').
62. Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Authority with
Respect to Germany, U.S.-USSR-UK-Fr., June 5, 1945, 60 Stat. 1649, TIAS 1520; The International
Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) Judgment and Sentence reprinted in 41 AM J. INT'L L.172, 172, 216,
248 (1947) [hereinafter Judgment of Oct. 1, 1946]; See SADAT, infra note 200, at 28; Morris, supra note
18, at 342-45 ("The Nuremburg tribunal, then, likely was not an instance of the exercise of universal
jurisdiction in the post-war trials"); Morris, supra note 42, 37-43.
63. Tonya J. Boller, The International Criminal Court: Better Than Nuremberg?, 14 IND. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 279, 304 (2003).
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universal jurisdiction." 64 While it is inconsequential for this Note's purposes which
argument prevails, it is undisputed that the Allied forces established jurisdiction
over the defeated Nazis through the "Charter of the International Military Tribunal,
annexed to the London Agreement, [which] provided the blueprint for the
Nuremberg Tribunal.,
65
The Charter of the International Military Tribunal was a joint agreement of
the Allied Forces enumerating international criminal charges that the Allied forces
could bring against Nazi suspects, specifically charges for the violation of
international laws against war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against
humanity. 66 Evidence in support of these charges was overwhelming, and
understandably, there was considerable world-wide support, led by the U.S., for
the judicial adjudication of the Nazis' use of concentration camps and other
criminal activities. 67 However, the international community's ability to prosecute
the Nazis for their conduct was limited given that international criminal law, at the
time, was scant and what law did exist was vague. 68 Consequently, the Nuremberg
Tribunal has been criticized for taking part in the application of ex post facto laws,
and criticized further that even if the Nuremberg Tribunal applied valid laws, these
international laws did not impose individual criminal responsibility for their
violation. 69 The Nuremberg Judgment, in answering these objections, plainly
stated that these crimes existed through custom and treaties at the time of their
commission, and that "[c]rimes against international law are committed by men,
64. SADAT, infra note 200, at 117; see Judgment of Oct. 1, 1946, supra note 62, at 216 (stating
that when the Allied Powers applied international customary and conventional laws against the defeated
Nazis, "they have done together what any one of them might have done singly" . ..) This breed of
universal jurisdiction is termed "universal international jurisdiction", such where a collection of States
have universal jurisdiction over an international crimes due to its jus cogens status, and rather than
argue over primacy of jurisdiction, the States agree to form a non-State actor to adjudicate the crime or
crimes. However, this concept is altered a bit in the ICC, in that the formation of the non-State actor to
adjudicate the crime(s) is formed prospectively, not in an ad hoc fashion, like the Nuremberg, ICTY,
and ICTR. This idea is discussed more in depth later in this Note. Infra note 220 and accompanying
text.
65. M&S YUGO, infra note 60, at 3; SADAT, infra note 200, at 27-8.
66. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6, 82 U.N.T.S. 284, 288, 59
Stat. 1546, 1548 annexed to Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 59 Stat. 1544; CASSESE, supra note 59,
at 439.
67. CARTER ET. AL, infra note 385, at 1085; CASSESE, supra note 59, at 439; POWER, supra note 1,
at 31-7; Cohen, supra note 61, at 118-35 (chronicling the long list of evidence against the Nazi
suspects, and exhibiting the international and public opinion for an international tribunal to try the
Nazis).
68. Cohen, supra note 61, at 137 (asserting that the only international criminal laws available at
the time of the Nuremberg trial was the Hague Convention and Geneva Convention, which had little
international criminal precedent associated with them); Remarks by M. Cherif Bassiouni, Panel Session,
Forty Years After the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals: The Impact of the War Crimes Trials on
International and National Law, 80 AM. SOCY INT'L L. PROC. 56, 62-63 (1986); Remarks by Telford
Taylor, id, at 57-58.
69. CASSESE, supra note 59, at 440-41; M&S YUGO, infra note 60, at 9; SADAT, infra note 200, at
30; Boiler, supra note 63, at 310. For an explanation on the importance of individual criminal liability,
read relevant portions of Mettreaux's book. See METTRAUX, infra note 113, at 9-12.
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not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such
crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced... 70 Yet, the
Nuremberg Tribunal, having been established by the victors of World War II, has
not fully escaped the criticism of "victor's justice".7'
Despite these and other legitimate concerns, the Nuremberg Charter, Tribunal,
and subsequent Judgment represents the most significant development in the
advancement of international criminal tribunals, international criminal law, and
indeed, one of the greatest developments in international law itself 72 The
Nuremberg Tribunal established the foundational principles of international
criminal law, which includes the principle that any individual-including generals
and presidents-can be held criminal responsible for violations of international
law, and the principle that international law preempts national law.73 These and
other foundational international criminal law principles instituted by the
Nuremberg Tribunal, Charter, and Judgment--commonly referred to as the
Nuremberg Principles-were determined to be customary international law by the
U.N. General Assembly and the U.N. International Law Commission.
74
Additionally, the Nuremberg Tribunal produced much needed international
criminal law precedent, 75 and legitimized the use of law in fair trials with due
process as a method of correcting international wrongs. 76 Prospectively, the
Nuremberg Principles influenced a majority of international human rights
70. Judgment of Oct. 1, 1946, supra note 62, at 221; CASSESE, supra note 59, at 440.
71. M&S YUGO, infra note 60, at 9. It is hard not to believe that the Nuremberg Tribunal was, to
some degree or another, unfair and an example of victor's justice. The Allied forces surely committed
international crimes during one of only two world wars. Regardless of this glaring defect, the
Nuremberg Tribunal was an invaluable moment in international criminal law.
72. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 19, 42, 49 (stating that the Nuremberg legacy gave birth to
"modern system of human rights protection" and "underpin(ned) the relationship between sovereignty
and the international system in the post-War era"); M&S YUGO, infra note 60, at 9; see CARTER ET. AL,
infra note 385, at 976, 1085. Although there was a sister tribunal to the Nuremberg Tribunal, commonly
called the Tokyo Trials, this tribunal does not carry the same amount of historical and legal weight as
the Nuremberg Tribunal, because the Tokyo Trials were fundamentally unfair to defendants. SADAT,
infra note 200, at 27; M&S RWANDA, infra note 123, at 8 n.42 ("[i]n his dissenting opinion, the French
Judge at Tokyo expressed his view that 'so many principles of justice were violated during the trial that
the Court's judgment certainly would be nullified on legal grounds in most civilized countries').
Furthermore, the Tokyo Trials were formed by military order of the U.S. Supreme Commander of the
Allied Forces at Tokyo. Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East at Tokyo, Special
Proclamation by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers at Tokyo, April 26, 1946, T.I.A.S. No.
1589,4 Bevans 20.
73. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 63, art. 7; SADAT, infra note 200, at
29, 30.
74. Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Ntinberg
Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95(I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., at 188, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1 (1946), available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/033/46/IMG/NR003346.pdf?OpenElement
[hereinafter Nuremberg Principles]; Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the
Ntirnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, [1950] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 364, UN Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add. 1, available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/7_1_1950.pdf.
75. See e.g., Nuremberg Principles, supra note 74.
76. M&S YUGO, infra note 79, at 9, 10.
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conventions, and provided invaluable legal precedent and philosophical support to
subsequent international tribunals, to Alien Tort Claims Act jurisprudence in U.S.
courts, and to the enforcement of international criminal law in many domestic
forums around the world.77
B. ICTY
1. The History of the Former Yugoslavia and Facts that Led to the Formation
of the ICTY
Geographically, former Yugoslavia was situated inside the Balkans, a large,
rugged region of southeastern Europe. The Balkans peninsula is one of the most
historically rich and fervently fought-over areas of the world. Ethnic wars,
centuries-long occupations, and social struggles have littered its history for longer
than a millennium. 78 The Balkans' turbulent history, for the most part, is credited
to the struggle between three religious groups that each possess very strong,
distinct identities: Roman Catholic Croats, Orthodox Christian Serbs, and Muslims
who mainly constitute converts to Islam while the area was under the Ottoman
Empire rule. 79 The advent of World War II and the Nazi occupation of the Balkans
revived inter-ethnic fighting in the region, which eventually resulted in the
execution of thousands of Croats, Serbs, and Muslims. 80 However, the Balkans'
misery ended with the creation of the former Yugoslavia-the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia-after the end of World War II, which was a loosely
federated nation under the Communist rule of Josip Tito. 1
The former Yugoslavia was made up of several republics, namely Bosnia-
Herzegovina (Bosnia), Serbia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Slovenia. 82
77. Prosecutor v. Staki6, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, 414 (31 July 2003), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/stakic/trialc/judgement/stak-tj030731e.pdf; SADAT, infra note 200, at 28; Paul
L. Hoffman, Justice Jackson, Nuremberg and Human Rights Litigation, 68 ALB. L. REV. 1145, 1145-
1152 (2005) (emphasizing the practical and theoretical impact of the Nuremberg Tribunal and
Nuremberg Principles on international human rights conventions, Alien Tort Claims Act jurisprudence
in U.S., and in other countries' jurisprudence as well); Henry King, Jr., Commentary: The Modern
Relevance of the Nuremberg Principles, 17 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 279, 280 (1997) (characterizing the
Nuremberg trials and the Nuremberg Principles as extremely influential in the formation of most major
human rights conventions/treaties).
78. POWER, supra note 1, at 285; ARNOLD SHERMAN, PERFIDY IN THE BALKANS 26-29
(Psichogios Publications 1993) (giving overview of Balkan history); Cervoni, infra note 171, at 490;
Andras Riedlmayer, A Brief History of Bosnia-Herzegovenia, (1993),
http://www.kakarigi.net/manu/briefhis.htm (chronicling the history of the Bosnia).
79. VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 18
(1995) [hereinafter M&S YUGO]; Cervoni, infra note 171, at 489-90; Riedlmayer, supra note 78.
80. M&S YUGO, supra note 79 (detailing how Croat forces ethnically cleansed Serbs in Croatia,
and Serbs retaliated with the ethnic cleansing of Croats and Muslims under Serb control); Cervoni, infra
note 171, at 491 (detailing the international crimes that occurred under Nazi occupation of the
Balkans); Riedlymayer, supra note 78.
81. M&S YUGO, supra note 79; Cervoni, infra note 171, at 491; Riedlymayer, supra note 78.
82. M&S YUGO, supra note 79; Aileen Yoo, Kosovo: Jeruselum of Serbia, WASH. POST, available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/balkans/overview/kosovo.htm (last updated
July 1999) (discussing Yugoslavia's communists roots).
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Despite social, political, cultural, and economic prosperity under Tito, ethnic
tensions in the former Yugoslavia were not solved, but rather squelched with
"stem repression".8 3 The fifty plus years of "pent-up hatred" shared among these
three groups for each other lead to a large degree of anxiety and tension in the
former Yugoslavia-especially in Bosnia-during the late 1980's to early 1990's
as a result of the power vacuum that occurred after the death of Tito and the
collapse of Soviet influence in the area. 4 In the summer of 1991, the situation
evolved into violence as Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Croats
clashed with each other in armed conflicts over the future of Bosnia. 85 On the one
hand, the Bosnian Muslims-who were the largest group in Bosnia--desired
Bosnia to secede from what was left of the former Yugoslavia. 86 On the other
hand, Bosnian Serbs who were militarily and financially supported by Slododan
Milosevir's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not want Bosnia to secede from
Yugoslavia for military, cultural, and historical reasons. 87 In late 1991 and into
1992, Bosnian Muslims and other groups successfully orchestrated the secession of
Bosnia from the former Yugoslavia through un-"representative" elections that
were mainly boycotted by Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnia was recognized by the world
community as a sovereign nation.
88
The internationally recognized secession of Bosnia from the former
Yugoslavia naturally agitated the more militarily powerful Bosnian Serbs-who
declared themselves as another independent nation called the Serbian Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, later to be renamed Republika Srpska-into
directing large-scale military onslaughts against the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian
83. M&S YUGO, supra note 79; Cervoni, infra note 171, at 491.
84. Cervoni, infra note 171, at 491-92; Kalinauskas, infra note 86, at 387-388; see Tim Ito, Bosnia
and Herzegovenia, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/inatl/longterm/balkans/overview/bosnia.htm (last updated October 1998) (discussing the history of
the Bosnian conflict).
85. M&S YUGO, supra note 79, at 19-20; Mark A. Bland, An Analysis of the United Nations
International Tribunal to Adjudicate War Crimes Committed in the Former Yugoslavia: Parallels,
Problems, and Prospects, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 233, 238-39 (1994) (discussing the beginning
of the Bosnia conflict). Samantha Power offers a concise, yet thorough investigation into the lead-up to
and actual commission of international crimes in Bosnia, reciting all that this Note has and will
describe. POWER, supra note 1, at 247-81.
86. Bland, supra note 85; Mikas Kalinauskas, The Use of International Military Force in
Arresting War Criminals: The Lessons of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 383, 389-90 (2002).
87. Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 4, 87 (Feb 26), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf; Bland, supra note 85 at 239; see M&S YUGO, supra
note 79, at 19-20. In light of Milosevid's death mid-trial, it is still being litigated at the ICTY as to the
criminal responsibility, if at all, that Serbian superiors have for the military and financial support the
Federalist Republic of Yugoslavia gave to Bosnian Serbs during the Bosnian war. See, e.g., Prosecutor
v. Perii6, Case No. IT-04-81-T, Amended Indictment, (Sept. 26, 2005), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/per-ai050926e.pdf.




Croat populations.8 9 "The ensuing three-year war between the Bosnian Muslims,
Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs would prove to be one of the most brutal
conflicts in recent memory."
90
As U.N. and European Union attempts to broker a cease-fire and peace in
Bosnia failed, it became apparent through many public and private international
observers that international crimes were occurring in Bosnia. 91 A U.N. report
found that Bosnian Serbs militias, with the help of Yugoslavian military forces,
were "making a concerted effort... to create ethnically pure regions..." of Bosnia,
92
which included the forced mass deportation of Muslims, mass executions of
Muslims, whole-scale destruction of Muslim towns, and creation of over 400 Serb
controlled detentions centers where Muslims were tortured and killed in the
thousands. 93 Although popular media characterized Bosnian Serbs and Serbs
elsewhere as the sole perpetrators of international crimes during this war, Muslims
and Croats in and out of Bosnia were very much involved in their own ethnic
cleansing campaigns, albeit on relatively smaller scales. 94 Regardless of which
group deserves what portion of blame, the commission of international crimes
during Bosnia's succession from the former Yugoslavia led to death of over
250,000 civilians and the displacement of millions more.
95
2. U.N. Intervention
The growing accounts of atrocities combined with the unwillingness on the
89. M&S YUGO, supra note 79, at 19-20; Kalinauskas, supra note 86, at 389; see Ito, supra note
84.
90. Ito, supra note 84.
91. M&S YUGO, supra note 79, at 20-21.
92. The Secretary General, Further Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 749, 5, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/23900 (May 12, 1992); Cervoni,
infra note 171, at 492-93.
93. M&S YUGO, supra note 79, at 21-22; Kalinauskas, supra note 86, at 389-90.
94. M&S YUGO, supra note 79, at 22; Kalinauskas, supra note 86, at 390; Ito, supra note 84; see
generally SHERMAN supra note 78 (making a persuasive case that each Bosnian ethnic group had plans
and/or undertook plans to "'ethnically cleanse" Bosnia of the other ethnic groups, and further argued that
US/UN/NATO intervention in Bosnia in defense of Muslims and Croats and against Serbs was
arbitrary, because each Balkan ethnic group was equally reprehensible for war crimes, genocide, crimes
against humanity, and other international crimes); but see POWER, supra note 1, at 307-10 (stating that
attempts to blame all ethnic groups in Bosnia for committing international crimes distorts the reality
that Serbs were by far the worse international criminals in Bosnia during this war, and such distorting
efforts were done by Western countries as an excuse for not intervening into the Yugoslavian war).
Regardless of the rhetoric on both sides of the argument, international crimes were committed by Croats
and Muslims in and outside of Bosnia, and have been and are being adjudicated by the ICTY. See, e.g.,
Prosecutor v. Orid, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Judgment, (July 30, 2006), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/oric/trialc/judgement/ori-jud06630e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Gotovina et al., Case
No. IT-06-90-PT, Joinder Indictment, (July 24, 2006), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/got-joind060724e.pdf.
95. Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf, Preface to M&S YUGO, supra note 79; M&S YUGO,
supra note 79, at 22 (stating the over 2.1 million people, or over 50% of the Bosnian population were
"killed or driven from their homes..."); POWER, supra note 1, at 251(estimating 200,000 Bosnian
deaths); Paul R. Williams & Francesca Jannotti Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap Between
Sovereignty and Self-Determination, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 347 (2004).
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part of the world community to intervene militarily and the ineffectiveness of
economic sanctions 96 led to passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 780 in
1992 that created a commission of experts to investigate and collect evidence
regarding alleged violations of international criminal and humanitarian law in the
former Yugoslavia. 97 This U.N. Commission submitted its report concluding that
violations of international humanitarian law were in fact occurring in the former
Yugoslavia and formally endorsing the formation of an ad hoc international
tribunal to adjudicate these violations. 98 Pursuant to this report, the U.N. Security
Council passed U.N. Security Council Resolution 808 (Resolution 808) in 1993
that ".... 'officially' declared 'ethnic cleansing' in the former Yugoslavia to be a
'threat to international peace and security'... "99 and most importantly, confirmed
the U.N. Security Council's intention to create an ad hoc tribunal.100
Although Resolution 808 was the first stage in creating the ICTY, in that it
obligated the U.N. to create such an ad hoc tribunal, "[t]he Security Council did
not indicate in Resolution 808 either the legal basis or the method for establishing
the tribunal."'' 1 In order to assist the Security Council on how to create the an ad
hoc international criminal tribunal, Resolution 808 mandated that the Secretary-
General issue a report on the legally acceptable methods of creating what would
later become the ICTY. 10 2 This report evaluated three options: Security Council
Resolution, General Assembly negotiations, or treaty negotiations. 103 Both Treaty
and General Assembly negotiations were discarded as viable options, mainly
because time requirements needed for negotiations of any type did not comport
with the expressed urgency to create the ICTY. 10 4 Adopting the U.N. Security
96. Allison Marston Danner, When Courts Make Law: How The International Tribunals Recast
the Laws of War, 59 VAND. L. REv. 1, 19 (2006).
97. S.C. Res. 780, U.N. Doc. S/RES/780 (Oct. 6, 1992), available at http://daccess-
ods.un.org/TMP/4597908.html; M&S YUGO, supra note 79, at 24-26; Kalinauskas, supra note 86, at
393.
98. The Secretary-General, Letter Dated 9 February 1993 from the Secretary General Addressed
to the President of the Security Council, 7 31-60, 7 72-74, delivered to the Security Council, U.N.
Doc. S/25274 (Feb. 10, 1993); M&S YUGO, supra note 79, at 28-29; Cervoni, infra note 171, at 493
("In October of 1992, after more than a year of engaging in ineffective scare tactics in light of well-
documented atrocities, the UN Security Council.. finally decided to act."); Kalinauskas, supra note 86,
at 393.
99. Cervoni, infra note 171, at 493.
100. S.C. Res. 808, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993), available at http://daccess-
ods.un.org/TMP/29842 1.8.html; M&S YUGO, supra note 79, at 31.
101. M&S YUGO, supra note 79, at 40; Danner, supra note 59, at 19; see Ralph Zacklin, Some
Major Problems in the Drafting of the ICTY Statute, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 361 (2004).
102. S.C. Res. 808, supra note 100, 2; see Kerry R. Wortzel, The Jurisdiction of an International
Criminal Tribunal in Kosovo, 11 PACE INT'L L. REv. 379, 387 (1999) (exhibiting the importance of UN
Resolution 808, and the legal authority behind the ICTY).
103. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security
Council Resolution 808 (1993), 7 18-30, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3,
1993) [hereinafter Res. 808 Report].
104. Id. at 7 19-22; M&S YUGO, supra note 79, at 40-42; Zacklin, supra note 101, at 361-62
(explaining additionally that treaty negotiations only bind those that sign and ratify the treaty, and it
would be inconceivable that parties to the Bosnian conflict would sign onto such a treaty).
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Council Resolution approach,105 the U.N. Department of Legal Affairs, with
assistance from States and non-governmental organizations, drafted a proposed
statute for the ICTY. 106 The draft statute of the ICTY was adopted without change
and little to no debate by Security Council members in U.N. Security Council
Resolution 827 (Resolution 827) of 1993, marking the U.N. Security Council's
second and final step in creating the ICTY.1
07
As asserted by the U.N. Security Council, the cumulative effect of Resolution
808 and 827 gave the U.N. Security Council the legal authority to create the ICTY.
As previously mentioned, the U.N. Security Council decided in Resolution 808
that the situation in the former Yugoslavia was a "threat.. .to... intemational peace
and security" in violation of Article 39 of the U.N. Charter. l0 8 Consequently,
Resolution 808 triggered the U.N. Security Council's ability to use Article 41 of
the U.N. Charter, which states that "[t]he Security Council may decide what
measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to
its decision."' t 9 Article 29 of the U.N. Charter and ICJ's jurisprudence on Article
29 confirmed the U.N.'s ability to create subsidiary, judicial bodies as a
"measure.. .to give effect to its decision"." 0
Theoretically speaking, a UN ad hoc tribunal, like the ICTY, is a product of
each U.N. Member State bestowing a part of its sovereignty, specifically "a
measure of criminal jurisdiction", to the U.N. Security Council to establish an
international criminal tribunal to adjudicate violations of international law on
behalf of the Member States."' The precedent created by the Nuremberg Tribunal
validates that States individually or collectively have the power to create tribunals
105. See M&S YUGO, supra note 79, at 41-42 (explaining that the U.N. Security Council
Resolution approach was expeditious and binding on all states).
106. Res. 808 Report, supra note 103, at annex; M&S YUGO, supra note 79, at 32-33; Danner,
supra note 59, at 19-20; Kalinauskas, supra note 86, at 393; see Zacklin, supra note 101, at 361.
107. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doe. S/RES/827, (May 25, 1993), available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/306/28/IMG/N9330628.pdf.OpenElement; M&S
YUGO, supra note 79, at 33-34; Danner, supra note 59, at 20 ("For the first time since Nuremberg and
Tokyo, an international court was endowed with the authority to punish violations of the laws of war.
A step that had been steadfastly resisted by delegates at the Diplomatic Conferences in 1949 and 1974-
77 was, in the press of events in 1993, embraced by the Security Council almost without comment.");
Michele Caianiello & Giulio Illuminati, From the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia to the International Criminal Court, 26 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 407, 420 (2001);
Christopher S. Wren, Judge Says Yugoslavia Impedes Work of War Crimes Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
9, 1999, atA7.
108. S.C. Res. 808, supra note 100; Chapter VII of U.N. Charter, Article 39 states: "The Security
Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain and restore international peace and security." U.N. Charter, ch. 7,
art. 39.
109. M&S YUGO, supra note 79, at 42-44; Caianiello & Illuminati, supra note 107, at 420-21;
Kalinauskas, supra note 86, at 395-96.
110. U.N. Charter, art. 29; Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations
Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 1954 I.C.J. 47, 53-56 (July 13), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/21/2123.pdf, Kalinauskas, supra note 86, at 395-96.
111. M&S YUGO, supra note 79, at 45.
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for the exclusive reason of adjudicating violations of international criminal law.112
Correspondingly, this power to create tribunals was one of the powers Member
States bestowed to the U.N. Security Council to use towards effectuating their
decisions, or in the case of the former Yugoslavia, to give effect to its decision in
Resolution 808 to maintain international peace and security.
113
As an ad hoc tribunal with limited territorial, temporal, and personal
jurisdiction, 114 the ICTY was bound to adjudicate only law that was "beyond any
doubt customary international law" at the time of the conflict '15 Otherwise, the
ICTY would be plagued with additional, complex jurisdictional questions, such as
if the former Yugoslavia--or any of the sovereign nations that came out of the
Yugoslavian conflict-was a State Party to a particular convention or treaty and if
such convention or treaty imposed criminal responsibility on individuals?116
Consequently, the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICTY consisted of four
112. Id.
113. The establishment of an international criminal jurisdiction can be achieved only by States
which, in effect, confer on the international court a measure of the criminal jurisdiction which every
State possesses as an essential element of its sovereignty. As recognized by the Nuremberg Tribunal,
any State or group of States may decide to establish a court for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction
with respect to crimes under international law. In this particular instance, the States that were members
of the Security Council decided to establish an international criminal jurisdiction by means of a binding
decision of the Council. In doing so, these States acted not as individual States on their own behalf, but
rather as the Security Council exercising its right to adopt measures for the maintenance of international
peace and security on behalf of the Member States of the United Nations. Id; but see Prosecutor v.
Milutinovi6 et al., Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Decision on Motion Challenging Jurisdiction, 46-8 (May
6, 2003) (separate opinion of Judge Patrick Robinson) (arguing that while theoretically true that the
U.N. could have formed the ICTY or like court via Nuremberg-type delegation of jurisdiction, the
ICTY was in fact formed by the Security Council independently exercising its Chapter VII powers to
adopt measures for the maintenance of international peace and security, and not upon delegated
authority from States). Judge Robinson's opinion on universal jurisdiction is worth reading. He clarifies
that "a large part of the difficulty in determining whether an international criminal tribunal such as the
Nuremberg IMT, the ICTY or the ICTR exercises universal jurisdiction is explained by the failure to
distinguish between the basis for the creation of that tribunal (a question that raises the issue of the
delegation by States of their jurisdictional powers to an international tribunal), and the jurisdiction that
is actually exercised by it by virtue of its Statute or customary international law." Id., at 34.
114. Pursuant to its Statute, the ICTY possessed limited temporal jurisdiction (only international
crimes committed after January 1, 1991) limited personal jurisdiction (only people, not corporations, or
States), and limited territorial jurisdiction (only areas under the territory of the former Socialists Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia). Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C.
Res. 827, arts. 1, 6, 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993), available at
http://www.un.orglicty/legaldoc-e/basic/statutstatute-feb06-e.pdf [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
115. Res. 808 Report, supra note 103, 34; M&S YUGO, supra note 79, at 51-52; GItNAEL
METTRAUX, INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND THE AD Hoc TRIBUNALS 5 (2005).
116. M&S YUGO, supra note 79, at 51-52; see METTRAux, supra note 113, at 6-7; but see
Prosecutor v. Galid, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment and Opinion, In 63 et seq. (Dec. 5, 2003),
available at http://www.un.org/icty/galic/trialc/judgement/gal-tj031205e.pdf (convicting the defendant
of "terror" and "attacks on civilians" based on Additional Protocol I of Geneva Conventions, not
considered customary law at the time); infra section III, D. On a similar note, because U.N. Security
Council decisions only bind States, it was necessary for the Security Council-in the case of ICTY and
ICTR-to create a subsidiary judicial body that could make judicial decisions on individuals and have
those decisions be binding, rather than recommendations. M&S YUGO, supra note 79, at 44-47; M&S
RWANDA, infra note 123, at 102, 106.
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categories of customary international criminal laws: 117 grave breaches of the
Geneva Convention; violations of the laws and customs of war; genocide, and
crimes against humanity. '18
(This Note would fail to recognize the full scale of international crimes
committed in the former Yugoslavia if it did not mention that after the creation of
the ICTY in 1993, the commission of international crimes within the former
Yugoslavia continued at a shocking pace. Probably the most horrific international
crimes occurred in the UN-protected Srebrenica enclave of Bosnia in 1995 where
over 7,000 Muslim men and boys were executed and many more Muslim women,
young children, and elderly were deported.119 Additionally, the Serbian siege of
Kosovo in the late 1990's also ended in the commission of international crimes
that resulted in the death of over 11,000 Muslims and the mass deportation of
Muslims out of Kosovo.120 These later episodes of international crimes in the
former Yugoslavia, however, are being adjudicated by the ICTY as well. 121)
C. ICTR
1. The History of Rwanda and Facts that Led to the Formation of the ICTR
Colonization by European powers significantly shaped the history of Rwanda,
which is a common story among African countries. Unfortunately, Europe's
influence over Rwanda did not cease when the last colonizers left. The foundation
117. The term "customary international criminal law" will be used often in this Note, and refers to
international criminal laws that have attained customary international law status. The term
"conventional international criminal law" will also be used, and refers to international criminal laws
created by convention or treaty. However, it is important to remember that most conventional
international criminal laws do not attach individual criminal liability for their violation, but rather
obligates State Party to the convention or treaty to enforce the law of the convention or treaty, and the
convention and treaty will only make the State Parties directly responsible for their violation. See infra
section III, D; IV, A.
118. ICTY Statute, supra note 114, arts. 2-5. For an easy to understand comparison of the
difference in subject matter jurisdiction of the ICTY and the ICTR, read former ICTY President and
Judge McDonald's article on international criminal tribunals. Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, The
International Criminal Tribunals: Crime & Punishment in the International Arena, 25 NOVA L. REV.
463, 466-67 (2001). Additionally, the ad hoc tribunals' statutes were formulated with Judges in mind,
"[t]he Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals (ICTY and ICTR) contain much more than the skeletons of the
crimes that are within their jurisdictions. The defmitions of these crimes and the application of the law
of international crimes in general, therefore, call further refinement to be made by the Court which has
been entrusted by the Security Council with the task of apply to Statute whilst ensuring that it was not
thereby legislating new international law. METTRAUX, supra note 113, at 5 (alteration).
119. DAVID ROHDE, End Game: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica, Europe's Worst Massacre
since World War If, at XVI, 388, 402; POWER, supra note 1, at 411-421. Power's entire portrayal of the
international crimes that occurred in Srebrenica is amazing in its own right. See POWER, supra note 1, at
391-441. Yet, nothing gives a more riveting and captivating story of all facets of the Srebrenica
massacres and mass deportations than Rohde's book End Game. See generally ROHDE, supra note 119.
120. POWER, supra note 1, at 466, 472.
121. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Popovid et al., Case No. IT-05-88-PT, Consolidated Amended
Indictment, (Nov. 11, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/pop-
scai0606l4.pdf; Prosecutor v. Milutinovi6 et al., Case No. IT-05-87-PT, Third Amended Joinder
Indictment, (June 21, 2006), available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/milu-
3aji06062 le.pdf.
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of the international crimes that occurred in Rwanda in 1993 unquestionably grew
out of Rwanda's colonial days. 122 Prior to the influx of a German population into
Rwanda at the end of the nineteenth century, 123 the two main socio-ethnic groups
that comprise Rwanda, the Hutus and Tutsi, are believed to have shared a peaceful
co-existence. 124 Despite stereotypical physical differences between the two groups,
some ethnographers and historians believe Tutsis and Hutus are not exclusive
ethnic groups, and furthermore, most Tutsis and Hums share the same language
and religion. 125 Unfortunately, minor social, economic, and political differences
between Tutsis and Hutus were brought to the forefront after German colonizers
took control of Rwanda, doing so by using Tutsis as the proxy rulers over the Hutu
population. 126 Belgium took control of Rwanda after World War I, and instituted a
brutal hierarchical system whereby Tutsis were molded and manipulated into the
ruthless ruling class of Rwanda and Hutus were subject to excessive forced labor,
which in tm, created a bright line in Rwanda's population between Tutsis and
Hutus. 127 The most lasting effect of Belgium's rule was an identification card
system instituted in 1933 that labeled Rwandans as either Hutu or Tutsi, which
later played an enormous role in the genocide and international crimes that played
out in Rwanda in 1994.128
As Belgian colonizers' rule over Rwanda drew to an end, Belgium switched
allegiance to the Hums, encouraging them to revolt against the ruling Tutsi, which
eventually led to the Hutu population seizing control of the country in 1959.129 The
following decades in Rwanda resulted in the mass exodus of Tutsis into
neighboring countries, Hutu domination, and "...numerous massacres of members
of the Tutsi tribe in Rwanda ...in 1963, 1966, 1973, 1990, 1992, and 1993. "13°
After the bloody fighting between the Hum-dominated Rwanda government and
Tutsi rebels ceased in 1993, the U.N.-backed Arusha Accord was signed, which
122. See generally, Paul J. Magnarella, Special Issue: Rwanda 10 Years On. I.) How Could It
Happen? The Background and Causes of the Genocide in Rwanda, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 801 (2005)
(tracking the pre-colonial and colonial history of Rwanda and its effect on the genocide that occurred in
1994 that lead to the creation of the ICTR).
123. VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
RWANDA 49 (1998); id. at 802 [hereinafter M&S RWANDA].
124. Magnarella, supra note 122, at 803; but see Magnarella, supra note 122, at 802-06 (explaining
that Tutsis held a higher social class, possessed a majority of the political and military power, and
essentially the ruling class of Rwanda in comparison to the larger group. Being Tutsis was widely
considered nobility whereas being Hutu was considered peasantry).
125. ALISON DES FORGES, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 4, 33 (1999),
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/index.htm#TopOfPage; M&S RWANDA, supra
note 123, at 48-9; see Magnarella, supra note 122, at 804-805.
126. M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 49; Magnarella, supra note 122, at 806-07; see Mark A.
Drumbl, Law and Atrocity: Settling Accounts in Rwanda, 31 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 41,43 (2005).
127. DES FORGES, supra note 125, at 34-38; Magnarella, supra note 122, at 807-08.
128. DES FORGES, supra note 125, at 37-38; M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 49; Magnarella,
supra note 122, at 808.
129. DES FORGES, supra note 125, at 38-39; M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 50; Magnarella,
supra note 122, at 809.
130. M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 47; DES FORGES, supra note 125, at 39-40; Magnarella,
supra note 122, at 809-12.
VOL. 35:3/4
THE "ROAMING ICC"
called for the political and military integration of the Hutus and Tutsis into a single
government. 131 However, a retrospective view of Rwanda at this time reveals the
specter of genocide lurking beneath the surface. Even before the negotiations of
the Arusha Accord, Hutu hardliners grew weary of their increasingly moderate
President Juvdnal Habyarimana, and these hardliners, which included close allies
of President Habyarimana, laid the groundwork to kill every single Tutsi in
Rwanda. 132 The genocidal framework included: stockpiling massive amounts of
machetes and six million dollars worth of firearms all across Rwanda,133training
large amounts of Hutus on "methods of mass murder and indoctrination in ethnic
hatred", 134constant radio transmission encouraging genocidal intent against Tutsis,
and similar radio banter labeling the Arusha Accord as an agreement between
Tutsis rebels and Hutu sympathizers. 135 President Habyariamana, while returning
from a meeting in Tanzania on the implementation of the Arusha Accord, was
assassinated when his plane was shot down by Hutu hardliners, who in turn blamed
Tutsis rebels for the assassination in numerous radio addresses to the population of
Rwanda.
136
What followed the assassination was -... the most efficient mass killing since
the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki" and a "...rate of
slaughter.. .three to four times that of the number of Jews killed in the
Holocaust."' 137 Within 30 minutes of the crash, the elite Presidential Guard sealed
off the airport,-which stopped any attempts by the U.N. to investigate the
airplane crash-checked every single Rwandans' identity card, and executed any
identified Tutsis.138 After the assassination of President Habyariamana and the
airport massacre, the Hutus hardliners executed their plan for genocide, which
spread like an angry beehive throughout the country.
The assassins' first priority was to eliminate Hutu opposition
leaders.. After that, the wholesale extermination of Tutsis got
underway... With the encouragement of [radio] messages and leaders at
every level of society, the slaughter of Tutsis and the assassination of
Hutu oppositionists spread from region to region. Following the
militias' example, Hutus young and old rose to the task. Neighbors
hacked neighbors to death in their homes, and colleagues hacked
131. DES FORGES, supra note 125, at 123-26; M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 50-51;
Magnarella, supra note 122, at 813.
132. DES FORGES, supra note 125, at 3-5; M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 51-53; Magnarella,
supra note 122, at 814.
133. DES FORGES, supra note 125, at 3-5, 127; M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 52.
134. M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 52; see Magnarella, supra note 122, at 814.
135. DES FORGES, supra note 125, at 4-12; M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 51-52; Magnarella,
supra note 122, at 814.
136. DES FORGES, supra note 125, at 5-6. 181-85; M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 53;
Magnarella, supra note 122, at 815.
137. Susan W. Tiefenbrun, The Paradox of International Adjudication: Developments in the
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the World Court, and the
International Criminal Court, 25 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 551, 556; 585 (2000).
138. M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 54.
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colleagues to death in their workplaces. Doctors killed their patients,
and schoolteachers killed their pupils. Within days, the Tutsi
populations of many villages were all but eliminated... Radio
announcers reminded listeners not to take pity on women and
children. 1
39
As the days wore on, militias "were sent to rural areas not just to kill, but to
force the local people to kill. Often, people were compelled to kill their neighbors
or members of their own families. The extremists' aim was for the entire Hutu
population to participate in the killing." 14° One hundred days later, 800,000 Tutsis,
and Hutus that were perceived as sympathizers, were killed, representing ten to
eleven percent of Rwanda's total population.14 ' The genocide did not stop until
exiled Tutsis rebels-who were just as cognizant of the international crimes
occurring in their country as the rest of the world yet received little to no
international support in their efforts-invaded and amazingly fought their way into
control of Rwanda. 1
42
2. U.N. Intervention
Unsurprisingly, the very first similarity that the creation of the ICTR shared
with the creation of its predecessor, the ICTY, was the international communities'
inability to do anything swiftly in reaction to the international crimes occurring in
Rwanda. Adding insult to injury, the mere thought of setting up the ICTR only
came about well after genocide and hostilities were "virtually over."' 143 Even the
impassioned pleas by the newly elected prime minister of Rwanda for the
formulation of an international tribunal and a report by an U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights detailing the criminal events in Rwanda were not
enough to persuade the U.N. Security Council or the U.S. to live up to their
respective duties to act in the face of genocide.144 Fortunately, the U.N. Special
Rapporteur for Rwanda submitted his extensive report to the U.N. Security
Council which "finally spurred the Security Council to acknowledge that 'acts of
genocide have occurred in Rwanda"' in Security Council Resolution 925 14 and
caused U.S. Secretary of State to testify before the U.S. Senate that "[i]t's a terrible
situation that calls out for international action."'
146
Using the ICTY as a precedential template, the U.N. Security Council
instituted a Commission of Experts for Rwanda to investigate violations of
139. Magnarella, supra note 122, at 815.
140. M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 58 (stating that one estimate had half of the Hutu
population participating in the genocide).
141. DES FORGES, supra note 125, at 15-16; M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 55; Drumbl, supra
note 126, at 42; Magnarella, supra note 122, at 816; Tiefenbrun, supra note 137, at 556.
142. Drumbl, supra note 126, at 44.
143. Daphna Shraga & Ralph Zacklin, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 7 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 501, 505 (1996); see M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 61.
144. M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 61-62; see DES FORGES, supra note 125, at 24-25, 640-44.
145. S.C. Res. 925, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/INF/50 (June 8, 1994), available at http://daccess-
ods.un.org/TMP/5305671 .html.
146. Christopher Urges Trial Over Genocide in Rwanda, WASH. POST, July 1, 1994, at A29.
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international humanitarian law. 147 Despite the clear indication by the Commission
of Experts that violations of international humanitarian law in Rwanda called for
the establishment of an ad hoc tribunal, 48 bureaucratic and diplomatic wrangling
dragged on for months. While the international community wrestled with the
decision to create either a separate ad hoc tribunal for Rwanda or add jurisdiction
over Rwanda to the 18 month old ICTY, the government of Rwanda fluctuated in
its support for an ad hoc Rwanda tribunal, ultimately ending in official opposition
to the formation of such a court. 149 However, the Rwanda's leadership indicated
that the government would cooperate if such an ad hoc tribunal was created despite
its official opposition, thus clearing the way for the U.N. Security Council to pass
Resolution 955 (Resolution 955) in 1994 establishing the ICTR. 50
In Resolution 955, the U.N. Security Council determined that "genocide and
other systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian
law" committed in Rwanda "constitute a threat to international peace and
security."'1 51 Relying on its precedent in forming the ICTY, Resolution 955
additionally called for the creation of an ad hoc tribunal to combat the threat to
international peace and security in Rwanda; thus, the ICTR was created in one
resolution with an attached ICTR statute, rather than the two resolutions that
created the ICTY. 152 Except for this minor difference in legislative history, the
U.N. Security Council established both the ICTY and ICTR pursuant to its powers
under Chapter VII, particularly Article 39 and 41, and created both ad hoc tribunal
based on the same legal and philosophic theories. 1
53
The ICTR and the ICTY diverge, however, in terms of subject matter
jurisdiction. Even though "[t]he ICTR Statute was modeled closely on that of the
ICTY", 154 as reported by the Secretary General, "...the Security Council elected to
take a more expansive approach to... the applicable law than the one underlying the
147. S.C. Res. 935, U.N. Doe. S/RES/935, 1 (July 1, 1994), available at http://daccess-
ods.un.org/TMP/1393874.html.
148. Preliminary Report of the Independent Commission of Experts established in accordance with
Security Council Resolution 935, 146-49, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1125
(Oct. 4, 1994); Raymond Bonner, U.N. Commission Recommends Rwanda 'Genocide' Tribunal, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 29, 1994, at A13.
149. M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 66-71.
150. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955, 1 (Nov. 8, 1994), available at http://daccess-
ods.un.org/TMP/2132961.htm [hereinafter Res. 955]; M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 71-72.
151. Res. 955, supra note 150, at 1; M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 103; Akhaven, infra note
152, at 502.
152. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security
Council Resolution 955, 7, delivered to the Security Council, UN Doe. S/1995/134, 1; 9 (Feb. 13,
1995) [hereinafter Res. 955 Report]; M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 101; Payam Akhavan, The
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of Punishment, 90 AM. J.
INT'L L. 501, 502 (1996) ("In establishing the Rwanda Tribunal, however, the Security Council decided
that 'drawing upon the experience gained in the Yugoslav Tribunal, a one-step process and a single
resolution would suffice."'); Catherine Cisse, The International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda: Some Elements of Comparison, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 109 (1997).
153. See infra Part III, Section B. ICTY / U.N. Intervention. This same legal/philosophic theories
discussed in this section apply to the ICTR as well.
154. Danner, supra note 59, at 23.
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statute of the [ICTY]."' 155 Two circumstances dictated a subject matter change in
the ICTR. First, genocide and crimes against humanity played a more prevalent
role in Rwanda and in the U.N. Security Council's reactions to Rwanda compared
to the former Yugoslavian situation. 156 Second, the armed conflict that occurred in
Rwanda was an internal armed conflict and purely incidental to the international
crimes committed in Rwanda, 157 thus certain international humanitarian laws did
not apply. 158 Consequently, several aspects of the ICTR statute differ from the
ICTY statute: the preamble of the ICTR statute specifically mentions genocide and
the first international criminal offense listed is genocide; 159 Article 3 of the ICTR
statute on crime against humanity does not require a nexus with an armed conflict,
but rather requires a nexus between the proscribed inhumane acts and
discriminatory grounds; 160 the grave breaches provisions of 1949 Geneva
Conventions are not included in Article 4 of ICTR dealing with war crimes,
because those provisions only deal with international armed conflicts and; Article
4 of ICTR statute does include common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions
and the 1977 Additional Protocol II, which are provisions that apply to internal
armed conflicts. 1
61
D. The Flaws of the Ad Hoc Tribunals
There is no doubt that the ICTY and the ICTR are tremendous triumphs in
international criminal law. 162 These ad hoc tribunals have unquestionably chipped
away at international impunity, added considerably to international criminal
jurisprudence, exemplified the viability of international criminal law, and
established the willingness of the international community to fight international
hostilities with the rule of law. 163 The UN ad hoc tribunals' most notable
155. Res. 955 Report, supra note 152, 12; M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 127; Cervoni, supra
note 171, at 497-498; but see METTRAUX, supra note 113, at 10 (indicating that this distinction by the
Secretary General between the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICTY and ICTR might have been "'an
unintentional distinction').
156. Cisse, supra note 152, at 109-110.
157. Id. at 107.
158. M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 142; Akhavan, supra note 152, at 503; Tiefenbrun, supra
note 137, at 562-63. It is imperative to stress that the belief at the time of the creation of the ICTR that
international humanitarian law did not unequivocally apply to internal armed conflicts, as opposed to
international armed conflicts, has changed dramatically since the ICTR's creation. Today, international
humanitarian law is applied to internal armed conflicts. Prosecutor v. Tadid, supra note 25, 128-30;
133-34; M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 128-30.
159. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, Pmbl., art. 2, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]; Cisse, supra note 152, at 109-110.
160. ICTR Statute, supra note 159, art. 3; Akhaven, supra note 152, at 503; see M&S RWANDA,
supra note 123, at 126.
161. ICTR Statute, supra note 159, art. 4; M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 126; Akhaven, supra
note 152, at 503.
162. M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 37; Yacob Haile-Mariam, The Quest for Justice and
Reconciliation: The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Ethiopian High Court, 22
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 667, 738 (1999); Beth Stephens, Accountability for International
Crimes: The Synergy Between the International Criminal Court and Alternative Remedies, 21 WIS.
INT'L L.J. 527, 541 (2003).
163. Tolbert & Solomon, infra note 164, at 36-37 (stating additionally that the ad hoc tribunals
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contribution is its impact on the future, for the "['ICC'].. .would not have been
possible without the ad hoc tribunals' trailblazing work."'' 64 Without intentionally
trampling on the predominantly positive legacy of the ICTY and ICTR, it is
imperative to point out that these and any other ad hoc tribunals are merely
stepping stones towards the realization of a true international criminal law system,
and not end goals in themselves. An examination of the various types of problems
faced by both the ICTY and ICTR illustrates the serious inadequacies with ad hoc
tribunals.
On a practical level, the ICTY and ICTR were forced to confront a whole host
of problems intrinsic with being ad hoc tribunals. As ad hoc tribunals, the ICTY
and ICTR each had to be built from the ground up, literally and figuratively. 165 In
the case of the ICTR, all of the components that any judicial institution needs to
operate, such as roads, courtrooms, legal staff, and detention units, were far from
being finished before the ICTR began working. 166 During the time wasted on
establishing the entire infrastructure of these ad hoc tribunals, there were no
mechanisms in place to protect evidence and, as in the situation with the ICTY, to
stop further international crimes from occurring. 67 Not surprisingly, being
required to build the ICTY and ICTR from scratch made both not only time-
consuming, but also overly expensive. 168
Both ad hoc tribunals suffered from severe logistical and administrative
nightmares. 169 The ICTY labored through years of little to no cooperation from
"...have an international legal basis and avoid the label of 'victor's justice',... [the ad hoc tribunals]
have been widely viewed as conducting fair trials, providing a measure of justice to victims, and
removing war criminals from the seats of power and thus 'clearing the ground' for more responsible
government.") see generally Payam Akhavan et al., The Contribution of the Ad Hoc Tribunals to
International Humanitarian Law, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1509 (1998).
164. David Tolbert & Andrew Solomon, United Nations Reform and Supporting the Rule of Law in
Post-Conflict Societies, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 29, 37 (2006).
165. Everything and anything imaginable that is associated with operating a judicial tribunal had to
be established for both the ICTY and ICTR from scratch. Hiring thousands of employees, creating
hiring procedures, establishing document storage systems, building detention centers for suspects,
finding buildings where the tribunal and its satellite office would be placed, developing internal tribunal
rules and procedures, starting health care programs for personnel, purchasing security systems, wiring
the buildings for internet, and so on, are components of any judicial tribunal that in the case of the
ICTY and ICTR, were non-existent and needed to be established in order for these tribunals to function.
And in the future, all of the money and time that went into creating the ICTY and ICTR will finish with
these institutions shutting down forever.
166. Erik Mose, Main Achievements of the ICTR, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 920, 921-22 (2005);
Akhaven, supra note 152, at 508-509.
167. SADAT, infra note 200, at 31.
168. Olivia Swaak-Goldman, Recent Developments in International Criminal Law: Trying to Stay
Afloat Between Scylla and Charybdis, 54 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 691, 693-94 (2005); see Akhaven, supra
note 152, at 508-509.
169. To this day, these types of problems persist. The ICTY, for instance, has not been able to
secure the arrest of General Ratko Mladid, who allegedly directed the Srebrenica massacres, and the
alleged mastermind behind the commission of international crimes by Serbs, Serbian politician
Radovan Kradzdid. BBC News, The Hague's Wanted Men,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1935955.stm#km (last visited October 19, 2007).
2007
DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
former Yugoslavian States and Western countries.' 70 Most disturbing was the fact
that extraditing indicted individuals, serving subpoenas, or carrying out court
orders were near impossible tasks.171 This severe lack of cooperation was caused
by the "toothless" language in the U.N. Resolutions that created the ICTY, which
effectively undercut the ICTY's authority over indicted suspects.'72 If a State
refused to cooperate with the ICTY, the ICTY's only recourse was to complain to
the U.N. Security Council. 173 Although the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) 174 -
an agreement between the former Yugoslavian republics that included provisions
mandating their cooperation with the ICTY-was created to fix these cooperation
issues, the DPA could not fully cure the structural problems inherent in the
ICTY. 17' As for the ICTR, it may have experienced more State cooperation than its
sister UN ad hoc tribunal, but it endured through allegations of corruption, terribly
inadequate facilities, and severe pre-trial delays and detentions.' 76 Combining
these problems with complaints about their physical location and poor outreach
programs, and both UN ad hoc tribunals appear distant, ineffective, political, and
illegitimate to the affected populations. 177 Indeed, the population of Rwanda and
the former Yugoslavia themselves have expressed these precise negative opinions
in regards to the ICTY and ICTR. 178 As a result, the ICTY and ICTR are unable to
gain authenticity with those who were the most affected by the tragedies in the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
Theoretically and legally, ad hoc tribunals like the ICTY and ICTR have
additional faults. Focusing first on the legal perspective, both ad hoc tribunals
apply international criminal law which is far from flawless, as illustrated by the
subsequent conduct of these tribunals' chambers. While both the ICTY and ICTR
were given statutes by the U.N. Security Council to use, the scope of their
170. Danner, supra note 59, at 24-25; Kalinauskas, supra note 86, at 399.
171. Rocco P. Cervoni, Beating Plowshares Into Swords-Reconciling the Sovereign Right to Self-
Determination With Individual Human Rights Through an International Criminal Court: The Lessons
of the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda as a Frontispiece, 12 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 477, 510
(1997); Kalinauskas, supra note 86, at 399-400; See Igor Jovanovic, Serbia and the UN War Crimes
Tribunal: An Historical Overview, S.E. EURO. TIMES (Belgrade), Jan. 24, 2004 available at
http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtm/en-GB/features/setimes/articles/2005/0 1/24/reportage-
01 (reporting either specifics instances or reports of Bosnian war criminals evading the ICTY).
172. Cervoni, supra note 171, at 509.
173. Id. at 508-09.
174. See generally General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with
Annexes, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75 (1996) (signing of which was meant to cure the jurisdictional
issues regarding the ICTY obtaining former Yugoslavian criminal suspects).
175. See Cervoni, supra note 72, at 514 (arguing that the DPA had no real effect on the situation of
Bosnian war criminals evading extradition or other means of being subjected to the ICTY);
Kalinauskas, supra note 86, at 399-410 (discussing the lack of cooperation and structural problems with
the ICTY, but additionally discussing the unfortunate consequences on ICTY's mandate that came from
the ICTY having to resort to other enforcement measures, which including using NATO).
176. See Tiefenbrun, supra note 137, at 589.
177. Danielle Tarin, Prosecuting Saddam and Bungling Transitional Justice in Iraq, 45 VA. J. INT'L
L. 467, 512-514 (2005); see id. at 564-65; 583-584.
178. Jean-Marie Kamatali, From the ICTR to ICC: Learning from the ICTR Experience in Bringing
Justice to Rwandans, 12 NEw ENG. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 89, 90.
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jurisdiction ratione materiae and the definitions of the crimes within their
jurisdiction were left to the ad hoc tribunals to determine. 9 In the case of the
ICTY, the U.N. Security Council and the ICTY Appeals Chambers specifically
directed the ICTY to make their jurisdictional determinations and crime definitions
based solely on customary international criminal law that existed at the time of the
Yugoslavia conflict, because those are the only international crimes that without
doubt applied to the potential defendants at the time of commission. "0 Although
the ICTY today diligently follows the rule that only customary international
criminal law applies within ICTY Chambers, 181 the influential Tadie Appeals
Chambers hinted at the application of international conventional law to ground
jurisdiction over a defendant, 182 and an ICTY Trial Chamber actually did ground
jurisdiction over a defendant based on treaty law. 183 In relation, the ICTR,
following what it believed was the broader mandate given to it by the U.N.
Secretary General to use international customary and conventional law, 184 has used
international conventional law to ground jurisdiction over a defendant's conduct
and/or define crimes it applies against defendants much more expansively than its'
sister UN tribunal. 185
By permitting such judicial conduct, the ICTY and ICTR exposes itself to
legitimate legal criticism. The most notable concern is the problem evident in the
legal distinction between "illegality and criminality." 186 Facially, international
conventional laws only bind States, not individuals, 187 so it is illegal, but not
criminal for anyone to violate international conventional law or treaties.188 Only
the ratifying State is liable for the violation of an international conventional law,
and depending on the international conventional law violated, an individual who
violated an international convention or treaty law would only become liable for
such a violation if a ratifying State gained jurisdiction over the violator and choose
to prosecute the individual. 189 Criminality, on the other hand, refers to violations
of either customary international criminal law or international conventional laws
179. METTRAUX, supra note 113, at 5; see supra section III, B-C.
180. Res. 808 Report, supra note 103, 29; see e.g., Prosecutor v. Blatkid, Case No. IT-95-14-A,
Judgment, 1 10, 139, 141 (July 29, 2004), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/blaskic/appeal/judgement/bla-aj040729e.pdf.
181. See METrRAUX, supra note 113, at 9.
182. Prosecutor v. Tadi6, supra note 25, 143.
183. Prosecutor v. Gali, supra note 116, 63 et seq.
184. See Res. 955 Report, supra note 152, 12.
185. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 604-607 (Sept 2,
1998); Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment and Sentence, 353 (May 15, 2003).
186. METTRAUX, supra note 113, at 9.
187. There exist conventional international criminal laws that create individual criminal
responsibility for violations of provisions within these international convention or treaty, such as
Genocide Convention or the ICC's Rome Statute. Rome Statute of the ICC, infra note 207, art. 25; see
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. 4, 6, Dec. 9, 1948, 102
Stat. 2045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/pgenoci.htm
[hereinafter Genocide Convention]. However, these types of conventions/treaties are the extreme
minority.
188. METrRAUX, supra note 113, at 8-9, 11.
189. Id. at 8.
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that have attained the status of customary international criminal law whereby the
violation includes individual criminal responsibility for the perpetrator of the
violation. 190 Therefore, when the ICTY and ICTR grounds jurisdiction' 91 over
defendants for violating international conventional law alone or in conjunction
with other reasons, these ad hoc tribunals are artificially attaching individual
criminal responsibility to "illegality", or violations that have not attained criminal
status as a matter of customary international law.192 The ICTY and ICTR, hence,
show a willingness not only to charge a defendant with a violation of a
conventional international law, but also to convict the defendant, in part or in
whole, due to this violation, simply because the Judge says the violation itself is
criminal. Consequently, the jurisdictional and judicial purity of these ad hoc
tribunals is called into question in light of their failure to take the critical step of
demonstrating that a conventional international law has attained individual
criminal responsibility as a matter of customary international law.
There is an additional concern surrounding the use of international
conventional law by ad hoc tribunals. Oftentimes, the use of international
conventional law confuses the clarity of the crimes charged by and the jurisdiction
asserted by the ad hoc tribunals. Specifically, many international conventional
laws used by the ICTY and ICTR are outdated and some crimes listed under the
ICTY and ICTR statute only exists in international customary law, so the use of
international conventional law in tandem with customary laws or exclusively
sacrifices uniformity in the development of customary international criminal
law. 193 Accordingly, ad hoc tribunals lack the legal justification to prosecute under
most conventional international law, and should properly be relegating to using
customary international criminal laws only. Yet, this is not an attractive
predicament considering that customary international criminal law is not easily
defined and amorphous in nature.
From a theoretical perspective, the very notion of ad hoc international
criminal tribunals is disjointed when one considers the context within which these
tribunals were formed and the underlying crimes that these tribunals adjudicate.
190. Id. at 9, 11. Technically, attaining criminality status means that the individual can be
criminally prosecuted for the violation without any need for a domestic State to prosecute the
individual. However, that presumes that the individual was under the jurisdiction of an international
tribunal that could prosecute the individual (i.e. ICTY, ICTR, ICC). In reality, n violation of an
international custom or international conventional law that has attained customary international criminal
law status would most likely be prosecuted by a domestic nation that had legitimate jurisdiction over
the perpetrator.
191. When the word "jurisdiction" is used in this way, it is meant to include jurisdiction to
adjudicate.
192. See METTRAUX, supra note 113, at 5-11. There are circumstances where a conventional
international law/treaty could be applied against a defendant without legal questions being raised. In the
case of the ICTY and ICTR, it would be where a defendant was charged with a violation of a
convention/treaty that either Yugoslavia or Rwanda was a ratifying member of, and the corresponding
violation can be legally proven to include individual criminal responsibility for the perpetrator of the
violation. "But that is not the same as suggesting.. .that, regardless of its crystallization under customary
international law, the treaty itself may form the basis of a criminal conviction." Id. at 9.
193. See id. at 11.
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The moral outrage expounded by the world community in regards to the former
Yugoslavian and Rwandan war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide was
unmistakably intense.'1 94 Additionally, it is beyond doubt that the underlying acts
that led to the creation of these ad hoc tribunals represent the absolute worst and
most reprehensible human behavior. Juxtapose these examples of unforgivable
human conduct and subsequent widespread intense outrage next to the ultra-
political, slow to materialize, and problem-riddled ICTY and ICTR, and the
incongruence is readily apparent. The world's reaction of disgust and
condemnation to these instances of grotesque international criminal conflicts must
justly be followed by the fair adjudication of the breaches of international criminal
law in an already established forum or tribunal. Anything less than an established
tribunal for the prosecution of alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity,
genocide, etc. intrinsically casts doubt on the veracity of the world's contempt
against such deplorable human behavior. The method of creating the ad hoc
tribunals, moreover, is ridiculed as undemocratic and unfair, because the ICTY and
ICTR were bestowed with the requisite sovereign authority to practice
international criminal jurisdiction indirectly from U.N. States pursuant to U.N.
Security Council resolution, which means all these States ceded away their
sovereignty without a vote on or a genuine chance to "engage in a debate about
their cession of sovereignty."'
95
The lack of a permanent international criminal tribunal creates ex post facto
institutional problems as well, for the formation of the tribunal occurs after the
commission of the crime. This last point differs from ex post facto criminalization,
or the criminalization of conduct after the conduct occurs,1 96 because an ex post
facto institutional problem instead focuses on. the lack of an institution to
adjudicate breaches of international criminal law. Within a domestic jurisdiction, it
would be unfair if the jurisdiction criminalized conduct X and never created or
expressed any intention to create an institution responsible for adjudicating
conduct X, but then indicted an individual for committing conduct X and created
194. See POWER, supra note 1, at 251, 276; Bland, supra note 85, at 234; Cervoni, infra note 72, at
483-84; J.F.O. McAllister Washington, Atrocity and Outrage: Specters of Barbarism in Bosnia Compel
the U.S. and Europe to Ponder: Is It Time to Intervene?, TIME, Aug. 17, 1992 available at
http://www.time.con/time/archive/preview/0,10987,976238,00.html; see, e.g., Editorial, Bosnia
Without Illusions - Bosnian Crimes Against Humanity, NAT'L REV., Aug. 31, 1992, at 12, available at
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1282/isn17_v44/ai_1 2 666339/pg_l. It must be
highlighted that unlike the entire world's reaction of moral outrage to the international crimes being
committed in Bosnia, the response to the international crimes occurring in Rwanda was different.
Unfortunately, only non-governmental organizations and like international organizations called for
intervention into Rwanda, and powerful nations were simply indifferent to the Rwandan situation or
intervened with small, relatively inconsequential forces. See Toby Gati, Intelligence and the Use of
Force in the War of Terrorism, 98 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 150, 152, (2004) (explaining the
importance of NGO's in bringing the world's attention to the international crimes in Rwanda); Marlise
Simons, France is Sending Force to Rwanda to Help Civilians, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1994, at Al; see
UN Body Concedes It Failed Rwanda, Security Council Vows To Do More Next Time, GLOBE & MAIL,
Apr. 15, 2000, at A25.
195. SADAT, infra note 194, at 31.
196. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 620 (8th ed. 2004).
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an institution to prosecute the individual after the fact. Applying this same idea to
the international arena, there might be agreement or codification that conduct X is
internationally criminal, but without defming the forum in which conduct X crimes
will be adjudicated, proper notice is not given to potential defendants that these
crimes will be enforced. Concurrently, "ad hoc tribunals give the impression of
arbitrary and selective prosecution", 197 because ad hoc tribunals are only designed
to try particular international criminals, not all international criminals. 198 For this
reason and others, ad hoc tribunals are seen as unfair, partial, and only applicable
in narrow circumstances.' 99 Law can only be applied fairly if the bricks and mortar
created to house the law and the flesh and bones charged with enforcing the law
exist, because without people and institutions, law is merely symbolic.
IV. ICC: LATEST DEVELOPMENT IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
"The International Criminal Court is the last great international institution of
the Twentieth Century. It is no exaggeration to suggest that its establishment could
reshape our thinking about international law., 20 0 The creation of this "last great
international institution of the Twentieth Century" did not materialize overnight.
The ICC is the product of more than a century of international diplomacy in
tandem with the learned experiences of the ICTY and ICTR.
20 1
Prior to its establishment, the ICC was preceded by a multitude of beneficial,
but ultimately unsuccessful international efforts to create the world's first
permanent international criminal tribunal.20 2 The catalytic events which propelled
197. SADAT, infra note 196, at 31. For some, the word "'ad hoc" in the context of international
criminal law means "selective". Antonio Cassese, Is The ICC Still Having Teething Problems?, 4 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 434 (2006).
198. The UN, which was the most important single institution in bringing about the ICC, itself
criticized ad hoc tribunals as being "selective justice", due in part because the institutions themselves
are built only after the crime is committed. See Establishment of an International Criminal Court, supra
note 7.
199. Summary Record of the 23 00'h Meeting, [1993] 1 Y.B. Int'l Comm'n 16, 4, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SR.2300, available at http://untreaty.un.orglilc/documentation/english/a-cn4sr2300.pdf ("In
the first place, as every lawyer knew, ad hoc courts were not the best method of administering criminal
justice. The members of a court set up in response to a particular situation might be influenced by that
situation and by, as it were, an obligation of result.") M&S YUGO, supra note 79, at 38; see M&S
RWANDA, supra note 123, at 39-46.
200. LEILA NADYA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 8 (2002) (continuing by stating that "[for if
many aspects of the Rome Treaty demonstrate the tenacity of traditional Westphalian notions of State
sovereignty, there are nonetheless element of supranationalism and efficacy in the Statute that could
prove extremely powerful. Not only doe the Statute place State and non-State actors side-by-side in the
international arena, but the Court will put real people in real jails. Indeed, the establishment of the Court
raises hopes that the lines between international law on the one hand and world order on the other are
blurring, and that the normative structure being created by international law might one day influence or
even restrain the Hobbesian order established by the politics of States.").
201. SADAT, supra note 200, at 42.
202. BROOMI-ALL, supra note 59, at 27-30, 63-66; id. at 21-45 (documenting the many episodes of
international negotiations that either were failed attempts to create an ICC-like institution which
contributed to the creation of the ICC anyway-or episodes that generally contributed to the future
creation of the ICC).
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the international community over the proverbial hump that previously inhibited the
creation of a permanent international criminal tribunal were undoubtedly the ICTY
and ICTR.2 °3 The mere existence of the ICTY and ICTR, not to mention the
trailblazing role in legal precedent that the ICTY and ICTR forged for the ICC,
convinced the world community of the viability of a permanent international
criminal court. °4 While the successes of the ad hoc tribunals spurred the world
community into action, the ills of the ad hoc tribunals laid out shortcomings for the
ICC to avoid, and to a degree, further accentuated the need for a permanent
international criminal tribunal.20 5 With this in mind, numerous governmental and
non-governmental delegations from across the globe underwent the arduous and
fragile task of meshing the varied legal backgrounds of the world, the varied
beliefs on international criminal law, and the varied proposals put forth by each
delegation into a single agreement to create a permanent international criminal
court.20 6 Their effort culminated in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (Rome Statute) in 1998, which marked a new era in international law.20 7 The
following sections offer an historical, legal, and analytical overview of the ICC,
which will serve as a context illustrating the problems solved and the issues missed
by the ICC.
A. "Constitutional Moment": ICC's Revolutionary Jurisdiction to Prescribe
"When the creation of an international criminal court was first conceived, the
focus was to build an effective prosecution and punishment regime ' 20 8 In order to
build such a regime, the ICC had to be "[t]he first permanent international criminal
court..."20 9 Yet, permanence was not the only factor necessary to create such a
regime, for how such a regime was to be constructed became ever more important.
The Rome Statute Framers, in deliberating on the method for creating the ICC,
were influenced greatly by the ways in which Nuremberg, the ICTY, and the ICTR
came to be, and also by the lessons learned from past futile attempts to create a
permanent international criminal tribunal in a State-centric world of international
203. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 71 (discussing the catalytic impacts of the ICTY and ICTR,
including substantive and procedural international criminal law formation and successes of State
cooperation, on the formation of the ICC); SADAT, supra note 179, at 39-40.
204. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 70; Bottini, supra note 13, at 504 (comparing the attitude of
the world towards a permanent international criminal court before and after the ICTY and ICTR).
205. SADAT, supra note 200, at 40 ("even the problems they (ICTY/ICTR) faced . did not
dampen enthusiasm for the ICC. Rather, they highlighted the urgent need for a permanent institution.").
One of the stated goals of the ICC is "[t]o remedy the deficiencies of ad hoc tribunals." Establishment
of an International Criminal Court, supra note 7.
206. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 70-76; SADAT, supra note 179, at 1-9, 275; Roy S. Lee, How
the World Will Relate to the Court: An Assessment of the ICC Statute, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 750, 752
(2002) (describing the negotiation process needed to create the ICC statute).
207. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 37
I.L.M. 999, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/RomeStatute_120704-
EN.pdf [hereinafter Rome Statute].
208. Lee, supra note 206, at 758.
209. PBS.org, Online News Hour, U.N. Creates International Criminal Court,
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/court_04-11-02.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2007).
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law. Given that there is no supreme sovereign authority on this planet, 210 the
historical foundation of all international laws is a "horizontal" system where the
only actors are sovereign, independent States. 211 As a result, the only examples of
international criminal law in practice is the few instances where the domestic
courts of sovereign States are willing to apply international criminal law using
some form of universal jurisdiction,2 2 and the even fewer instances where
sovereign States consent to the creation of an ad hoc international criminal
tribunal.213 With the reality being that States have a monopoly over the
implementation of international criminal law and that the "horizontal" international
law system is diametrically at odds with the inherently "vertical" legal concept of
criminal law,214 the Rome Statute Framers knew that a new approach was required
in order to establish the ICC properly. More traditional international law-making
approaches simply failed in creating a permanent international criminal court in the
past, and new ideas and methods were required for the international community to
accomplish the immense task of succeeding where others had failed.
As a result, the negotiations that preceded the creation of the Rome Statute
were unlike any treaty negotiations in the history of international diplomacy. The
Rome Statute, considering all of the facets of its creation, can be considered a
"'[c]onstitutional moment'.., a sea-change in international law-making" where
true legislative behavior, a more or less unheard of concept in international
rulemaking, was being undertaken by the international community.2 5 Such
international legislative action by the international community, as displayed during
the creation of the Rome Statute, differs from traditional treaty or convention
lawmaking in several respects.216 First, the Rome Statute is not a "suppression
convention" where State Parties agree, in the form of a treaty, that conduct X is
criminal and that each State Party must make sure conduct X does not occur on its
territory or anywhere within the State Party's control by passing domestic
legislation criminalizing conduct X. 217 For this reason alone, it is said that
210. SADAT, supra note 179, at 11 (stating that one of the objections to the creation of an
permanent international criminal tribunal "has been the absence of an international sovereign power
with the authority to exert prescriptive jurisdiction over the human beings of the world").
211. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 65; CASSESE, supra note 59, at 5-6.
212. Again, domestic courts applying international criminal law includes the possibility that the
court is applying customary and/or conventional international criminal law, and that the court uses
permissive or mandatory universal jurisdiction to gain jurisdiction over the defendant(s) solely or in
combination with domestic jurisdiction statutes. See supra section II.
213. Also, this statement does not imply that the international criminal tribunals were using
universal jurisdiction in all instances. See supra section II; III. A.-C; supra note 44, 46.
214. See BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 59, 65.
215. SADAT, supra note 200, at 11-14, 78-79, 108-09, 277; see also BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at
31, 67; but see generally United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 2(1), Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397. The Law of the Sea Convention, while another example of groundbreaking quasi-
legislating by the international community in the creation of true international law, cannot be said to
have the same implications or severity of legislating as the Rome Statute. SADAT, supra note 179, at 13.
216. See SADAT, supra note 200, at 12-13 (stating that given the circumstances surrounding the
creation of the Rome Statute, it cannot be feasible to explain the legitimacy of the Statute on "classic
theory of contract between absolute sovereigns (treaty-making)...").
217. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 12-14, 37. These suppression conventions are the exact kind of
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suppression convention impose obligations on States, not on individuals
directly. 218 Additionally, it is these suppression conventions that give rise to the
already discussed "mandatory universal jurisdiction", or said differently, an
obligation on a State Party to a convention or treaty to comply with the convention
or treaty by discharging the State Party's jurisdictional authority-be it via
territorial, nationality, passive personality, etc.-by making conduct X criminal
domestically and punishing its commission within the State Party's territory or
anyone under State Party's control.219 In contrast to suppression conventions, the
Rome Statute legislated directly that certain actions of individuals are
internationally criminal per violation of Rome Statute law using a new form of
universal jurisdiction that requires no subsequent State party legislation. Building
off of the concept of "universal inter-state jurisdiction ' 220 in developing the
concept of "universal international jurisdiction", 221 the Framers of the Rome
conventions/treaties that give rise to "mandatory universal jurisdiction" discussed above in this Note's
section dedicated to universal jurisdiction. See supra section II.
218. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 13, 37.
219. Id. at 12-14, 37. The conduct criminalized under such suppression conventions, which in turn
give rise to mandatory universal jurisdiction, are commonly called "treaty crimes" Id. at 30; see also
SADAT, supra note 179, at 109. Note of clarification: Sadat refers to the conceptual ideas of "mandatory
universal jurisdiction" and "permissive universal jurisdiction (concepts discussed extensively earlier in
this Note) as "universal inter-State jurisdiction." It is from this concept of universal inter-state
jurisdiction, as Sadat describes, that the Rome Statute alters this concept into universal international
jurisdiction. Infra note 220.
220. The term "universal inter-state jurisdiction" is no different from the term "universal
jurisdiction" used prevalently in this Note. Sadat defines universal inter-state jurisdiction no differently
from the definition of universal jurisdiction used in this Note, "...the well-accepted theory of universal
jurisdiction that derives from the idea that when criminal activity rises to a certain level of harm..., or
sufficiently important interests of the international society are threatened, any State may apply its laws
to the act, 'even if it occurred outside its territory, even if it has been perpetrated by a non-national, and
even if its nationals have no been harmed by [it]"' SADAT, supra note 200, at 109-10 (footnote omitted).
Inserting the term "inter-state" simply accentuates the use of universal jurisdiction by States, rather than
non-State actors. The larger concept of "absolute" universal jurisdiction is simply any entity exercising
universal jurisdiction over individual(s) under the same theory already discussed heavily in this Note.
SADAT, supra note 200, at 109; see supra section II.
221. SADAT, supra note 200, at 109-10. "Universal international jurisdiction" is not the same, but
similar to the concept of "international jurisdiction" mentioned earlier in this Note. Supra note 44 and
accompanying text. International jurisdiction is the broader concept, and universal international
jurisdiction is a subset of international jurisdiction. As stated above, international jurisdiction is where a
non-State actor (i.e. an international tribunal like Nuremberg) receives delegated authority from State(s)
to prescribe particular conduct as internationally criminal, adjudicate an individual(s) for commission of
the international crime(s), and hopefully enforce their decisions through some means. Under the
concept of international jurisdiction, there is no inquiry into the source of jurisdiction from which the
delegating State(s) delegate jurisdictional authority to the non-State actor in the first place. If the
delegated authority comes from the territorial jurisdiction of the delegating State(s), it would be said
that the tribunal is practicing "territorial international jurisdiction." If, however, the source of the
jurisdiction that the State(s) delegates to the non-State actor stems from universal jurisdiction, this can
be said to be "universal international jurisdiction", as is the situation where the ICC Prosecutor will
receive referrals from the Security Council, but not entirely the situation where the Prosecutor initiates
their own investigation or an ICC State Party refers a case to the ICC Prosecutor (i.e. that would be
territorial, or even nationality, international jurisdiction). In the U.N. Security Council referral situation,
the ICC will initiate investigations into a suspected international crime using true universality principle,
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Statute criminalized, in specific circumstances, 222 certain conduct of foreign
individuals in foreign lands against foreign victims "by embodying prescriptive
norms for the international community as a matter of substantive criminal law."
223
Specifically, the Rome Statute allows the ICC "to supplement, or even displace,"
national criminal laws applied pursuant to territorial principle in favor of the
international criminal code set forth in the Rome Statute applied pursuant to
universal international jurisdiction.224 Hence, without any prerequisite for State
Party legislations, the Rome Statute applies obligations on individuals directly by
establishing a criminal code that is "universal in thrust and unbounded by
geographical scope.
' 225
Second, the method in which the Rome Statute was formed deviated from
traditional convention and treaty creation methods, where the default rule is that
decisions during negotiations are only made by consensus or unanimity, a blatant
and traditional ode to sovereignty. 226 Instead,, the Rome Statute negotiations
employed legislative voting procedures whereby super or simple majority votes
resolved disputes and also brought about final substantive decisions. 227 Third, in a
true sign of unparalleled international legislating the Rome Statute empowered the
ICC to exercise jurisdiction to prescribe, to adjudicate, and to enforce, all in one
document, which are jurisdictional powers that have historically been "the most
jealously guarded precinct of State sovereignty., 228 A further indication that the
because the State where the crimes occurred would not have anything to do with U.N. Security Council
referring a situation to the ICC Prosecutor for possible investigation and prosecution, and the ICC
Prosecutor-an non-State actor- obviously has no connection to the crime or criminal. Sadat defines
universal international jurisdiction as, "[t]he international community as a whole, in certain limited
circumstances, to supplement, or even displace, ordinary national laws of territorial application with
international laws that are universal in thrust and unbounded in geographical scope." Id. at 110.
222. Rome Statute only makes criminal "the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole." Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 5(1). As will be discussed later in this Note,
this is a pretty blurry line to draw.
223. SADAT, supra note 200, at 108-110. As discussed previously and will be discussed further in
this Note, it is not as if the State Parties to the Rome Statute conjured up previously unheard of
international laws, but were negotiating on the codification of already existing, but undefined customary
international criminal laws, "the elaboration and adoption of an international criminal code as part of
the Rome Treaty was perhaps the least controversial of the three jurisdictional axes within the Rome
Statute, for the four categories of crimes within the Statute were consider jus cogens norm by most
writers, even though their precise definition had not yet been completely agreed upon by all States." Id.
at 108 (footnote omitted).
224. Id. at 108.
225. Id. at 110. The end result of the Rome Statute negotiations is that "the universality principle
[universal jurisdiction] has been extended from a principle governing inter-State relations to one of
general prescriptive international law..."Id. at 116-17 (alteration).
226. See generally INT'L L. COMM'N, REVIEW OF THE MULTILATERAL TREATY-MAKING PROCESS,
U.N. Doe. ST/LEG/SER.B/21 (1985).
227. SADAT, supra note 200, at 11-14, 109, 280.
228. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 68; SADAT, supra note 200, at 107-108 (describing the Rome
Statute as, "[t]hrough a rather extraordinary process, these three jurisdictional categories classically
known to international law have been transformed from norms providing 'which State can exercise
authority over whom, and in what circumstances,' to norms that establish under what conditions the
international community ... may prescribe international rules of conduct, adjudicate breaches of those
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Rome Statute possesses a unique international legislative quality is that the ICC is
an independent legal and judicial entity, completely distinct from the U.N.229
Finally, explicitly not permitting States to condition their signatures with
reservations or deviations from the laws and procedures set forth in the Rome
Statute solidifies the unprecedented legislative nature of the Rome Statute's
230creation.
B. Role of Customary International Criminal Law in the ICC
While it is notable that the Rome Statute negotiations were radically different
from treaty norms, the most revolutionary aspect of the Rome Statute was the
Rome Statute itself. In the realm of international criminal tribunals, predecessors
of the ICC were not created by treaty. 231 The ICC, therefore, was the byproduct of
an extraordinary international act whereby an international criminal tribunal,
including its substantive and procedural attributes, was created from the ground up
through treaty negotiation between sovereign States. Aside from the obvious
length of time treaty negotiations take, establishing the first permanent
international criminal tribunal pursuant to treaty possesses advantages over other
options, such as the ability to clarify and refine complex international criminal
laws, create new binding substantive and procedural laws if need be, allow
sovereign voices to be heard, and choose how treaty laws are to apply, if at all.232
The difficult obstacle of creating the ICC demanded that the ICC be created by
treaty negotiation rather than by other options, such as U.N. resolution,233 but
treaty negotiations complicated the relationship between customary international
law, the historical hallmark of international criminal law, and the ICC. Past
international criminal tribunals, including Nuremberg, ICTY, and ICTR, relied
heavily on customary international law, because those international criminal
tribunals were simply forums to adjudicate already existing customary
rules, and enforce those adjudications"); see Antonio Cassese, On the Current Trend Towards Criminal
Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 2, 6
(1998) (stating that one of the most precious powers of sovereignty is criminal/penal jurisdiction).
229. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 1, 2; SADAT, supra note 200, at 78-9.
230. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 120. This concept of not allowing reservation by Rome
Statute signatory States must be distinguished from the Roaming ICC's concept of not allowing any
deviations from the substantive and procedural Roaming ICC laws passed by Roaming ICC signatory
States. See infra section V, B. Under the Rome Statute, when a State signs the Rome Statute, it cannot
condition its signature/ratification with reservations to the substantive and procedural laws set forth in
the Rome Statute. While this idea is also incorporated in the Roaming ICC proposal, when this Note
says that Roaming ICC State Parties are not allowed to deviate from the substantive and procedural
Roaming ICC laws, it is meant that the Roaming ICC State Parties cannot deviate from the Roaming
ICC substantive and procedural laws that those State Parties enact into their own jurisprudence. See
infra section V, B. This is not a reference to conditional signatures.
231. Both ad hoc tribunals were created by U.N. Resolutions. See supra section III, B-C.
Nuremberg was a pseudo-treaty, but better described as either an agreement among Allied Powers on
how to handle war criminals or the Allied powers acting as new government of Germany in exercising
criminal jurisdiction. See supra section III, A.
232. SADAT, supra note 200, at 261 (detailing treaty advantages in regards to the ICC); see M&S
YUGO, supra note 72, at 40 (explaining the advantages of creating the ICTY pursuant to treaty).
233. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 67-68.
2007
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
international criminal laws.234 Although it would be disingenuous to argue that
customary international criminal law did not heavily influence the international
criminal laws established under the Rome Statute, customary international law
does not have the same relationship with the ICC as it did with Nuremberg, ICTY,
and ICTR. 235 Differing from its predecessors, the ICC would solely adjudicate "the
criminal code for the world", 236 or the laws legislatively created under the Rome
Statute negotiations, and apply those laws prospectively; 237 hence, customary
international criminal law is not the legal foundation of the ICC nor is it required
that the ICC only apply customary international criminal law. Yet, customary
international criminal law, by its nature, continues to evolve independently from
the ICC 238 and the extent to which existing or future customary international
criminal law would or would not influence the crimes enumerated in the Rome
Statute or the future work of the ICC was an issue that needed resolution.
The dilemma surrounding the relationship between customary international
law and the ICC is borne out of the political reality of the treaty making process, a
reality that was particularly prevalent during the Rome Statute negotiations.
Negotiations on any contentious international legal issue, like creating a permanent
international criminal court, will involve a battle between two age-old competing
interests: "sovereignty" and "international rule of law". 2 39 In the context of the
Rome Statute negotiations, "international rule of law" supported the creation of a
treaty that would attract sufficient State support to create an impartial,
authoritative, and legitimate international criminal system, whereas "sovereignty"
supported a treaty that would safeguard the independence, power, and discretion of
all States.240 As these competing interests expectedly bore themselves out during
the Rome Statute negotiations in the form of the political compromises, anxiety
grew over the effect such compromises would have on existing customary
international criminal law, "[t]he concern arose that the treaty-making process
234. It can be argued that Nuremberg partook in pseudo-legislating international criminal laws, as
pointed out earlier in this Note. See supra section III, A. Nevertheless, none of these predecessor
international criminal tribunals could be said to legislate international criminal laws. As pointed out
elsewhere in this Note, each of these predecessor tribunals, being tribunals that were created after the
commission of the crimes, were relegated to adjudicating laws that stood at the time the alleged
suspects committed the crimes. See supra section III, A-C. The ICC is not limited in this fashion,
however, and can thus formulate laws that it will adjudicate in the future, regardless if they existed at
the time the Rome Statute was initially created.
235. SADAT, supra note 200, at 11-12.
236. Id. at 263.
237. The Rome Statute's use of the term "[f]or purpose of this Statute" indicates that the criminal
laws under the treaty are not customary international criminal laws, but laws specifically legislated for
use by the ICC. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 6, 7(1), 8(2).
238. See SADAT, supra note 200, at 263.
239. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 68. "The former President of the [ICTY], Antonio Cassese,
describes the choice in stark terms: either one supports the international rule of law, or one supports
State sovereignty. The two are not, in his view, compatible." Id. at 56. Cassese's statement directly
highlights the eternal conflict waged between the international rule of law and State sovereignty, and
how this conflict is ever present in international law/politics/diplomacy. This idea will be addressed
more fully later in this Note.
240. Id. at 67-68.
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might, rather than advance the cause of international justice, actually produce
definition of crimes that would be 'lowest common denominator' definitions far
more restrictive than those generally believe to be part of customary international
law...,,241 To squelch these worries, Article 10 was added, "[n]othing in this
[Statute] shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or
developing rules of international law for purposes other than this Statute.,
2 42 At
first blush, Article 10 appears to permit the existence of two sets of equally
universal international criminal law that differ from each other, one being the more
restrictive Rome Statute2 43  and the other being pre-existing customary
international criminal law. However, as noted, customary international criminal
law will continue to evolve; thus, Article 10 does not partition the Rome Statute
from customary international criminal law, but instead is an admission that
political compromises were made during the Rome Statute negotiations and these
compromises are the floor, or the "minimum rules of conduct and [those outside
the tribunal] (and the Court itself) must read it that way.",244 Consequently, Article
10 creates a "pick and choose" mechanism, whereby the parts of the Rome Statute
that pair back on contemporary customary international criminal law are limited in
application to the ICC, and the more progressive parts of the Rome Statute are its
contributions to the development of customary international criminal law.
24
Furthermore, as customary international criminal law continues to develop in the
future, Article 21 permits the ICC to use these developments to supplement its
decision as a type of "gap filler": 246 "[t]he Court shall apply.. .where appropriate,
applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law, including the
established principles of the international law of armed conflict."247 While the
future will determine if the Rome Statute Framers made a mistake or were brilliant
in allowing for the existence of a law outside of the Rome Statute, their recognition
and subsequent action to detail the relationship between the Rome Statute and
customary international criminal law shows a subjective belief on the part of the
Rome Statute Framers that they were truly legislating a world criminal code.248
C. The Structure of the ICC and Its Jurisdiction to Adjudicate
The end result of the Rome Statute negotiations was the ICC, an international
legal and judicial body unlike any other in history. The Rome Statute clearly was
an unprecedented exercise of international prescriptive jurisdiction, and as a result,
241. SADAT, supra note 200, at 267.
242. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 10.
243. The ICC is universally applicable to all-regardless if an individual is from a State that has
not ratified the Rome Statute-when a case is referred to the ICC from the U.N. Security Council.
244. SADAT, supra note 200, at 263. Sadat also states that "article 10 retains tremendous
importance not as a rule of decision but as a principle of interpretation." Id.
245. Id. at 269. This idea is not foreign, for the Nuremberg Judgment echoed a similar sentiment in
regards to the Nuremberg Charter when it said that the Charter was an "'expression of international law
existing at the time of its creation" while simultaneously "a contribution to international law." Judgment
of Oct. 1, 1946, supra note 62, at 186, 216-17.
246. SADAT, supra note 200, at 270.
247. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 21(1)(b).
248. SADAT, supra note 200, at 271.
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the ICC is the first international tribunal to possess prospective subject matter
jurisdiction over any international crime, which in the ICC's case is jurisdiction
over genocide, 24 9 crimes against humanity, 25° war crimes,
2 51 and aggression.2 52
Yet, there are substantial limits placed on the ICC by the Rome Statute that make
the ICC very different from a domestic court. The Rome Statute bestowed the ICC
with limited temporal and personal jurisdiction, failing to give the ICC jurisdiction
over past international crimes and jurisdiction over corporations or States.253 The
most significant restraint on the ICC is on its jurisdiction to adjudicate. Unlike any
domestic court in any domestic jurisdiction, the Rome Statute does not allow
jurisdiction to adjudicate to follow naturally from jurisdiction to prescribe. 254 Only
in limited instances will the ICC be able to adjudicate the commission of an
international crime(s) that the Rome Statute prescribed as internationally criminal.
To illustrate the regimen created to determine when the ICC can exercise its
jurisdiction to adjudicate, the first step will be to discuss the separate organs of the
ICC and their roles, followed by a discussion on how the ICC's jurisdiction to
adjudicate is triggered and the limits of the ICC's jurisdiction to adjudicate.
The ICC is divided into four main parts: The Presidency, the Judiciary, the
Registry, and the Office of the Prosecutor.2 5 5 The Presidency is primarily called
upon to ensure the "proper administration of the Court, with the exception of the
Office of the Prosecutor",256 which includes managing the Judges in the Judiciary,
deciding if an increase in Judges is necessary,257 and anything else that the Rome
Statute may in the future call the Presidency to do. 258 The Presidency is made up
249. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 6.
250. Id. at art. 7.
251. Id. at art. 8.
252. The crime of aggression or crimes against peace was not specifically defined under the Rome
Statute, thanks in part to its highly controversial status. The crime of aggression is prescribed under the
Rome Statute in theory. Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 207, pmbl., art. 5(2). However, aggression
will not become justiciable until it is defined pursuant to the Rome Statute's amendment procedures,
which will be an ongoing, slow process for the ICC to undertake. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art.
121, 123; BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 46-7; SADAT, supra note 200, at 134-8.
253. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 1, 11, 25(1).
254. For example, if a domestic jurisdiction prescribes murder as criminal, the adjudication of
murder in that domestic jurisdiction by that domestic jurisdiction's judiciary will always occur. The
ICC does not make such a smooth transition from jurisdiction to prescribe to jurisdiction to adjudicate,
as will be described below.
255. Boller, supra note 63, at 282; see SADAT, supra note 200, at 86-98. While not specifically an
organ of the ICC, there also exist the Assembly of State Parties, which is charged with general oversight
of the ICC's "operations and functioning", including management and budget oversight, changes to
amount of judges, potential amendments to the Rome Statute, and alterations to ICC's Criminal,
Procedural, and Evidentiary rules. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 112(2)(a-b, d-e); SADAT, supra
note 200, at 98-99. A decision made by the Assembly of the Parties is made by consensus, but if there is
no consensus, a decision is made by either supra-majority or simple majority depending on the type of
decision. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 112(7).
256. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 38(3)(a)
257. Id. at art, 36(2).




of full time Judges elected by a majority of their peers.
The Judiciary, or what the Rome Statute identifies as the "Appeals Division, a
Trial Division and a Pre-Trial Division",260 is made up of eighteen Judges from
signatory State Parties to the ICC, with strict regulations on the term limits,
election procedure, moral character, and geographic makeup of the Judges.26'
Selection of Judges also includes a consideration of an equitable geographic
distribution of Judges and legal systems, equal distribution of gender,262 their
special expertise in specific areas of concern,263 competence and experience in
criminal law and procedure, and competence and experience in international law,
particularly humanitarian law and law of human rights. 264 Each Judge within the
Judiciary serves a non-renewable nine year term, 265 which was agreed upon to
avoid the politicization of Judge selections. However, some argue the term-limit
diminishes the legitimacy, institutional memory, and competence of the
Judiciary.266 Once the Judiciary is set, the Judges are tasked with organizing
themselves within the Appellate, Trial, and Pre-Trial divisions.267 While almost all
legal systems are familiar with Trial and Appellate divisions, the Pre-Trial division
is a civil law concept that is "actively involved in the organization and supervision
of the case by the Prosecutor during the pre-trial phase",268 which, among other
things, includes deciding whether reasonable evidence exist to proceed with an
investigation or begin a prosecution, 269 hearing challenges to admissibility or
jurisdiction of the ICC,270 preserving evidence, protecting national security
information,27 1 and confirming charges for admittance to Trial division. 72
The Registry, while handling the operation of the ICC with respect to non-
legal matters,273 has immensely important responsibilities that have direct impact
on ICC cases.274 Chief among those responsibilities is the selection and facilitation
259. Id. at art. 35(2), 38.
260. Id. at art. 34(b).
261. Id. at art. 36(3); Boiler, supra note 63, at 282-283.
262. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 36(8)(a).
263. Id. at art. 36(8)(b).
264. Id. at art. 36(3)(b)(i-ii).
265. Id. at art. 36(9)(a).
266. SADAT, supra note 200, at 87-88. Another contentious issue is the power to issue majority and
minority judicial opinions by both Trial and Appeals Chambers, and separate opinions by the Appeals
Chambers, which the ICC Judiciary does have. Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 207, art. 74(5),
83(4). A good overview of the arguments surrounding this issue are found in Sadat's book. SADAT,
supra note 200, 88-90.
267. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 38(1).
268. SADAT, supra note 200, at 91.
269. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 15(4), 53(2).
270. Id. at art. 15(3), 17-19, 57(2).
271. Id. at art. 57(3)(c).
272. Id. at art. 61.
273. Id. at art. 43(1).
274. SADAT, supra note 200, at 96. Registrars in the ICTY and ICTR manage the detention units,
maintain court records, handle all language related services, and control the Tribunals' budget. M&S
YUGO, supra note 79, 168-70; M&S RWANDA, supra note 123, at 396-98.
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of defense counsels for suspects. 275 Registry is controlled by a full-time, elected
Registrar, and the possibility does exist for the appointment of a Deputy
Registrar.276
The highly controversial Office of the Prosecutor, a separate entity from all
other ICC organs, 277 has a Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutor that are subject to
very similar membership requirements and election procedures as the Judiciary.
278
The main purpose of the Office of the Prosecutor is to make determinations as to
the appropriateness of exercising the ICC's jurisdiction to adjudicate: 279 "[t]he
Prosecutor is responsible for receiving referrals and substantiating information on
crimes within the jurisdiction of the [ICC], for examining those referrals and for
conducting investigation and prosecutions., 28 0 There are three avenues from which
the Prosecutor can commence an investigation or prosecution: referrals from a
State party, referrals from the U.N. Security Council, or investigations and
prosecutions started proprio motu (on his or her own motion). 28 Bestowing State
Parties and the U.N. Security Council with substantial power to determine when
and where the Prosecutor acts is clearly inserted in the Rome Statute to appease the
sovereignty of States;282  however, allowing the Prosecutor, in limited
circumstances, to initiate investigations/prosecutions on their own proves that the
Rome Statute Framers understood that political, economic, and other non-legal
reasons would inhibit States and the U.N. Security Council, in many instances,
from referring cases to the ICC.283 Furthermore, an independent Prosecutor would
bring legitimacy and effectiveness to the ICC and give an incentive to States to
275. SADAT, supra note 200, at 98.
276. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 43(4-5).
277. Id. at art. 42(1).
278. Id. at art. 42(4); Boller, supra note 63, at 283.
279. As alluded to elsewhere in this Note, jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to adjudicate are
related, but different. Supra note 254 and accompanying text. Using the ICC as an example, jurisdiction
to prescribe certain conduct as internationally criminal revolves around this Note's prior discussion on
universal international jurisdiction, or the ICC's jurisdiction to deem particular conduct as
internationally criminal wherever it takes place. Supra note 220 and accompanying text. The subsequent
conversation here discusses whether the ICC can/should adjudicate an individual(s) who has violated
the Rome Statute. Hence, jurisdiction to prescribe is the legislative power to make certain conduct
criminal, and jurisdiction to adjudicate is the judicial power to judge whether certain laws have been
violated. The theoretical jump from jurisdiction to prescribe to jurisdiction to adjudicate is not so
immediate under the ICC regime in comparison to domestic jurisdiction, because under domestic
regimes, jurisdiction to adjudicate follows naturally from jurisdiction to prescribe; only restricted by
reasonableness. Supra note 254 and accompanying text. However, under the ICC, the State consent
regime, the principle of complimentarity, and the principle of neb is in idem are three ways the ICC is
restricted from adjudicating Rome Statute crimes that the ICC has prescriptive jurisdiction over and
could theoretically prosecute. SADAT, supra note 200, at 112.
280. SADAT, supra note 200, at 95; Boiler, supra note 63, at 283.
281. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 13.
282. Additionally, the U.N. Security Council option was included to take care of situations where
international crimes occurred exclusively domestically, and that certain State was either not party to the
Rome Statute, was a State Party that refused to adjudicate the case domestically, or a State Party that
refused to refer a situation to the ICC. See BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 207.
283. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 78-82; SADAT, supra note 200, at 112-19.
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initiate their own investigations or prosecutions of Rome Statute violations.
284
The manner in which any "situation" 285 is referred to the Prosecutor by a
State Party or U.N. Security Council or if the case is started by the Prosecutor
proprio motu286 will determine which jurisdictional rationale to adjudicate is
implicated and the processes that the Prosecutor must follow in order to commence
an investigation. If a situation is referred to the Office of the Prosecutor by a State
Party or initiated proprio motu, the Prosecutor's jurisdiction to adjudicate requires
implicit State Party consent, in that either the territorial State in which the
suspected violations of the Rome Statute occurred or the State of the suspect's
nationality is a State Party to the Rome Statute or has consented ad hoc to ICC's
jurisdiction.287 While universal jurisdiction to adjudicate is not completely
eliminated from the justification of the Prosecutor's jurisdiction to adjudicate
situations or cases referred by State Parties or started by proprio motu motion, 288
the Prosecutor's jurisdiction to adjudicate State party referrals and proprio motu
motions is "layered... [with] a State consent regime based on two additional []
principles of jurisdiction: the territorial principle and the nationality principle",
considered the two most fundamental jurisdictional principles of criminal law,
289
284. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 79-80; 86. Considering that the ICC makes the final decision
on its jurisdiction to adjudicate, incentives include the avoidance of adverse international media
exposure, diplomatic hardship, a duty to cooperate with the ICC, and legitimizing domestic legal
system.
285. To protect the independence of the Prosecutor and legitimacy of the ICC, situations, not cases
or suspects, are referred to the Office of the Prosecutor by a State Party or U.N. Security Council. Id. at
79-80.
286. If an investigation is started by a proprio motu motion of the Prosecutor, it is not limited to
"situations", because this allows victims and interested parties to "avail themselves of the Court". Id. at
80.
287. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 12(2); BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 80. It is an implicit
consent from the State Party, because upon ratification of the Rome State domestically, the State Party
has proactively and explicitly accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC over the crimes specifically
enumerated and defined in the Rome Statute without the availability of reservations. Rome Statute,
supra note 207, art. 5-9, 12(1), 120.
288. Universal jurisdiction plays a role in not only the ICC's jurisdiction to prescribe certain
conduct-as discussed above in section on universal international jurisdiction-but also in the
Prosecutor's jurisdiction to adjudicate situations/cases referred to the Office of the Prosecutor by a
State Party or by proprio motu motion. Supra note 220 and accompanying text. In other words,
universal jurisdiction is not completely excluded from an ICC case that started from a State Party
referral or from a Prosecutor's proprio motu motion, because the States Parties-even absent their
presumed territorial and nationality jurisdiction to adjudicate such crimes-still have universal
jurisdiction to adjudicate genocide, crimes against humanity, etc., as these crimes arejus cogens, and
punishable by all States pursuant to customary international criminal law. Hence, a State Party that
refers a case or a Prosecutor that starts their own investigation could, theoretically, need not find that
the crimes occurred on the territory or by a national of a State Party in order to justify the adjudication,
but this requirement was artificially imposed pursuant to the Rome Statute to ease the concerns of some
States during negotiations.
289. SADAT, supra note 200, at 116-17; BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 80-81. Broomball also
argues that, practically speaking, an additional precondition exist for the ICC to exercise its jurisdiction
to adjudicate, that being the approval of the U.N. Security Council in situations referred to the ICC via
State Party or by Prosecutor proprio motu motions. Under Article 16, no investigation or prosecution
may be commenced or continued if the U.N. Security Council passes a Chapter VII resolution
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In contrast, a referral from the U.N. Security Council does not require any explicit
or implicit consent from any State Parties to justify the Prosecutor's jurisdiction to
adjudicate, because the U.N. Security Council, acting pursuant to its Chapter VII
powers to protect international peace and security,290 can refer a situation to the
Office of the Prosecutor that has occurred on the territory of a State or non-State
Party and/or by a national of a State or non-State Party. Under U.N. Security
Council referrals, the Prosecutor has jurisdiction to adjudicate anyone, anywhere in
the world.291 So, it can be said that situations investigated or prosecuted by the
Prosecutor pursuant to a U.N. Security Council referral is universal jurisdiction to
adjudicate in its purest form.
2 9 2
Turning to the varied procedures that the Prosecutor must follow in regard to
investigations and prosecutions, referrals of situations to the Office of the
Prosecutor by State Parties or by the U.N. Security Council must overcome a lower
threshold in order for the Prosecutor to initiate an investigation or prosecution, in
that the Prosecutor must only establish that a reasonable basis exist for an
investigation or prosecution to commence pursuant to Article 53. 293 Moreover,
State Parties, the U.N. Security Council, and even the Pre-Trial Chamber in limited
circumstances, can request reconsideration of situations referred to the Prosecutor
that the Prosecutor subsequently concluded were void of a reasonable basis to
investigate or prosecute. 294 Proprio motu investigations or prosecutions, on the
other hand, must adhere to a much stricter procedure whereby the Pre-Trial
Chambers "closely supervise cases in which the Prosecutor exercises his or her
proprio motu investigative powers." 295 In addition to the requirement that the
Prosecutor must find a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation or
prosecution pursuant to Article 53, the Prosecutor must apply for the Pre-Trial
Chamber's approval for an investigation, which gives rise to further inquiry into
the facts and law of the case by the Judiciary, and only after approval by the Pre-
Trial Chamber may the Prosecutor proceed with the investigation or initiate a
296prosecution. 1 6 The more stringent procedure put upon the Prosecutor in respect to
requesting the ICC to withdrawal from adjudicating a particular situation. However, this requires an
affirmative, unified action by the overly political, divergent U.N. Security Council in order to stop a
potential or ongoing investigation/prosecution. Plus, there still is not a literal requirement that the
Office of the Prosecutor must receive authorization from the U.N. Security Council prospectively in
order to adjudicate a situation. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 16; BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at
81-82.
290. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 13(b). The Security Council can only refer a situation
pursuant to their Chapter VII powers to protect international peace and security, not pursuant to any
other powers bestowed to the U.N. Security Council by the U.N. Charter. BROOMHALL, supra note 59,
at 79.
291. SADAT, supra note 200, at 116-17.
292. Id. at 116-17.
293. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 53(1-2).
294. Id. at art. 53(3).
295. SADAT, supra note 200, at 95.
296. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 15. Broomhall believes the structural differences between
referrals from a State Party and U.N. Security Council vs. cases started proprio motu by the Prosecutor
boils down to the difficulty the Prosecutor has in obtaining Article 54 powers, which include the power
VOL. 35:3/4
THE "ROAMING ICC"
proprio motu investigations and prosecutions resulted from the fear that despite the
benefits of an independent Prosecutor, political motivations and other non-legal
impulses could contaminate the Prosecutor's judgment, thus outside checks on the
Prosecutor's proprio motu powers were deemed necessary.297
Overarching the entirety of the ICC's jurisdiction to adjudicate is the principle
of complimentarity, a concept constructed by the Rome Statute Framers.298 The
principle of complimentarity is not to be confused as meaning concurrent. Rather,
complimentarity defines the admissibility of a situation or case to the ICC and sets
the ground rules for ICC's jurisdiction to adjudicate in a State- centric world where
a State or multiple States and the ICC will possess simultaneous jurisdiction to
adjudicate a situation or case. 299 The ICC may exercise its jurisdiction to
adjudicate a situation only if: 1.) a State that has jurisdiction over a situation "is
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigations" or a State with
jurisdiction over the situation "decided not to prosecute" it; 2.) the situation is of
"sufficient gravity" for the ICC to adjudicate and; 3.) the alleged suspect has not
already been tried for the same conduct at issue.30 0 Particular to situations referred
by State Parties and prosecutions or investigations commenced proprio motu,30 1 if
the Prosecutor begins an investigation, the Prosecutor must notify the State or
States that "would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concerned" of a
pending ICC investigation, and if a State contacted ask for the Prosecutor to defer,
the Prosecutor must defer the investigation barring Pre-Trial Chamber
authorization to the contrary. 30 2 However, the Prosecutor may revisit a deferred
investigation if there is a "significant change of circumstances based on the State's
to make cooperation requests upon State Parties. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 79, n. 41.
297. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 79-80.
298. To reiterate in different words, to understand complimentarity correctly-and the whole ICC's
jurisdiction to adjudicate for that matter-, remember that there is jurisdiction on one hand and
admissibility on the other hand, within the context of the ICC. The ICC can have jurisdiction over a
situation, but complimentarity will make the ICC's jurisdiction inadmissible. However, no situation
would ever be admissible without the ICC having jurisdiction over it. Sadat gives a great discussion on
jurisdiction and admissibility concepts under the ICC. SADAT, supra note 200, at 122-27.
299. Id. at 119. From the beginning of the Rome Statute, it is said that the ICC is "complimentary"
to domestic/national jurisdictions, and thus the principle of complimentarity conceptually defines when
ICC jurisdiction to adjudicate is permissible or if a State has primacy of jurisdiction. Rome Statute,
supra note 207, pmbl., art. 1.
300. Id. at art. 17(1)(a-d); SADAT, supra note 200, at 119. A detailed discussion on the principle of
complimentarity and also how complimentarity gives incentives for States to adjudicate international
crimes is done by Broomhall. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 86-93.
301. The Rome Statute is vague on how the principle of complimentarity relates differently, if at
all, to situations referred to the Prosecutor via a State Party, U.N. Security Council, or cases started
proprio motu. While Article 17 on complimentarity does not refer to a distinction between the three
types, Article 18 on complimentarity only applies to proprio motu or State Party referral
investigations/prosecutions. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 17-18. Sadat suggests that maybe
complimentarity is bypassed in situations referred to the Prosecutor by the U.N. Security Council, and if
not bypassed, the situation is on the '"fast track' to investigation and potential prosecution, because
Article 18 does not apply. SADAT, supra note 200, at 123. Boiler, on the other hand, states that the
Prosecutor is under no deferral obligations or the principle of complimentarity if the situation is referred
to the Prosecutor via U.N. Security Council. Boller, supra note 63, at 287.
302. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 18(1-2).
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unwillingness or inability to carry out the investigation., 30 3 The hopeful end result
of having a procedure of complimentarity is that the investigation or prosecution of
international crimes will occur one way or another, because either a sovereign
State will take control of its opportunity to head up an investigation and
prosecution of an international crime or the ICC will step into its place by
exercising its jurisdiction to adjudicate the criminal conduct.
As highlighted from this Note's look at the ICC, many of the criticism lodged
against the ad hoc tribunals are not applicable to the ICC. Of most importance, the
ex post facto institutional criticisms that dealt with the creation of ad hoc tribunals,
or tribunals post-crime, is erased with the permanent ICC. First, it seemed illogical
to put in such a tremendous amount of time, effort, and money to create the ICTY
and ICTR, all for the adjudication of international crimes that occurred in
individual conflicts of the past, rather than putting that time, money, and effort into
creating a tribunal that would prospectively handle all future international crimes
under its jurisdiction. However, this is exactly what the Rome Statute and ICC did,
thus avoiding this criticism altogether. Second, having a permanent international
criminal court validates and solidifies the international community's commitment




Lastly, making the ICC a permanent criminal tribunal confers legitimacy on its
future actions and fairness to potential defendants, because a permanent institution
alerts potential international criminals that the world is ready to punish them if
they choose to commit international crimes.
The ICC possesses additional advantages over its ad hoc predecessors.
Although the ICC has not handled enough cases yet to know its true speed and
efficiency, it will nevertheless surely be able to adjudicate crimes, from time of
commission to judgment, faster than the ICTY and ICTR because, unlike the ad
hoc tribunals, the ICC is already established. In contrast, bringing justice to
Rwanda and to the former Yugoslavia was delayed while the protracted political
and logistical effort to create the ad hoc tribunals was underway, which
unreasonably elongated the overall time it took these institutions to handle
international criminal violations. Along the same line, lack of cooperation severely
affected the ICTY's ability to function as a judicial entity, and the Rome Statute
Framers addressed this issue by incorporating into the Rome Statute an elaborate
305international cooperation regime. The creation of the Rome Statute itself, a clear
and uniform criminal code that the ICC must use primarily in its court rooms,
306
spares the ICC of dealing with the legality problems that the ad hoc tribunals were
303. Id. at art. 18(3).
304. Of course, this potentially will include the world's commitment to adjudicate instances of
aggression, but as stated earlier, the ICC has some work to do on defining aggression before the ICC
can adjudicate cases of aggression. Supra note 252.
305. See Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 86-111. However, despite this enforcement mechanism
put in place, enforcement is still a weakness for the ICC as will be discussed later in this Note.
306. As discussed earlier in this Note, the use of customary international criminal law by the ICC
remains an option; however, such use is not to be the primary law applied in the ICC, and is only
supplementary. Supra section IV. B.
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forced to face, as highlighted earlier. For instance, the ICC, unlike the ICTY and
ICTR, will not be compelled to use confusing, ill-created customary international
criminal law. In addition, the ICC will not have to decipher if certain violations of
conventional international criminal laws is a criminal offense, or just illegal
breaches. For the foregoing reasons, the ICC, as it presently stands, is without
question a vast improvement over the ad hoc tribunals.
D. The Flaws of The ICC: Is the ICC the Answer?
The amazing amount of perseverance and cooperation necessary to create the
Rome Statute resulted in an enormous international accomplishment when the ICC
became reality on July 1, 2002.307 Yet, it would be a disservice to the world's
aspiration for a fully functioning, coherent international criminal system to call the
ICC the answer. Substantively, structurally, and of gravest concern, conceptually,
the ICC faces an uphill struggle that will not be overcome without either a
revolution in the international legal order or momentous alterations to the ICC's
structure. The struggle that awaits the ICC stems from two factors: internal defects
within the ICC and the external realities of the Westphalian world order.
Internally, the ICC must confront some troubling issues. Of chief concern is
that justifying the ICC's ability to go from "jurisdiction to prescribe" to
"jurisdiction to adjudicate" is a complicated mess in comparison to domestic
courts. Of course, this complicated mess stems from the self-inflicted negotiated
compromises made between those who supported sovereignty and those who
supported the international rule of law. However, the principle of complimentarity,
the multitude of jurisdictional preconditions, and all the other jurisdictional merry-
go-rounds in the Rome Statute obscures when the ICC can adjudicate the subject
matter of the Rome Statute or when it must defer to national proceedings. 30 8 This
ultimately will impair the ICC's ability to operate without controversy. 319 In this
respect, the ICC is a setback from its ad hoc tribunal predecessors, where both the
ICTY and ICTR had primacy of jurisdiction over national proceedings, which
inevitably means that the ICC will have to deal with significantly more
jurisdictional battles than both ad hoc tribunals combined. 310 The Rome Statute
does not provide any countermeasures to State Parties that abuse the
complimentarity system, whereby a State Party can feasibly launch a bogus
investigation of an alleged international crime in order to deflect ICC intervention
and/or to prevent any judicial action from taking place at all.311 Additionally, the
307. Establishment of the Court, supra note 3.
308. See BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 83; SADAT, supra note 200, at 110-11, 114 ("Yet the
Statute does not propose a bright line test for sorting the international from the national; that is, there is
no 'interstate commerce clause requirement' such as we find in U.S. federal criminal law, ").
Amazingly, the Rome Statute's most explicit indication of when the ICC possesses jurisdiction to
adjudicate is where the Rome Statute vaguely says that the ICC can adjudicate "the most serious crimes
of concern to the international community as a whole." Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 207, art.
5(1).
309. See BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 83; SADAT, supra note 200, at 110-11, 114.
310. SADAT, supra note 200, at 85, 280.
311. Id. at 124. Although the Rome Statute states that the State Party must "genuinely" be
unwilling or unable to prosecute in order for the ICC to adjudicate, there is question as to what
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confusion surrounding when the ICC has jurisdiction to adjudicate is another
reason supporting the conclusion that the ICC may be an unattractive forum to
adjudicate international crimes. Limited financial resources, an inexperienced
judicial system, potential adjudication away from the territory of the crime, and the
inevitable difficulties in extraterritorially gathering evidence, running
investigations, and apprehending suspects are all extremely valid reasons against
bringing a case to the ICC.
3 12
The most troubling internal problem with the ICC is its jurisdiction to
enforce,313 which "is paltry, at best,... ' '314 Unlike the ICC's jurisdiction to
prescribe and adjudicate, the ICC's jurisdiction to enforce is far from ground-
breaking, for the ICC depends almost completely on State Party cooperation to
fulfill even the most basic judicial functions. 315 While there is nothing theoretically
wrong with having a State-dependent enforcement structure, the ICC gives little
motivating incentives to State Parties to comply or harsh penalties for not
complying, and consequently, the ICC will go through the same enforcement
hardships that afflicted the ad hoc tribunals. 316 Given that States are afforded
enough discretion and power to undercut the ICC's enforcement mechanism freely
and purposefully - if so desired-, the ICC's jurisdiction to enforce is uncomfortably
at the whim of sovereign nations and ill-fated by design.
317
The blame for all of these internal structural and substantive problems
belongs with the Rome Statute Framers who attempted to achieve compromise
between what the former President of the ICTY believes are completely
"genuinely" means and if the ICC is able to prove one way or another if the State Party is "genuinely"
unwilling or unable to adjudicate themselves? Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 17(1)(a-b); see SADAT,
supra note 200, at 124.
312. SADAT, supra note 200, at 114.
313. Jurisdiction to enforce, in this Note, should be construed very broadly. It includes enforcing
anything and everything that would come up during an investigation, pre-trial process, and/or trial.
Anything, big or small, that a tribunal must enforce in order to work is encompassed under the term
"jurisdiction to enforce".
314. SADAT, supra note 200, at 11.
315. The ICC lacks an independent police force, and accordingly, cannot undertake the most basic
judicial operations without State Party cooperation, including execute arrest warrants, freeze assets,
order the production of documents, force witness to appear, issue subpoenas, impose penalties on State
Parties that do not comply with the Rome Statute, or undertake judicial orders on the territories of State
Parties, to name a few. SADAT, supra note 200, at 120-22; BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 151-162
(giving detailed insight in the ad hoc tribunal enforcement problems, the enforcement mechanism of the
ICC, and concluding that the enforcement mechanism depends heavily on cooperation and is subject to
the old world order of sovereignty); Cassese, supra note 197, at 435 ("The second shortcoming is more
serious. Like any other international criminal tribunal, the ICC relies heavily upon state cooperation, to
the extent that it might be crippled in the absence of such cooperation.").
316. The ICC can look simply to the troubles the ICTY and ICTR experienced to foretell the ICC's
future in this regard, because both ad hoc tribunals were also dependent on sovereign States for
enforcement measures. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 151-162.
317. Stephan Rademaker, Unwitting Part to Genocide:The International Criminal Court is
Complicating Efforts to Save Darfur, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2007, at A25 (illustrating the power of a
State-China in this instance-to frustrate an ICC's international criminal investigation in Sudan, all in
the name of protecting China's domestic and foreign interest in Sudanese oil).
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incompatible interests: sovereignty and international rule of law. 318 As the ICC
grows older and as these internal issues slowly develop into mammoth
impediments, it will become even more evident that the Rome Statute Framers
should have charted a different course for the ICC, specifically one that did not
include unworkable compromises.
Perhaps the most egregious misstep of the Rome Statute Framers was in their
misunderstanding of how a permanent international criminal court should
conceptually be constructed in light of the undeniable external reality of the
Westphalian international world order. 3 19  As a consequence of this
misunderstanding, the ICC is ill-equipped for success in our State-centric world of
international law because it frustrates the very essence of sovereignty, and
accordingly, the odds are not in its favor that it can survive in this Westphalian
world order.320
Doubts exist as to whether the Westphalian State-centric international world
order still persists as it once did. There is a popular belief that the impact of
globalization, the expanding recognition of human rights, and the growing
legitimacy of international law has elevated the influence of multinational
corporations and non-governmental organizations to new heights, and
correspondingly, has chipped away at the authority of sovereign States on the
world stage. 321 Similarly, another common conception is that the end of the Cold
War brought about a new found willingness on the part of the international
community to use the law as a preferred method of fighting international crime,
even if this means violating the Cold War maxim that no one intervenes into the
internal affairs of a sovereign State.322 These beliefs, while true to a certain extent,
318. Cassese, supra note 228, at 6-9 (stating that either one supports sovereignty or one supports
international rule of law, for one cannot support both); see BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 56, 68
(discussing the compromise made between State sovereignty and the international rule of
law/effectiveness during the Rome Statute negotiations).
319. For purposes of this Note, Westphalian world order and State-centric world order are one and
the same. Both refer to the historical and present-day system of world affairs in which sovereign States
dominate everything, including international law, international diplomacy, and international politics.
Supra note 9.
320. It should be noted that this point, and other similar ones, are not endorsements of unabashed
sovereignty. Rather, one of the premises of this Note is that sovereignty still rules, and likely will
always have a strong role in international affairs for the foreseeable future. Hence, an international
criminal law system should construct itself around this undeniable reality.
321. It is popular conception, in and out of the legal world, that the power of sovereign States in the
world is slowly eroding. This sentiment can be found in many different sources across the spectrum.
See generally NON-STATE ACTORS IN WORLD POLITICS (Daphn6 Josselin & William Wallace eds.,
2001); Christyne J. Vachon, Sovereignty Versus Globalization: The International Court of Justice's
Advisory Opinion on the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 691 (1998);
Ken Wiwa, Commentary, Without Borders: In a World With No Borders, The Best-Connected Nation is
King, GLOBE AND MAIL (TORONTO), Sept. 27, 2003 at A27; Jeff Vail, The New Map: Terrorism and
the Decline of the Nation-State in a Post-Cartesian World, http://www.jeffvail.net/thenewmap.doc (last
visited Oct. 21, 2007).
322. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 185-86 ("The end of the Cold War brought with it a change in
the way that issues were articulated, given priority, and responded to at the international level ... More
to the point, the collapse of the system of superpower confrontation has allowed human rights to take a
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are overstatements and mischaracterizations of reality on the ground, for the
prevailing international legal structure remains State-centric:
The end of the Cold War... has led to some attenuation of the link
between territorial integrity and international stability, and has
supported an increased willingness to consider intervention and the
altering of borders... At the same time, the importance of the Cold
War's end as a matter of legal change should not be exaggerated. The
conditions inherent in the post-War order (dividing prohibitions and
their enforcement, norms and behavior, and ultimately law and politics)
have not themselves ceased to exist since 1989. Decisions in
interpreting or applying the law, as well as action authorized through
the Security Council, the (ICC) Assembly of State Parties, or NATO,
unilaterally or otherwise, will continue to depend significantly on the
auto-interpretation of self-interested States and on their calculus of
national strategic, economic, and political costs and benefits... The
same can be said of the "decline of sovereignty" and globalization. The
term 'globalization' may be the 'the clich6 of our times'... While
globalization does have certain power in framing analysis of
undoubtedly real transformations in a number of areas... the
"distinctive attributes of contemporary globalization.., by no means
simply prefigures the demise of the nation-state or even the erosion of
state power". On the contrary, "processes of globalization are closely
associated with, although by no means the sole cause of, a
transformation or reconstitution of the power of the modem nation-
state."... The better view is that the foreseeable future does not hold the
realistic prospect of a significant replacement or realignment of the
institution of sovereignty, at least in any sense relevant to the
establishment of the preconditions for regular, impartial enforcement of
international criminal law. 323
Of particular relevance to international criminal law, the fact that ultimate
power still rest exclusively within the control of sovereign States lend itself to the
conclusion that "there are few signs that the tension between the 'international
order' rationale of international criminal law and the State-centric character of the
'Westphalian' system is likely to abate in the foreseeable future." 324 Specifically,
sovereign States still hold onto two powers that disrupt the proper and effective
implementation of international criminal law: sovereign States maintain a
more prominent place in the discourse and the practice of States and international organizations ... The
increasing prominence, expansion, and refinement of international criminal law, and the project
establishing an ICC... were also facilitated by this change.")
323. Id. at 184-88 (footnotes omitted); see also Gene M. Lyons & Michael Mastanduno, State
Sovereignty and the International Intervention: Reflection on the Present and Prospects for the Future,
in BEYOND WESTPHALIA? STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION, 250, 250-51
(1995); Duncan B. Hollis, Why State Consent Still Matters - Non-State Actors, Treaties, and The
Changing Sources of International Law, 23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 137, 145-74 (2005).
324. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 58.
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"'monopoly on legitimate force' and; enjoy the freedom to make legal decisions
based solely upon non- or extra-judicial factors.
325
As discussed elsewhere, the jurisdiction to enforce, or said simply, the ability
to implement judicial decisions, to use military force, and to police other States
remains in the hands of sovereign States, not the international 
community.3 26
Furthermore, sovereign States freely make critical decisions on international
criminal matters based upon "diplomatic, economic, strategic, and 'purely
political' considerations, rather than applying international criminal law
objectively and justly. Without an international constitution that divides powers
among States, a large majority of the "legislative, executive, and adjudicative
functions" exercised in the international arena rest within "the discretion of
States." '327 Until it can be said that the decision-makers on international criminal
issues are reasonably impartial and predictable, and possess the requisite and
unequivocal force to back up their decisions, any international criminal system
must come to terms with "the State-centric character of the 'Westphalian'
system
, 328
Taking into account the continued domination of the State-centric model of
international law, the conceptual blunder committed by the Rome Statute Framers
becomes more apparent. The Rome Statute Framers assumed that the only way to
combat international crime was to convince sovereign States to agree upon the
creation of a completely independent international organization that would have
jurisdiction over international crimes, a jurisdiction traditionally under sole
possession of sovereign States. In other words, the Rome Statute Framers shared
the popular belief that the promotion of international rule of law can only occur at
the expense of sovereignty. While the logic of this idea is not in itself controversial
or unworkable in a perfect world, it is an idea that simply will not work in a State-
centric world because it upsets the very core of sovereignty.
Nowhere is this sentiment better expressed than the U.S. stance on the ICC.
The U.S. views the mere existence of the ICC as an abrogation of its sovereign
independence, mainly because the ICC possesses a power in international criminal
325. Id. at 58, 60.
326. Id. ("In fact, significant delegations of decision-making authority in vital areas of the policing,
security, and military functions of States are not typically made in international law."). Even
international organizations set up to police others States, such as the U.N. and NATO, do not make truly
international decisions on the actions of other States. Rather, these international entities are mechanism
whereby Member States to these organizations exercise their powers behind the veil of an international
organization as a means to mask their decisions of other States. Id. at 60.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 58. Broomhall concludes that if the enforcement of international criminal law
intrinsically means "the revision" of the State-centric Westphalian world order, than "it would require a
deep change in the international order, either through a marked decline in (or delegation of)
sovereignty, or through a substantial convergence of interests among States (giving rise, for example, to
an international police authority)." Id. Such drastic events are highly unlikely to happen, either today or
in the foreseeable future. So, that is where the Roaming ICC proposal comes into play, because it brings
about the enforcement of international criminal law without the need for such drastic events such as
these to occur.
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jurisdiction-albeit extremely limited-that the U.S. believes only sovereign
States are meant to possess. 3 29 Specifically, the U.S. believes that allowing for the
existence of an entity that is entirely independent from the sovereignty of the U.S.
and permitted to adjudicate international crimes takes away a piece of U.S.
sovereignty. 3 0 The U.S. would rather have sovereign nations, on their own, be
responsible for adjudicating international crimes, or allow sovereign nations the
opportunity to create ad hoc tribunals when needed, as the U.S. proposed should be
done in Darfur, Sudan.33' Yet, given that the ICC does have jurisdiction over
international criminal activity and that the ICC's international criminal jurisdiction
does come at the cost of sovereign States being unable to practice international
criminal jurisdiction in limited circumstances, this fuels the U.S.' perception of the
ICC as an unbridled foreign tyrant that if given one ounce of power, it will grow to
encroach on the sovereignty of all States. 332 The legitimacy of this perception is
not an issue, for the reality of the ICC slowly destroying the U.S.' or any other
nation's sovereignty is beyond comprehension.333 Nonetheless, as demonstrated by
329. Prior to becoming the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, John Bolton spoke on behalf of
the U.S. Department of State on the topic of the ICC, stating:
[flor a number of reasons, the United States decided that the ICC had unacceptable consequences for
our national sovereignty. Specifically, the ICC is an organization whose precepts go against
fundamental American notions of sovereignty, checks and balances, and national independence. It is an
agreement that is harmful to the national interests of the United States, and harmful to our presence
abroad.
See The United States and the International Criminal Court, U.S. Dep't of State, Nov. 14, 2002,
http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/15158.htm [hereinafter Bolton Speech].
330. Id.
331. Fact Sheet, infra note 334 (trumpeting the use of ad hoc tribunals as an option to the ICC).
Without a doubt, the U.S. is infatuated with the concepts of ad hoc tribunals. Despite it being common
knowledge that ad hoc tribunals are costly, inefficient, and jurisdictionally unsound, the U.S. continues
to run against prevailing world opinion that embraces a permanent international criminal court. This
was demonstrated when the U.S. proposed for an UN resolution to create an ad hoc tribunal for the
international crimes occurring in Darfur, Sudan even though the majority of the UN Security Council
voted to refer the Darfur, Sudan situation to the ICC. U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 5158d mtg. at 3, U.N.
Doe. S/PV.5158 (Mar. 31, 2005), available at
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/PVs_1593_DarfurReferral_3lMarch05.pdf; WILLIAM A. SCHABAS,
THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA AND SIERRA
LEONE 5 (2006).
332. See Bolton Speech, supra note 329 ("[O]ne might assume that the ICC is simply a further step
in the orderly march toward the peaceful settlement of international disputes, sought since time
immemorial. But in several respects, the court is poised to assert authority over nation states,. . .Never
before has the United States been asked to place any of that power outside the complete control of our
national government without our consent."); Anne K. Heindel, The Counterproductive Bush
Administration Policy Toward the International Criminal Court, 2 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 345, 362-63
(2004)(documenting the vehement words of Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International
Security John Bolton that the ICC will destroy U.S. constitution, and that the ICC is a risk to U.S.
sovereignty).
333. Personally, this Note's author believes that countless human rights abuses and international
crimes have been committed in the name of sovereignty or protected by the notion of sovereignty.
Ideally, if States were to stop trumpeting the sovereignty horn, the international rule of law could make
the world a more peaceful and stable place. Raphael Lemkin, as quoted by Samantha Power, best
expressed the ills of State sovereignty in relation to international crimes, "Lemkin was appalled that the
banner of 'state sovereignty' could shield men who tried to wipe out an entire minority. 'Sovereignty,'
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the U.S.' fanatical rejection of the ICC, the existence of this perception within the
U.S. government is not in question, and more likely than not, this perception even
exist within some governments of State Parties to the Rome Statute. Without
substantial changes to the ICC, the perception of the ICC being anti-sovereignty
will put the ICC at odds with a multitude of sovereign States in the future, and
given the power of the sovereign State in the Westphalian world order, the ICC
will find itself in a very perilous position.
Unfortunately for the ICC, this perception might already be working against
it. The U.S. has lodged a litany of legal complaints against the ICC, such as the
overall power of the ICC, the independence of the Office of the Prosecutor, the
jurisdiction of the ICC, and the ICC referral process, to name a few. 334 Despite the
assurances of domestic and international legal organizations-including the
American Bar Association- that the U.S.' concerns are effectively addressed in
the Rome Statute,335 U.S. opposition to the ICC remains firm and may also prove
336 thdestructive. In fact, the U.S. opposition to the ICC is so fervent that the U.S. has
taken proactive steps to nullify and undermine the ICC through legislation 337and
bilateral treaties.338 Most disturbing is the American Servicemembers' Protection
Act, dubbed the "Hague Invasion Act", which not only prohibits any sort of U.S.
governmental cooperation with the ICC, but also authorizes the President to use
military force to extract any U.S. citizens or U.S. protected individuals held in ICC
custody in The Hague, which should not be forgotten is located in The
Netherlands, an U.S. NATO ally! 339 Considering the U.S.' persistent assaults on
Lemkin argued... 'implies conducting an independent foreign and internal policy, building of schools,
construction of roads.., all types of activity directed towards the welfare of people. Sovereignty cannot
be conceived as the right to kill millions of innocent people."' POWER, supra note 1, at 19.
334. See Fact Sheet: The International Criminal Court, U.S. Dept. of State, May 6, 2002,
http://www.state.gov/s/wci/usreleases/fs/9978.htm (listing the U.S. objections to the ICC) [hereinafter
Fact Sheet].
335. See A.B.A., Recommendation that the United States Government Accede to the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court, at 5-9, Feb. 19, 2001, available at
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/ABARes-onUSFebOl.pdf; Just. Richard J. Goldstone, US
Withdrawal from ICC Undermines Decades of American Leadership in International Justice, The
International Criminal Court Monitor: The Newspaper of the NGO Coalition for the International
Criminal Court (New York), Issue 21, June 2002, at 3, 11, available at
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/monitor2l.200106.english.pdf (giving legitimate legal answers to
each and every U.S. objection to the ICC).
336. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 168 ("Under the Bush Administration, such efforts to obtain a
'fix' have been abandoned, and replaced by a stance of active hostility..."); Diane Marie Amann &
M.N.S. Sellers, The United States ofAmerica and the International Criminal Court, 50 AM. J. COMP. L.
381, 385-86 (2002) (cataloging U.S. Senators disparaging and anti-cooperative remarks about the ICC,
including calling the ICC an "international kangaroo court"); Heindel, supra note 332, at 364-65
(alluding to the words of U.S. officials that not only do not support the ICC, but would rather it not
exists).
337. Amann & Sellers, supra note 336, at 384.
338. Heindel, supra note 332, at 365-67; see generally Chet J. Tan, Jr., The Proliferation of
Bilateral Non-Surrender Agreements Among Non-Ratifiers of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, 19 AM. U. INT'L. L. REV. 1115 (2004).
339. American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002, 22 U.S.C. § 7421 (2002), available at
http://vienna.usembassy.gov/en/download/pdf/aspa2002.pdf; see Human Rights Watch, Human Rights
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the ICC and its unresponsiveness to the counterarguments presented by ICC
proponents, it is clear that the objections the U.S. holds against the ICC run deeper
than mere issues with the language in the Rome Statute, and instead are motivated
by the perception of the ICC as anti-sovereignty.
340
The ICC may believe that it can go on successfully without U.S. support,
341
but the likelihood of this occurring is remote. The track record of large, hopeful
international organizations existing without U.S. support is abysmal, considering
that the lack of U.S. support already demolished one great international effort in
the League of Nations 342 and arguably might spoil the greatest international
agreement of all in the United Nations.343 Although a majority of the world's
nations signed and ratified the Rome Statute that brought about the ICC,344 it is not
beyond the realm of possibilities that the U.S. -a single, albeit powerful State-
could destroy the ICC. 345 If the ICC hopes to corral U.S. support, the perception of
the ICC as an international hegemon determined to demolish the sovereignty of all
States must be eradicated. However, the question remains if it is even feasible for
the ICC to squelch this perception? If it cannot, the ICC runs the risk of becoming
the next ICJ, or even worse, a distant memory.
346
News, U.S.: 'Hague Invasion Act' Becomes Law: White House "Stops at Nothing" in Campaign Against
War Crimes Court, http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/08/aspa080302.htm (last visited Aug. 3, 2007).
340. BROOMHALL, supra note 59, at 183; SADAT, supra note 200, at 280. It is not a surprise that the
U.S.' opposition to the ICC is driven by a perception of the ICC as an infringement on U.S. sovereignty.
During the U.S. Senate deliberation on ratifying the Genocide convention, which received strong
international support and was ratified by many countries, the opposition of the U.S. government to
ratifying the Genocide Convention was an almost carbon copy to the present day opposition of the U.S.
government to acceding to the Rome Statute and ICC. When every single legal or logistical critique put
forward by the U.S. government for not ratifying the Genocide Convention was shot down by
overwhelming evidence, the U.S. government still maintained a position against ratification. There
forward, it became evident that the U.S. opposition stemmed from the perception of the Genocide
Convention as an infringement on U.S. sovereignty. "The core American objection to the treaty, of
course, had little to do with the text, which was no vaguer than any other law that had not yet been
interpreted in a courtroom. Rather, American opposition was rooted in a traditional hostility toward any
infringement on U.S. sovereignty, . . . [i]f the United States ratified the pact, senators worried they
would thus authorize outsiders to poke around in the internal affairs of the United States or embroil the
country in an 'entangling alliance' POWER, supra note I, at 65-9. That quote could, word for word, be
used to describe current U.S. opposition to the ICC. Moreover, the entire situation surrounding the U.S.
and the Genocide convention accurately describe the situation and sentiment revolving around the U.S.
government's present day opposition to the ICC.
341. BRoOMHALL, supra note 59, at 182-83.
342. BROOMHALL, supra note 5 1, at 183; SADAT, supra note 200, at 43.
343. See Tom Regan, US, UN: Can This "Unhappy Marriage" Be Saved?, Christian Sci. Monitor,
June 9, 2006, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0609/dailyUpdate.html.
344. See International Criminal Court, Assembly of State Parties, The State Parties to the Rome
Statute, http://www.icc-cpi.int/statesparties.html, (last visited Oct. 17, 2007).
345. See BROOMHALL, supra note 51, at 183; SADAT, supra note 200, at 43. The fact that one
sovereign State could bring down or even disrupt any large international institution that is supported by
a majority of States also supports the finding that can the international legal order continues to be State-
centric.
346. See Simi Singh, The Future of International Criminal Law: The International Criminal Court
(ICC), 10 TOURO INT'L L. REv. 1, 10-11 (2000) (warning that the ICC could become just as ineffective
institution as the ICJ, and documents reasons why the ICJ is ineffective); but see Douglass Cassel, Is
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IV. ROAMING ICC: AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL SYSTEM MADE FOR OUR STATE-
CENTRIC WORLD
A. What Do the Flaws of the ICC Tell Us?
It is not a stretch to label the internal problems and conceptual missteps of the
ICC as alarming, for theses issues raise considerable doubt as to the ability of the
ICC to punish and deter the commission of international crimes. This is not to say
the ICC is a failure, because the Rome Statute and the institution it created will be
remembered as a watershed moment in the history of international criminal law.
However, the world deserves a completely universal international criminal
enforcement mechanism, because an all-inclusive system is a prerequisite to a truly
effective system. Sadly, the current ICC cannot be considered as such. The
question then becomes "what must be done to establish an international criminal
enforcement mechanism that is sufficiently inclusive so as to properly deter and
punish international criminals?"
Currently, the international legal community at large is bickering over the
wrong issues regarding the ICC and the ICC's role in the progression of
international criminal law. The focus of international debate has revolved around
the internal problems with the ICC, specifically the structural and substantive
facets of the Rome Statute discussed earlier.347 While these issues are deserving of
attention, such discussion does little to bring the world to a consensus over how to
create a proper international criminal system, because many of these issues are
secondary to the one issue that is fundamental to the development of an
appropriate international criminal enforcement mechanism. This fundamental issue
is one that this Note has already discussed briefly: How the Westphalian State-
centric world order effects the development of international criminal law? In more
basic terms, how to reconcile sovereignty with the international rule of law?
The reason why the resolution of this quandary is vital to the creation of a
proper international criminal system is straightforward: if the sovereign authority
of States is not upset by the creation of an international criminal system, in that the
international criminal enforcement mechanism is not perceived by States as a
threat to their sovereignty, such a system will have an greatly increased chance of
surviving in our Westphalian world order. Considering the importance of this
issue, it is disappointing that the Rome Statute Framers fell back onto the
There a New World Court?, 1 Nw. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTs. 1, 18-31 (2003) (showing that the ICJ's surge
in caseload is an indication of the resurrection in the ICJ's importance); Chris Borgen, Reconsidering
the Reconsideration of the ICJ, Opinio Juris, http://lawofiations.blogspot.com/2005/06/reconsidering-
reconsideration-of-icj.html (arguing that the ICJ is not a very good judicial body, but is the one of the
premier international legislative body).
347. By substantive and structural issues, this Notes means issues regarding the language of the
Rome Statute and the internal structure of the ICC, which turn into arguments over, for instance, the
independence of the Prosecutor, the level of cooperation State Parties must give, the limits of ICC
jurisdiction, etc. Essentially, issues that are not conceptual, but more legal in nature. See Fact Sheet,
supra note 334 (showing that a majority of the U.S.' official objections to the ICC--considered the
main opponent of the ICC-deal with structural and substantive aspect of the Rome Statute and the
ICC); supra section IV, D.
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conventional, but unworkable conclusion that only through compromise of the
uncompromisable-sovereignty and international rule of law-can an international
criminal enforcement mechanism be agreed upon by sovereign States. Thus, the
Rome Statute Framers' decision to promote the establishment of a detached,
independent international institution bestowed with limited, yet significant
international criminal jurisdiction over international crimes not only failed to
resolve the dilemma between sovereignty and the international rule of law, but
created deeper division among the international community. Where some States
were willing to approve of the creation of the ICC at the cost of losing some
sovereignty, other States balked at the idea of an international criminal system that
jeopardized their unbridled sovereignty. The result of the Rome Statute Framers'
miscalculation is a problematic ICC that has not received the support of the
world's most powerful country, the U.S. 348 No matter how misguided the U.S.
may be on the ICC issue, the reality is that an international criminal system
without the U.S. holds a slim chance of being as effective as it would be with the
preeminent international economic, military, and political leader.349 Furthermore, a
true sense of international justice can never be realized without the moral support
and cooperation of the U.S. 350 Does this mean the rest of the world must back
down to U.S. demands in order to achieve any semblance of an international
criminal system? Certainly not, for having it the U.S.' way would abandon the
much needed support of the rest of the world. Instead, this Note proposes a new
option.
To set the stage for this new option, the following section delves deeper into
the philosophical and conceptual pitfalls of the conventional method used to create
international criminal institutions. To date, international efforts towards the
establishment of an international criminal enforcement mechanism focused on
either the ad hoc-Nuremberg, the ICTY, the ICTR-or prospective-the ICC-
creation of an international criminal body without addressing the structural
weakness of such options in a State-centric model of international law. This
structural weakness exists because these prior mechanisms are grounded upon the
murky realm that exists between, and outside, sovereign states. Thus, when the
international community agrees to the formation of an international criminal
enforcement mechanism whereby sovereign States are bound, to one degree or
another, to an entity that exists outside of the realm of all sovereign States, this
agreement is perched precariously beyond the strength of the Westphalian world
order and cannot stand up to the concerns of State actors that stem from the very
core of this order. Using the ICC as an example to clarify, the ICC is an entity that
exists completely detached from the confines of any and all State Parties. The ICC
348. See SADAT, supra note 200, at 280; see generally Eric P. Schwartz, The United States and the
International Criminal Court: The Case for "Dexterous Multilateralism ", 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 223 (2003)
(diagramming the U.S. position against the ICC, which is at the forefront of opposition to the ICC).
349. BROOMHALL, supra note 51, at 163-64; SADAT, supra note 200, at 43; see Amann & Sellers,
supra note 336, at 382 (stating that the U.S. will likely continue to distance itself from the ICC, which
severely hampers the ICC's future).
350. SADAT, supra note 200, at 43.
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is on the outside looking in on the sovereignty of all State Parties, or as the U.S.
inartfully, but accurately put it, "the Court... [is] simply 'out there' in the
international system." 351 Yet, despite its outsider status, the ICC can potentially
bind sovereign State Parties to its jurisdiction.352 Little thought has gone into the
creation of an international criminal system tailored to the strength of our State-
centric world, the strength being the domestic authority of each and every
sovereign nation. Few question the power a sovereign State possesses over its
territory, a power which derives from the State exercising dominion over its people
and land. This unquestioned power of sovereign States is the strength of the State-
centric system of international law, and this Note proposes that the ICC reinvent
itself in order to harness this strength.
B. Details of the Roaming ICC
This Note's proposal is for the international legal community to re-
conceptualize the manner in which an international criminal system should exist.
Instead of creating an independent, detached, outside entity that hovers over all
sovereign States, the international community should adopt an international
criminal system that exists within every sovereign State. The heart of the proposal
is a decentralized international criminal system that would facilitate the creation of
temporary courts of law manned by domestic, regional, and international Judges
and Prosecutors that would exercise the same substantive and procedural
international criminal laws in the prosecution and adjudication of an alleged
international criminal violation, regardless of where the court resides
geographically. The "Roaming ICC" proposal does not call for the abandonment of
the current ICC in its entirety, but rather a reformulation of the conceptual
infrastructure of the current ICC to reflect a new thinking of how an international
criminal system should be. Accordingly, the aim of the Roaming ICC proposal is
to make alterations to the framework of the current ICC, not to abolish it, and thus
transform the current ICC into the Roaming ICC.
The Roaming ICC proposal has two essential components. The first
component is the backbone of the Roaming ICC: the adoption of the Roaming ICC
substantive and procedural laws into each State Party's domestic law. The
Roaming ICC's substantive and procedural laws 353 would not be drastically
different from the Rome Statute, except for changes to the Rome Statute's
procedural laws that are necessary to mesh the diversity of international procedural
351. Bolton Speech, supra note 329.
352. See Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 207, art. 3 (inferring that the ICC is separate from
any sovereign State, for it enters into agreements with the Hague for its occupancy, and can leave the
Hague if need be).
353. As any honest lawyer would admit, the difference between substantive and procedural law can
be as clear as mud. For purposes of this Note, Roaming ICC substantive law incorporates the
jurisdictional concepts, general principles of law, and subject matter of the Rome Statute, save any
obvious changes that would need to be made. By procedural, this Note means the rules that govern the
conduct of an ICC trial, not the procedural rules associated with the complimentarity system, or the
procedural rules associated with the ICCs jurisdiction to adjudicate. The Roaming ICC gets rid of these
procedural rules.
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and court room rules.354 More precisely, the Rome Statute's subject matter laws
giving the current ICC jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and aggression 355 would also be the Roaming ICC's substantive law and
the Rome Statute's procedural laws on prosecutorial duties, court room rules, and
pre-trial procedures would become the Roaming ICC's procedural laws, and
altogether, would form the law of the Roaming ICC from which every State Party
would enact into their internal law, word for word. No State Party would be
allowed to make reservations or amendments to either the substantive or
procedural laws of the Roaming ICC, for absolute consistency from one State to
another is critical for the success of the Roaming ICC. 35 6 While this concept of
totally adopting the Rome Statute into the domestic law of a State has been
followed by some current ICC State Parties, 357 others have not taken that course in
regard to the Rome Statute.358 It must be stressed that it is mandatory that the each
State Party to the Roaming ICC adopt the substantive-including relevant
jurisdictional aspects-and procedural components of the Roaming ICC
jurisprudence into the State Party's domestic law without exception. 359 Otherwise,
important jurisdictional aspects of the Roaming ICC would crumble.
The adoption of the Roaming ICC's substantive and procedural law into every
single nation's domestic law may sound impossible, but there are indicators that
this task is not as daunting as it might seem. There are numerous international
treaties and conventions, not to mention the Rome Statute itself, that exhibit the
world community's ability to agree on substantive laws against genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and to a certain degree, aggression. 360 Taking the
354. Because the current ICC is an international, independent body, their procedural laws (i.e.
within the court room, pre-trial, etc.) were developed as such. However, the Roaming ICC, as will be
shown, ends up operating in the domestic jurisdiction of any State Parties, so this facet of the Roaming
ICC would necessitate more international negotiations to come up with internal procedural laws for the
Roaming ICC that all States could agree with. This will be discussed later.
355. As noted, the aggression issue is still unresolved. Supra note 252. However, at the point in
time when the stalemate over defining the crime of aggression is resolved, it would be incorporated into
the Roaming ICC. At present, the crime of aggression would exist within the Roaming ICC as it does in
the current ICC.
356. See Fact Sheet, supra note 334 (showing that the U.S. is critical of the fact that the Rome
Statute does not allow States to add reservations, which in the Roaming ICC would be a similar
requirement).
357. See Implementation Strategies Adopted by: Australia, New Zealand Canada, United Kingdom
and South Africa, INT'L JUSTICE (Human Rights Watch, New York, NY), Dec. 18, 2002,
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/docs/chartl.pdf. Of course, it is not total, complete adoption, but
rather a total adoption of the Rome Statute's subject matter laws.
358. See Implementation Strategies Adopted by: Argentina, Spain, France, Switzerland and
Belgium, INT'L JUSTICE (Human Rights Watch, New York, NY), Dec. 18, 2002,
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/docs/chart3.pdf.
359. Essentially, every State Party to the Roaming ICC would have mirror image jurisprudences in
regards to the Roaming ICC.
360. See, e.g,. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 49, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Genocide
Convention, supra note 187; Hague Convention Hague Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539; Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 207.These
international laws are examples of already agreed upon substantive laws against genocide, war crimes,
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next step in having each country incorporate these laws without derogation into
their own jurisprudence will take significant amounts of time and effort, but is far
from an insurmountable task. The idea of adopting foreign material into a domestic
jurisprudence is not an uncommon practice in the U.S., for the adoption of
Restatements and Uniform Acts into the law of individual U.S. states occurs
frequently and parallels the same logic as adopting Roaming ICC substantive and
procedural law into the national law of all Roaming ICC State Parties. 361 However,
crafting a procedural system that the Roaming ICC could use in any State and that
Judges, Prosecutors, and Defense attorneys of varied legal background could work
with will take careful negotiations and a tremendous amount of effort to
accomplish, especially considering the gulf of differences between civil and
common law criminal systems. Nevertheless, the current ICC contains procedural
laws that a majority of the international community has already agreed to, and
additions and/or modifications to this already existing procedural law is a good
starting point from which to form an uniform, workable procedural system that
every State Party could agree to implementing.
The second component of the Roaming ICC proposal exhibits what is the
most radical difference between the Roaming ICC and the current ICC: the
transition from a centralized to a decentralized legal entity. Two Articles in the
Rome Statute allude to the possibility of the current ICC carrying out its judicial
functions within a State Party's territory, but instead of this possibility being the
exception, the Roaming ICC proposal would make this practice the rule.362 In
addition to each Roaming ICC State Party adopting the substantive and procedural
law of the Roaming ICC into their domestic jurisprudence, each State Party must
also agree to three contractual obligations in the Roaming ICC agreement: the
State Party must allow Roaming ICC proceedings to occur within their territory;
the State Party must fulfill their designated duties and obligations if a Roaming
ICC proceeding were to occur in their territory; and the State Party must accept
that international and regional Judges, Prosecutors, and other staff will enter its
territory to fulfill their duties and obligations in a Roaming ICC proceeding.
Making the Roaming ICC a decentralized court that could set up operation in the
jurisdiction of any Roaming ICC State Party on demand is a change that
unequivocally capitalizes on the strength of the State-centric system of
international law, because pursuant to the Roaming ICC contractual agreement, the
Roaming ICC would undertake its judicial proceeding within the domain of the
State Party where the international crime occurred. The intended consequence
being that the territorial jurisdiction and expertise of this State Party would be
utilized in order to effectuate the Roaming ICC process.
crimes against humanity, and aggression that could be adopted into each and every Roaming ICC State
Parties' jurisprudence.
361. See generally Kristen D. Adams, The Folly of Uniformity? Lessons from the Restatement
Movement, 33 HOFSTRA L. REv. 423 (2004) (describing the philosophy and practice of adopting
Restatements into U.S. state's jurisprudence, and the same practice could be used by Roaming ICC
State Parties in adoption of Roaming ICC substantive and procedural laws).
362. Rome Statute, supra note 207, art. 3-4.
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The basic setup of the Roaming ICC system would be a three-tiered
hierarchy, with varying amount of judicial and prosecutorial authority dispersed
throughout the branches of the Roaming ICC. Each level of the Roaming ICC
would contain a panel of Judges and a Prosecutor's Office.363 The highest level
would be the Roaming ICC Presidential Authority made up of internationally
chosen Judges and an internationally chosen Prosecutor's Office that would control
ultimate prosecutorial discretion in all Roaming ICC cases. 364 The second highest
level of the Roaming ICC system would be made up of multiple Roaming ICC
Regional Authorities that would represent large regional territories of the world,
such as Africa, Europe, Asia, North America, etc. Each Regional Authority,
accordingly, would have Judges and Prosecutors nominated by and chosen from
their respective region. Finally, the lowest level of the Roaming ICC framework
would comprise the many Roaming ICC State Authorities that represent each State
Party, with their own domestic Judges and Prosecutors.
An example of the course of events that would occur if an alleged
international crime happened under the Roaming ICC regime will help elaborate
on the structure and inner-working of the Roaming ICC. An alleged act of
genocide occurs in State Party A in Region A. Either the Prosecutors Office for
State A, the Regional Prosecutor's Office for Region A, the Presidential
Prosecutor's Office, or a collaborative team of these offices may start an
investigation into the alleged genocide. 365 The three prosecutorial offices shall
cooperate to decide if a prosecution should go forward, but ultimate prosecutorial
discretion on any prosecution would belong with the Presidential Prosecutor's
363. Every Judge and Prosecutor would be trained in the laws and procedures of the Roaming ICC,
thus equally useful in any State Party they may find themselves in. Also, membership requirements for
Judges and Prosecutors will be the same as the current ICC membership requirements. As for all the
other organs of the current ICC, they could stay centralized in the Presidential Authority under the
Roaming ICC proposal, such as the Registry, defense counsel assignment department, victims and civil
parties unit, witness protection unit, investigator's office, etc. However, these units would be able to
work outside of the centralized unit, such as the Registry could have a satellite unit set up where
Roaming ICC proceedings were taking place. This does not discount the possibility that Regional and
State Party authorities would have similar departments and services.
364. All the Prosecutor Offices across the Roaming ICC network would cooperate per the Roaming
ICC agreement and would defer to each other in certain circumstances. However, ultimate Prosecutorial
discretion is best left to the Presidential Prosecutor's Office, because this office would be the most
protected from the political and social implications on the ground where the international crime
occurred and would presumably be the most objective in deciding if an international crime did occur
and if it should be adjudicated. Again, information would flow freely among the Prosecutor's Offices,
and the Presidential Prosecutor's Office would be obligated to consult with the State Party and Regional
Prosecutor's Office in a majority of instances. The possibility exists that a procedure could be put in
place where, if the State Party and Regional Prosecutor Office agree on one course of action and the
Presidential Prosecutor's Office desires another course, the State Party and Regional Prosecutor's
Office could overrule the Presidential Prosecutor's Office or appeal to a Pre-Trial Chambers for
resolution.
365. Similar to the current ICC, each Prosecutor's Office, depending on which level it is from, will
need permission by a Judge from its Roaming ICC level at certain stages in the investigation process in
order to proceed with the investigation. However, when the Prosecutor's Office would need this
permission is a detail not worth going into in this Note.
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Office.3 66 In addition, the Presidential Prosecutor's Office would have ultimate
discretion to decide if the Presidential Prosecutor's Office, the Regional
Prosecutor's Office for Region A, or the Prosecutor's Office for State Party A shall
lead the prosecution of the case. 36 7 Once the investigation turns into an official
prosecution, a Pre-Trial Judge from State Party A would be appointed to supervise
pre-trial litigation, who would possess the same basic powers and responsibilities
as a Pre-Trial Judge at the ICC.3 68 Additionally, a panel of one Presidential
Authority judge, one Region A judge, and one State Party A judge would be
formed to handle select appeals lodged by parties against decision handed down by
the Pre-Trial Judge. As a trial becomes closer to reality, a panel of Trial Judges
would be formed consisting of one Judge from State Party A, one from Region A,
and one from the Presidential Authority. The Judge from the Presidency shall be
chief Judge, but each Judge would have equal weight in deciding procedural and
substantive issues that arise as well as the ultimate judgment of the case. This
mixed panel of Judges is just an extension of a concept already used by the UN-
sponsored hybrid international criminal tribunals in Sierra Leone, Cambodia, and
East Timor where domestic and international judges work on panels together.
369
366. However, there could be a procedure whereby the Roaming ICC State Party Prosecutor and
the Regional Authority Prosecutor can bind forces to overrule a decision of the Presidency Prosecutor,
which will alleviate U.S. concerns about overzealous international Prosecutors. Also, the idea of
domestic and international prosecutors working together is not just a theory, but an idea currently at
work at the UN-Cambodia criminal tribunal. See UN-Cambodia Agreement, infra note 369, art. 6.
367. The Presidential Prosecutor's Office would make a determination like this upon consideration
of resources, time/effort, effectiveness, suitable distance from the area where the international crimes
took place, etc., Whatever Prosecutor that ends up prosecuting the case will be treated as a Prosecutor
of the forum State Party. Furthermore, there will be no set rules on how the makeup of the Prosecutor's
team should be, such as what office must make up what percentage of the Prosecutorial team.
368. The background of this Pre-Trial Judge is debatable, but the existence of one is required. The
Pre-Trial Judge could be from the same Authority "level" as the lead Prosecutor that prosecutes the case
in chief, but could be from any Authority level. The Pre-Trial Judge would monitor the investigation of
the alleged international crime, tackle the multiple pre-trial procedural issues that arise from
investigations and preparation for trial, and confirm the indictment.
369. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N.- Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, art. 2, U.N. Doc.
S/2002/246, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-agreement.html; Agreement Between the United
Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of
Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, UN-Cambodia, June 6, 2003, art. 3,
5, U.N. Doc. A/Res/57/228 B, available at
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/agreement/5/AgreementbetweenUN and RGC.pdf
[hereinafter UN-Cambodia Agreement]; Agreement On the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive
Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offenses in East Timor, U.N. Transitional Administration in East
Timor, § 22, U.N. Doc. UJNTAET/REG/2000/15 (2000) (pursuant to U.N. SCOR Res. 1272), available
at http:// www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/RegOO15E.pdf, see David Cohen, Seeking Justice on the
Cheap: Is the East Timor Tribunal Really a Model for the Future?, AsIAPACFIC ISSUES, No. 61 (East-
West Center, Honolulu, HI), Aug. 2002, at 1, available at
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/stored/pdfs/api06l.pdf [hereinafter AsiaPacific]. Cohen's piece
criticizes the hybrid tribunal idea, but mainly for funding reasons, which would not be an issue for the
Roaming ICC, because the Roaming ICC structure will be able to pool resources from all three levels of
the Roaming ICC-State, Regional, and Presidential-; thus alleviating and spreading out financial
concerns associated with international criminal trials. Infra section V, D, 4. There has also been
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The Roaming ICC proceedings would take place in State A in a pre-existing
forum within State A. 370 Due to the alleged genocide occurring in State Party A in
violations of State Party A's Roaming ICC laws adopted by State Party A's
legislature or equal body, State Party A would have the obligation to carry out all
logistical and necessary aspects of the trial, which would include arrest and
detention of suspects, obtaining and securing evidence, victim and witness
protection, forum security, subsequent enforcement of court decisions, etc.371 After
a judgment is reached in the case, the Roaming ICC proceedings within State A
would be over, and the entire operation would be shut down. This entire Roaming
ICC investigation, pre-trial, and trial process would be replicated in any State Party
where an international crime occurred, or any State Party for that matter.
Additionally, given the immense, yet decentralized structure of the Roaming ICC,
many Roaming ICC proceedings could occur simultaneously in the territory of
multiple Roaming ICC State Parties, assuming the need was present.
In regard to appeals, the Roaming ICC Appeals process would institute a
different procedure from the current ICC. In order to avoid domestic bias and to
afford the defendant the most practical opportunities to prove his or her innocence
or correct procedural errors made at trial, the Roaming ICC appellate process
would be two-tiered with the first appeal of the presumed genocide conviction in
State Party A made to an panel of Judges solely from the Region A Authority, and
the final appeal would face a panel of Judges solely from the Presidential
Authority. To ease the worries of some Roaming ICC State Parties that there
would be regional or international review of a Roaming ICC judgment reached
within the territory of the State Party, appeals could only be made for procedural
errors or grave misapplications of Roaming ICC substantive law that would be
tantamount to subversion of the Roaming ICC process.
Having laid out an example of a hypothetical Roaming ICC proceeding, there
is a noticeable parallel between the Roaming ICC and the UN-Lebanon tribunal.
The UN-Lebanon tribunal is a hybrid international criminal tribunal currently
under development, and like other UN hybrid tribunals, is the creation of an
agreement between the UN and Lebanon to form an international criminal tribunal
additionally criticism regarding the rift between the Cambodian and international Judges over
procedural matters. See Seth Mydans, Unwieldy Court Further Complicates Khmer Rouge Trial, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Jan. 25, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/01/25/news/cambo.php. However, this
issue would not be a problem for the Roaming ICC, because negotiations prior to the world-wide
adoption of the Roaming ICC's substantive and procedural laws would smooth out these types of
issues. Also, one must remember that these tribunals are not all the same. For example, the UN-
Cambodia criminal court would best be called a "mixed" or internationalized domestic criminal court,
because it is not an international criminal tribunal in the strict sense. See SCHABAS, supra note 331, at 6.
370. If a violation occurs over separate countries, a decision by the Presidential Authority about the
most suitable forum or where the most substantial violations occurred would decide the correct State
Party forum. The possibility of a Roaming ICC proceeding not taking place where the international
crime occurred will be addressed later in this Note. Infra section V, D, 1.
371. The Presidency and Regional Authority would be able to provide additional funds, manpower,
and cooperation needed to carry out these functions (i.e. use their Victim's Unit or relevant personnel to
assist the State Parties victim representation and protection efforts).
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composed of international and domestic Judges and Prosecutors.3 72 The objective
of this tribunal is to handle the prosecution and adjudication of the Hariri
assassination and related criminal offenses.373 However, unlike other UN hybrid
tribunals, the UN-Lebanon tribunal will apply Lebanese criminal penal law
exclusively, rather than applying a mixture of international and domestic criminal
law. 374
The similarities between these two concepts is that the Roaming ICC system
would be the mass institutionalization of the idea behind the UN-Lebanon tribunal,
which in turn would facilitate the duplication of UN-Lebanon-like tribunals
anywhere in the world where an international crime occurs or in any State Party
hosting a Roaming ICC proceeding. Quite literally, the UN-Lebanon tribunal
would be an example of the Roaming ICC system in action, specifically if a
Roaming ICC proceeding was to take place in Lebanon.375 Additionally, like the
UN-Lebanon tribunal, a Roaming ICC proceeding would apply exclusively the
local criminal law as well. However, the local criminal law applied would be the
aforementioned Roaming ICC substantive and procedural law that every State
Party would have already incorporated in its domestic law with verbatim precision.
This correlation between the Roaming ICC and the UN-Lebanon tribunal indicates
that there is an undercurrent of approval within the international community for the
Roaming ICC proposal, because the international community has already
legitimized and accepted-as evidenced by the planned creation of the UN-
Lebanon tribunal-a fundamental precept of the Roaming ICC concept.
There are further tangible indications that the international community would
embrace the Roaming ICC. The UN-Cambodian Tribunal that is now underway is
best described as a "mixed" or internationalized domestic criminal tribunal, which
means that despite substantial international presence at the tribunal, it is for all
tenses and purposes a domestic criminal court. 376 The very name of this tribunal
indicates as such, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
372. The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary General on the Establishment of a Special
Tribunal for Lebanon, annex, pmbl., art. 1, 8, 11, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2006/893 (Nov. 15, 2006) [hereinafter UN-Lebanon Report]. Additionally, the UN-Lebanon tribunal
would be independent of the United Nations and the Lebanese judiciary, and would have primacy of
jurisdiction over domestic Lebanese courts. Id., 6, attach. art. 4.
373. Id., 1.
374. Id., attach, art. 2; see Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, UN-
Cambodia, art. 3 new-8, Oct. 27, 2004, Reach Kram No. NS/RKM/0801/12 (2001) (Cambodia),
available at
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/law/4/KRLaw-as-amended 27 Oct 2004_Eng.pdf
[hereinafter UN-Cambodian Statute]; Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, UN-Sierra Leone,
arts. 2-5, Jan. 16, 2002, U.N. Doc S/2002/246, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-statute.html.
375. At time of publishing, the seat of this UN-Lebanon Tribunal has not been determined
precisely. Along with the tribunal being located in Lebanon, there remains the possibility that the
tribunal will be seated in The Hague, Utrecht, or elsewhere in Europe. However, regardless where this
court takes place, many of the points made here still apply.
376. SCHABAS, supra note 331, at 6; UN-Cambodia Agreement, supra note 369, pmbl, art. 1, 31;
UN-Cambodian Statute, supra note 374, art. 2 new.
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(ECCC).377 Each organ and department within this tribunal is equally represented
by international and Cambodian personnel.378 While it remains to be seen if this
particular tribunal will be a total success, the existence of the ECCC further
supports the potential reality of the Roaming ICC. Specifically, the ECCC would
be another example of the Roaming ICC in action, because a Roaming ICC
tribunal in Cambodia would similarly be operated in total by an equal or equitable
distribution of international, regional, and domestic personnel. The ECCC-in its
makeup and conceptual foundation-is more or less a carbon copy of a Roaming
ICC tribunal at work, and as the ECCC continues towards becoming a genuine
success, the Roaming ICC proposal gradually gains legitimacy as well.
To dispel any confusion about the nature of the Roaming ICC, once a
Roaming ICC proceeding begins operation in a State Party's territory, this does not
mean that this proceeding is a defacto State Party proceeding and/or subject to all
of the State Party's domestic laws. For example, a Roaming ICC proceeding taking
place in the U.S. does not mean that the person tried would be subject to or receive
the benefit of all U.S. domestic laws, such as the 6th Amendment right to a jury
trial. The Roaming ICC proceeding would be technically separate from the State
Party. Theoretically, it is best to envision the State Party as an "active host" to the
Roaming ICC proceeding. The State Party would contribute its jurisdictional
supremacy-such as its police forces, investigators, subpoena powers-, its
prosecutors and judges, its court rooms, and so on, to the Roaming ICC for use
during the proceeding. This arrangement would be much like the relationship
between The Netherlands and the ICJ, ICTY, and the ICC, where Dutch authorities
and jurisdiction are often used for the benefit of these institutions, but the whole of
Dutch law does not apply to either these institutions or the individuals being
prosecuted. 7
C. What the Roaming ICC is Not
Just as important as it is to lay out what the Roaming ICC would be, it is also
important to distinguish the Roaming ICC from other similar proposals. First, the
Roaming ICC is not a "community of courts" idea, where the international
criminal enforcement mechanism is, essentially, a web of domestic courts
practicing international criminal jurisdiction over international crimes. 380 The
377. UN-Cambodia Agreement, supra note 369.
378. UN-Cambodia Agreement, supra note 369, art. 3, 5-6; UN-Cambodian Statute, supra note
374, art. 10 new, 16, 23 new.
379. The Dutch-ICJ/ICTYIICC arrangement is not completely parallel to the Roaming ICC/State
Party arrangement, for those tried at either the ICTY or ICC are not being tried for violation of any
Dutch criminal law, which an individual being tried at a Roaming ICC proceeding would be adjudicated
with, theoretically, if tried in The Netherlands. This would be so under the Roaming ICC system
because The Netherlands would have incorporated Roaming ICC's substantive and procedural laws into
its own jurisprudence, so the person tried would be-technically speaking-prosecuted for violation of
this law, regardless of where the events took place. This idea is further elaborated below. Infra section
IV (D) (l).
380. See Burke-White, supra note 60, at 75-97. While some of the fundamental principles of the
community of courts idea are present in the Roaming ICC, the difference is that the Roaming ICC
involves international participation at a much larger scale and requires far more organization than the
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community of courts concept differs in that it lacks active international
participation and oversight, and is better described as an organic coalition of
381domestic sovereign States practicing international criminal law on their own.
The extensive involvement of the international community is necessary, because
sovereign States, when left alone, have proven themselves to be untrustworthy in
doing the job of the international community in fighting international crime.
382
Even international pressure on sovereign States to use domestic measures to punish
the commission of international crimes has not shamed States into action. 383 The
Roaming ICC, on the other hand, utilizes active international participation in the
development of a system whereby an agreement between sovereign States and the
international community 384 will obligate States to work with the international
community in prosecuting and punishing international criminals. Specifically,
sovereign States will assist by allowing the international community to
"piggyback" onto the undisputed territorial authority and power of the sovereign
State, enabling both the State and the international community to fight
international crime in a collective manner. The Roaming ICC, basically, is the
concrete institutionalization of an agreement between sovereign States and the
international community to work together in enforcing international criminal law.
Additionally, the Roaming ICC is not a disjointed series of independent
hybrid courts, or an agreement between the current ICC and an individual State to
allow the ICC to set up a pseudo-hybrid court in the individual State.385 These
community of courts idea. Also, it is unknown what type of international criminal jurisdiction would be
practice under the community of courts idea, be it territorial, nationality, or universal.
381. Id. at 86 ("The emerging community of courts is largely self-organizing and self-regulating.
Though some of the principles that regulate the community are found in the Rome Statute, the
community itself lacks any controlling or regulating authority. Therefore, the relationships and
interactions among these courts are essential to the effectiveness of the emerging system of
international criminal justice").
382. See supra notes 48-60 and accompanying text. Additionally, even assuming many domestic
States were to practice international criminal law through whatever jurisdictional rationale, without a
standard uniform procedure to be used by these domestic States and without an international oversight
organization, these multiple domestic States end up applying diverse interpretations of international
criminal law and apply them in overly diverse ways. See, e.g., Redress Memo, supra note 35; New
Redress Memo, supra note 35.
383. See, e.g., Universal Jurisdiction in Europe: The State of the Art, Human Rights Watch Reports
(Human Rights Watch, New York, NY), June, 2006, at 1-2, available at
http:/ihrw.org/reports/2006/ij0606/index.htm; Antonio Cassese, Is the Bell Tolling for Universality? A
Plea for a Sensible Notion of Universal Jurisdiction, 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 589, 589-595 (2003).
384. It is odd to use the term "international community" outside of the context of the Roaming ICC,
because the international community is an abstract term, not a tangible entity, like a sovereign State.
However, in the context of the Roaming ICC, the international community is the combination of every
other State outside of the State where the trial would occur.
385. See Rosanna Lipscomb, Restructuring the ICC Framework to Advance Transitional Justice: A
Search for a Permanent Solution in Sudan, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 182, 204-212 (2006). Lipscomb also
makes mention of Article 3 and 4 as a basis for moving the ICC out of The Hague. However,
Lipscomb's idea focuses on a one time use of these Articles as a statutory basis from which to create an
ICC-Hybrid Tribunal in the Sudan. This Note's Roaming ICC proposal uses these Articles to promote a
much more radical departure from the current ICC, where these Articles would be the springboard from
which the current ICC would transform into a cohesive network of "ready to mix", but temporary
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ideas, while following similar logic and promoting similar objectives as the
Roaming ICC, are far less organized and developed than a potential Roaming ICC
regime. To use the analogy of a hybrid tribunal to differentiate the Roaming ICC
from these hybrid tribunals ideas: under the Roaming ICC framework, every State
Party would have a pre-existing organization-the Roaming ICC State Authority,
which in the instance of the U.S., could be an alliance between the Department of
Justice and Federal Judiciary- to receive and work with the incoming constituents
of the Roaming ICC Regional and Presidential Authorities, primarily being the
Prosecutors and Judges from those authorities. The next series of steps from this
point would include the State Party overseeing, if feasible, logistics for the trial,
386
the formation of the Judge's panel by the joint collaboration between each
Roaming ICC Authority, and the joint decision by the Prosecutor's Offices from
the varying levels of the Roaming ICC on which Prosecutor's Office will take on
which duties. Therefore, a hybrid tribunal of sorts would materialize more or less
overnight after the Roaming ICC decides to investigate and potentially prosecute
an international crime, given that the infrastructure needed for an investigation,
pre-trial, and trial would already be in place within the State Party-save some
minor aspects-and only the makeup of the various Judges' Panel, Prosecutorial
team, and Defense team would be left undetermined.387
Finally, the Roaming ICC is not a compromise between sovereignty and the
international rule of law. The Rome Statute Framers' believed that only through
compromise of these two diametrically opposed interests could an effective
international criminal enforcement mechanism become reality. The Rome Statute
Framer's belief deserves criticism, because there is no compromise in a game of
"tug of war". One either wins or loses. The Roaming ICC proposal flips the
paradigm away from compromise by creating an international criminal system
structurally and conceptually built into the Westphalian world of sovereign States.
In other words, the Roaming ICC is a system that ensures the international rule of
law through the powers of sovereign States. Neither sovereignty nor the
international rule of law is required to compromise in order to create the Roaming
ICC. Consequently, sovereign States do not feel trampled by the international rule
of law, and the international rule of law is not sacrificed in the name of
sovereignty.
hybrid tribunals in every State Party. Id. at 206-07.
386. Logistics, as already mentioned, would include all aspects necessary to undertake a trial, from
the mundane to the critical, from providing a physical forum for the proceedings to apprehending
suspects. However, some substantial assistance would be provided by the Roaming ICC Registry and
other organs of the Roaming ICC Presidency, such as paperwork, international investigators, assistants
to the Judges, etc.
387. While it might be only of academic interest, technically speaking, the Roaming ICC would
"enter" the sovereign State in order to adjudicate the alleged international crime. It would not be as if,
using the U.S. as an example, the U.S. was adjudicating international crimes with assistance from the
Roaming ICC's Presidential and Regional Authorities. However, in actuality, the perception might be
as such, because the U.S. would be responsible for ensuring the trial runs effectively, plus an American




D. Advantages of the Roaming ICC
The Roaming ICC possesses clear advantages over the current ICC, mainly
due to the construct of the Roaming ICC being a workable international criminal
system tailored to a State-centric world. The advantages, discussed below, are not
only numerous, but substantial.
1. Jurisdictional Prowess: An Enhancement on Jurisdiction to Prescribe and
to Adjudicate
The Roaming ICC would constitute a welcomed improvement over the
current ICC in terms of its jurisdiction to prescribe and its jurisdiction to
adjudicate. In regard to prescriptive jurisdiction, this Note has made much of the
groundbreaking nature of the current ICC's jurisdiction to prescribe, namely that
the Rome Statute exercised universal international jurisdiction when the Rome
Statute Framers prescribed genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
aggression as internationally criminal wherever it takes place. The Roaming ICC
does not wish to tarnish or alter this accomplishment, 388 but enhance this feat by
making the Rome Statute's subject matter laws perfectly uniform in every State
Party's jurisprudence. As a result, the Roaming ICC's prescriptive jurisdiction
would be impervious to challenge or criticism, and furthermore, would utterly
validate the truly international reprehensibility of these crimes by making them
verbatim entries into the national law of every State on Earth. 389 Additionally, if
the law of every State Party is identical in respect to these international crimes,
then the legitimacy of the Roaming ICC moving from prescription to adjudication
is significantly improved, because it will mirror the treatment domestic courts give
domestic criminal laws where the jurisdiction to prescribe is almost always
followed by the jurisdiction to adjudicate.39 °
Jurisdictionally speaking, the greatest improvement of the Roaming ICC over
the current ICC is its jurisdiction to adjudicate. The Roaming ICC will work from
a superb jurisdictional position to adjudicate almost all situations of international
criminal violations, because in a majority of circumstances, all the organs of the
Roaming ICC framework will premise their jurisdiction to adjudicate on the most
credible justification of them all: the territorial jurisdiction of the domestic
388. Included in the Roaming ICC's desire not to tarnish or alter the Rome Statute/ICC's
accomplishments in terms of jurisdiction to prescribe, the Roaming ICC proposal would not change
anything in regards to the current ICC's relationship with customary international criminal law. The
exact same structural concept that allows customary international criminal law to coexist with the Rome
Statute would be incorporated in the Roaming ICC system. See supra section IV, B.
389. As already stressed, but worthy of more emphasis, the idea of adopting a substantive and
procedural jurisprudence into every State's laws, word for word, sounds impossible on several levels.
However, the world is not that far off from being able to do just this. The Rome Statute codified certain
international crimes to an extent not demonstrated before, and the procedural experiences of the ICTY,
ICTR, and in the future, ICC will bring the world closer to an agreement on the procedural aspects of
adjudicating international crimes. Thus, the next step is to undertake the Roaming ICC proposal, and
focus on negotiations-no matter how long-geared towards realizing this proposal's promise.
390. Supra note 254 and accompanying text.
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Roaming ICC State Party to adjudicate violations of their own domestic laws. '91
In the clear cut case of an international crime being committed within a
Roaming ICC State Party, the suspect staying in the State Party where the crime
was committed, and the decision to prosecute this individual is made after an
investigation has concluded, then the State Party will apprehend the suspect, thus
initiating the Roaming ICC adjudicative process. The Roaming ICC State Party
will apprehend the suspect, because the afflicted State Party has a general interest
and legitimate reason to adjudicate infractions of their own laws within their own
borders, specifically in this case, violation of their Roaming ICC laws. As the
suspect sits in custody,392 the Roaming ICC State Party will be obligated pursuant
to the Roaming ICC agreement to let the Regional and Presidential Authorities
enter its territory in order to fulfill their respective adjudicative and prosecutorial
roles under the Roaming ICC framework. Thus, when this type of clear cut
violation occurs, the Roaming ICC State Party has its unquestionable territorial
jurisdiction to adjudicate this infraction, and concurrently, the Regional and
Presidential Authorities also legitimize their jurisdiction to adjudicate the suspect
by linking itself, or said differently, by partnering itself with the State Party's
definitive jurisdiction to adjudicate.
Although a majority of international crimes will occur in this manner
described above-for instance, Rwanda, former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Nazi
Germany-in the absence of such a clear cut scenario, the Roaming ICC
framework has other jurisdictional justification to adjudicate as well. In the case of
a suspect fleeing the territory of the Roaming ICC State Party where the crime was
committed or the territorial State Party clearly unwilling to investigate or
prosecute, other Roaming ICC State Parties will have a jurisdictional basis for
capturing and adjudicating the suspect if the suspect enters their territory, or for
offering to accept the proceedings from the State Party unwilling to adjudicate the
suspect. This jurisdictional basis spawns from the fact that the Roaming ICC
jurisprudence would be a part of every Roaming ICC State Party's domestic law,
and as already stressed, will be perfectly consistent from one country to another.
As a consequence of every nation having the exact same Roaming ICC law, the
concept of vicarious jurisdiction would exist for every State Party across the
Roaming ICC network.
Vicarious jurisdiction possesses similar characteristics as universal
jurisdiction, but is a distinct jurisdictional theory altogether. Under the concept of
vicarious jurisdiction, a Roaming ICC State Party-State B-ends up prosecuting
an individual who committed an international crime in another Roaming ICC State
Party, State A. State B can prosecute this suspect because of the failure of State
A-who initially possessed primacy of jurisdiction to adjudicate because the
391. BARRY E. CARTER ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 650-653 (4th ed. Aspen Publishers 2003)
(highlighting the elements of territorial jurisdiction, and the power of territorial jurisdiction).
392. There could be circumstances where a Roaming ICC investigation/pre-trial goes on without
the presence of the defendant(s) in custody. However, their presence in custody would be mandatory for
trial to begin. For literary ease, this Note assumes for this example that the suspect(s) is in custody.
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offense happened on its territory-to adjudicate the suspect warrants and triggers
State B to step in and adjudicate the suspect in State A's place. 393  Vicarious
jurisdiction, an concept present in German and Austrian jurisprudence,394 differs
from universal jurisdiction, because State B initially possesses a claim to
adjudicate the suspect despite State A having primacy of jurisdiction. 395 State B
has an initial claim to adjudicate the suspect, because the suspect breached State
B's Roaming ICC laws, but with the operative events occurring in another
Roaming ICC jurisdiction, in State A. Conceptually, the vicarious jurisdiction idea
comes from the theory that the sovereign authority of a State to adjudicate the
commission of an international crime that occurs in its territory passes to the
international community, or another State, once the territorial State abrogates its
sovereign duty to adjudicate recognized international crimes. 39 6 Vicarious
jurisdiction would be a codified jurisdictional concept under the Roaming ICC, for
all Roaming ICC State Parties would have the same domestic laws in regard to
Roaming ICC law. As a result of this codification, the ability but denial of State A
to prosecute a suspect for committing a Roaming ICC crime within State A, or the
fleeing of this suspect from a violation in State A into State B, would justify and
motivate State B in apprehending or offering to prosecute the individual for
violation of Roaming ICC laws in State Party A. The motivation for State B to
apprehend or to offer to prosecute this suspect comes from not only the suspect
violating the Roaming ICC laws present in State A's jurisprudence, but the
verbatim Roaming ICC laws in State B's jurisprudence as well. Otherwise, State
B's failure to adjudicate this suspect would intrinsically undermine the validity of
State B's Roaming ICC laws. Furthermore, vicarious jurisdiction would pass from
Roaming ICC State Party to Roaming ICC State Party at each failure of any of the
State Parties to apprehend and prosecute, so the suspect could face prosecution in
State C, State D, and so on, never finding a safe haven. 397 As a result of codifying
vicarious jurisdiction, the Roaming ICC framework still maintains jurisdictional
prowess in the face of fleeing suspects or a Roaming ICC State Party unwilling to
prosecute.
The more complex situation is where a Roaming ICC State Party refuses to
investigate or prosecute a Roaming ICC crime that occurred within its territory, the
suspect staying within this State Party's territory, and this State Party is unwilling
to extradite the suspect to another Roaming ICC State Party for prosecution.
However, this is an issue of potential military or hostile intervention into the
territory of the Roaming ICC State Party unwilling to extradite, because the only
393. See Bottini, supra note 13, at 512-13.
394. Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] Allgemeiner Teil [AlT] § 7 (2) 1-2 (Germany);
Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] Allgemeiner Teil [AIT] § 65 (1)-(3) (Austria).
395. See Bottini, supra note 13, at 512-13.
396. See 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, 138-39, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct.
24, 2005), available at http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/7325911 html; Report of the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, xi-xiii (Dec. 2001),
available at http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf; Sammons, supra note 49, at 122-24.
397. Bottini, supra note 13, at 511-12 (discussing that a major goal of international criminal law is
to eliminate safe haven, which unfortunately are a reality in today's world).
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way the suspect could face justice is if another State Party breaches the territorial
sovereignty of the unwilling State Party in order to capture this individual. The
Roaming ICC is not designed to answer a dilemma of military or hostile
intervention, because the Roaming ICC is an international criminal enforcement
mechanism, not an end run around acts of war. No system is capable of solving all
international criminal situations - including the Roaming ICC - considering the
unpredictable and overtly political nature of world affairs. Plainly put, the
Roaming ICC can only go so far.
Nevertheless, the Roaming ICC system would incorporate normative
measures to handle a situation like this, and could resort to its vast membership to
bring about an acceptable solution. If a State Party refuses to cooperate with the
Roaming ICC, fails to live up to their Roaming ICC contractual obligations, or
refuses to extradite a suspect to a Roaming ICC State Party willing to prosecute,
the initial step would be to allow individual State Parties to engage the
uncooperative State Party in diplomacy. There are two valid reasons why other
State Parties would be motivated to persuade the uncooperative State Party to
change its way. First, all Roaming ICC State Parties will have a vested interest in
maintaining the integrity of the Roaming ICC system, because it takes just one
State Party being allowed to skirt its Roaming ICC contractual obligations to make
the whole system unreliable and tarnished for the rest. Hence, the State Parties that
want the Roaming ICC to work and/or are relying on the Roaming ICC to work
when needed will have a self-interest in making other States Parties cooperate.
Second, the idea of vicarious jurisdiction would persist even in this above
described scenario, because the suspect has still violated the laws of all Roaming
ICC State Parties, but unfortunately in a State Party unwilling to do anything about
it. 398 Allowing a State Party to harbor an individual accused of violating a law that
all nations have specifically adopted into their own domestic law directly
undermines the validity of such a law; therefore, other Roaming ICC States Parties
will want to persuade the uncooperative State Party to cooperate for everyone's
benefit, least of which the persuading States' own benefit.
With these two reasons, other States will have plenty of diplomatic leverage
and normative pressure to exert over an uncooperative State Party. Roaming ICC
State Parties can inform the uncooperative State Party that not only is the State
Party doing damage to its reputation by failing to live up to its contractual
Roaming ICC obligations, but it is doing damage to its future ability to contract or
have other States believe them at all in future negotiations of any sort.
Furthermore, other State Parties can stake a claim over the harbored suspect
pursuant to vicarious jurisdiction, which will put the uncooperative State Party on
notice that there is much too lose and nothing to gain by staying uncooperative. As
a precautionary measure, States could insert "Roaming ICC compliance"
provisions into trade, economic cooperation, maritime, or any other kind of
398. The only true way around a scenario like this would be to include a provision in the Roaming
ICC agreement that all States will obey extradition requests, but such a provision would most likely be
unacceptable to many sovereign States.
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bilateral or multilateral treaties such that the benefit of a treaty will only flow to a
country if the country is compliant with the Roaming ICC. As a last resort, the
Roaming ICC would be able to refer the situation to the UN Security Council for
resolution, which could include economic and diplomatic sanctions imposed upon
the uncooperative State Party. As can be seen, despite the complexity of this type
of situation, the Roaming ICC will still have plenty of concrete normative options
at is disposal to solve this dilemma.
Finally, the Roaming ICC jurisdiction to adjudicate will be substantially
simpler than the current ICC, because the current ICC's confusing and complex
referral/deferral/complimentarity process will be eradicated under the Roaming
ICC. The potential for political firestorms between current ICC State Parties and
the Prosecutor's Office regarding future deferrals will be extremely high, and such
political skirmishes will inevitably delay justice from happening. One of the main
legal arguments put forward by the U.S. against the current ICC is the
discretionary ability of the Prosecutor to avoid deferring a case to a national court,
thus allowing the ICC to proceed with an internal ICC proceeding against the
wishes of a State Party. 399 In contrasts, deferrals will never be an issue under the
Roaming ICC framework, because the actual judicial proceeding will take place in
the affected forum, or in a neighboring State Party. As such, politics about
deferrals and over-zealous Prosecutors will not be an issue that will bog down the
Roaming ICC.
2. Internal Strength: A Reliable Jurisdiction to Enforce
Despite amendments within the Rome Statute to require cooperation with the
current ICC's investigation and prosecution of suspects, 400 the Rome Statute
cannot guarantee that the current ICC will not be plagued with the same
enforcement problems that faced the ad hoc tribunals, particularly the ICTY.
Evidence gathering, evidence protection, witness and victims security, witness
summoning, enforcement of arrest warrants, the ability to arrest, and other
necessary elements to any judicial proceeding were far from foregone conclusions
for the ad hoc tribunals,0 1 and the ICC is vulnerable to the same issues.40 2
Cooperation agreements, while in principle seem to be a solution, cannot be trusted
when it comes to international criminal matters, because it leaves far too much
discretion with sovereign States. Although these necessary elements are never
completely certain of occurring in any international judicial proceeding, the mere
fact that a Roaming ICC proceeding will be administered primarily by a Roaming
ICC State Party within that State Party's territory increases the odds that every part
of an investigation, pre-trial, and trial will transpire. Seldom is it a worry in the
399. Fact Sheet, supra note 334 (pointing out that a major U.S. objection to the ICC is the
Prosecutor's ability to avoid having to defer a case).
400. See Rome Statute, supra note 207, pt. 9.
401. See Cervoni, supra note 72, at 510.
402. See Mark B. Harmon & Fergal Gaynor, Prosecuting Massive Crimes with Primitive Tools:
Three Difficulties Encountered by Prosecutors in International Criminal Proceedings, 2 J. INT'L CRIM.
JUST. 403, n.26 (2004) (forecasting that the ICC mechanism will experience the same enforcement
flaws that plagued the ICTY).
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domestic criminal context if a trial will take place, because of doubts that the
suspect can be arrested, or evidence can be secured, or prosecutors will want to
uphold the law. The goal of the Roaming ICC is to bring that level of certainty to
the enforcement of international criminal law by relying on the State Party's
experience, knowledge, and overall ability to facilitate an investigation and judicial
proceeding within its own borders.
3. True Sense of Justice
The practice of prosecuting international crimes outside of the area in which
the crimes took place has been substantially discredited.4 °3 Using the two ad hoc
tribunals as examples, the prosecution of international criminals in The Hague and
in Arusha created a multitude of problems in the affected areas of Rwanda and the
former Yugoslavia. These severely traumatized populations felt disconnected from
the proceedings, unaffected by the sentencing of these criminals thousands of miles
away. 404 The supreme goal of criminal justice is to make the affected community
whole and the ICTR and ICTY not only missed accomplishing this goal, but
caused joint opposition among the affected communities against the tribunals.4 5
There are no assurances that the current ICC's proceedings will not produce the
exact same feelings among the communities ravaged by genocide, or the like,
because the ICC will also be operating, from a distance, in The Hague. However,
the Roaming ICC would not encounter such issues. The proceeding of any
violation of the Roaming ICC laws would most likely take place where the crimes
occurred. In the few situations where a Roaming ICC investigation and prosecution
were to take place elsewhere, such proceedings would invariably take place in a
nearby Roaming ICC State Party. Due to this feature of the Roaming ICC, affected
communities will be more likely to rally around the proceedings, instead of
opposing them.
4. Caseload Capacity and Pooling of Resources
As it stands today, the ICC, as a centralized, singular institution, holds neither
the resources nor capability to handle adequately a plethora of simultaneous
international criminal cases.40 6 If international criminal cases start to pile up, the
current ICC's inability to take on a large number of cases at once, and do so
effectively, will force the ICC to make one of two unattractive decisions: it can put
a finite limit on its caseload capacity, and hope national jurisdictions fill the void
or; allow itself to become overloaded, which inevitably will result in undesirable
consequences, such as delays in justice for the afflicted communities and
403. Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 295, 300-08 (2003);
Lipscomb, supra note 376, at 193-99.
404. See Developments in the Law-International Criminal Law: I. The Promises of International
Prosecution, 114 HARV. L. REV 1957, 1971-72 (2001) (emphasizing that having the prosecution forum
far away from the affected communities, such as the scenario with the ICTY and ICTR, creates a void
in justice, and galvanizes the communities against the tribunals).
405. Id. at 1972.
406. See Bottini, supra note 13, at 547 (describing the logistic problems that the ICC will face in
light of how the ICC is set up).
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unreasonably long detention periods for suspects. 40 7 In contrast to the current ICC,
the Roaming ICC is built to handle any number of international criminal cases
simultaneously given that the Roaming ICC is a decentralized entity that possesses
all the resources of its State Parties, its Regional Authorities, and the Presidential
Authority. As such, the burden of simultaneous international criminal cases will be
dispersed; therefore, Roaming ICC cases could occur in Somalia, Brazil, Albania,
Vietnam, and Mexico all at once without one case detracting or harming another.
Another benefit of being larger and more decentralized than the current ICC is
that the Roaming ICC would have a much larger pool of money to facilitate its
investigations and trials, and create a funding mechanism that all States would
support. While unnecessary here to determine the exact percentage each Roaming
ICC Authority would pay towards financing a Roaming ICC proceeding, the
breadth and the setup of the Roaming ICC structure will make certain that the
financial fears that hang over the head of the Sierra Leone, Cambodia, and East
Timor tribunals will not be replicated in Roaming ICC system. 40 8 In most
circumstances, a Roaming ICC proceeding would be drastically cheaper than any
other international tribunal, because a Roaming ICC investigation and trial would
rely on the already financed, preexisting legal infrastructure of the State Party
where the trial would take place to fund a majority of the trial and investigation
costs. For example, the State Party's Judges, Prosecutors, investigators,
administrative officers, court rooms, detention facilities, and so on would already
be paid for, and would simply be reassigned to a Roaming ICC case. Conversely,
the Regional and Presidential Authorities would be financially responsible for the
peoples, goods, and services each Authority contributed towards the fulfillment of
its obligations in a Roaming ICC proceeding, and additionally, would partly
reimburse the forum State Party for the Roaming ICC's use of its preexisting legal
infrastructure. 409 This reimbursement would give the forum State Party extra
incentives to hold up their end of the Roaming ICC agreement as well.
In situations where a Roaming ICC proceeding takes place in a State Party
where the international crimes did not occur, the afflicted State Party would be
responsible for paying in part the hosting State Party.410 Such an arrangement
would give a financial enticement to the hosting State to accept the role as forum
407. See Howard Morrison, Experimental Justice: Do International Tribunals Work?, 3-4,
http://www.leginetcy.com/articles/Experimental%20Justice-
Do%20Intemational%20Tribunals%20Work.pdf (discussing the delay of justice issues associated with
the ad hoc tribunals).
408. AsiaPacific, supra note 369, at 1; Rob Sharp, Funding Crisis Threatens Khmer Rouge Trials,
THE INDEP., Mar. 12, 2008, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/ftmding-crisis-
threatens-khmer-rouge-trials-794486.html; see Sierra Leone Agreement, supra note 368, art. 6 (stating
the Sierra Leone Tribunal will be financed by voluntary contributions by States, which to a legal mind,
is incomprehensible, considering that allows for the possibility of a trial to end because of a lack of
money).
409. Each Regional Authority would be funded in part by the States in the Region, and the
Presidential Authority would be funded by all State Parties.
410. The Roaming ICC agreement would not prohibit any other financial agreement between the
three Authorities, as long as it furthers the goal of international justice.
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State Party, and allow for the afflicted State to put its resources towards punishing
those responsible. Finally, as a last resort, if any State Party is or becomes
financially or technically unable to fulfill their obligations in a Roaming ICC
proceeding, the Regional and Presidential Authorities would assume the
investigation and judicial responsibilities as well as the financial burden of the
indigent State Party, if need be.
E. Attractive to Opponents of the Current ICC
For State and non-State opponents of the current ICC, like the U.S., the
Roaming ICC alternative is less objectionable to the principle of sovereignty, and
therefore, more likely to be adopted by all nations. The Roaming ICC effectively
addresses two primary concerns shared by opponents of the current ICC: the
infringement of an external, independent international institution on the
sovereignty of the State, and the legitimacy of the jurisdiction asserted in an
international criminal prosecution. For many States, like the U.S., it is unnerving to
envision an independent, foreign legal entity potentially having international
criminal jurisdiction over its citizens, mainly because the sovereign State would be
cut out of having direct involvement in the judicial proceedings. 41 1 The hallmark
of the Roaming ICC is that it is a conceptually decentralized court that temporarily
"creates itself' within the territory of the crime or any State Party, so the Roaming
ICC cannot be labeled external or foreign. Additionally, the Roaming ICC depends
on the State Party in which it sits not only for the performance of a majority of
investigatory and judicially necessary functions, but also on the allocation of
domestic Judges and Prosecutor from the territorial State Party. Therefore, the
Roaming ICC is not an independent hegemony asserting its authority over
sovereign States. Instead, the Roaming ICC is set up to incorporate the sovereign
influence of the State Party in which it sits, which includes everything from
411. One of the U.S.' grounds for opposing the ICC is that the ICC may attempt to gain jurisdiction
over its soldiers, military personnel, high ranking military leaders, or foreign policy makers working
abroad. Bolton Speech, supra note 329. This is a uniquely American concern, for no country maintains
a military force abroad to the extent that the U.S. does. Under the Roaming ICC, it is imaginable that a
U.S. military official or civilian foreign policy maker could be investigated and potentially prosecuted
in a foreign Roaming ICC State Party. However, there are safeguards and incentives in place that would
appease both the U.S. and international community if such a scenario would take place. First, the
Roaming ICC State Party that initially began an investigation or prosecution against the U.S. military
official could extradite the U.S. military official to the U.S., and the entire Roaming ICC process could
take place in the U.S. The sending country would be assured, by the structural safeguards within the
Roaming ICC agreement, that the U.S. and the international community would adjudicate the U.S.
military official together, rather than the U.S. simply taking the soldier back with no assurances that any
judicial proceedings will take place at all. Second, regardless if Roaming ICC proceeding took place in
the extraditing country or in the U.S., it would be the exact same proceeding, so there would be no
worry that the U.S. would hold a kangaroo court of some sort. The inverse of this, if the U.S. official
were to stay in the Roaming ICC State Party that initially investigated or prosecuted the U.S. military
official, and the U.S. did not seek extradition, the U.S. would at least be assured that the exact same
proceedings would take place regardless where the Roaming ICC proceedings occurs. Additionally,
because the U.S. would take part in the negotiations surrounding the jurisprudence of the Roaming ICC,
the U.S. would indirectly influence all future Roaming ICC proceedings wherever they took place, even
if it was a Roaming ICC prosecution against a U.S. general in Burundi, for instance.
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domestic investigators to a sitting domestic Judge. Essentially, the Roaming ICC
provides State Parties with both a sense of ownership over the Roaming ICC
proceedings taking place within its territory and with "checks and balances" on the
amount of influence that the Roaming ICC Presidential and Regional Authorities
can assert, yet still maintaining a system whereby the international community can
counteract any misgivings on the part of the State Party.
Much to the liking of opponents of the current ICC, through the adoption of
the Roaming ICC laws into the domestic jurisprudence of all State Parties and the
dependence of a Roaming ICC proceeding on the domestic State Party to help "run
the show", the Roaming ICC proposal adds an element of territorial legitimacy to
the entire process of enforcing international criminal law, Objections as to the
legitimacy of universal prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction used by the
current ICC are answered, because the Roaming ICC attaches itself onto the
unquestioned territorial power of the State Party, and the State Party's own
internal, pre-existing mechanisms, to enforce Roaming ICC's criminal laws.
F. Attractive to Proponents of the Current ICC
It has been emphasized that the Roaming ICC proposal will gain the support
of State and non-State opponents of the current ICC, because it calls for the active
involvement of the sovereign State as a "check and balance" on unadulterated
international intervention and provides jurisdictional legitimacy not found in the
current ICC. However, their support will not come at the cost of losing the support
of those States and non-States that are proponents of the current ICC. A chief
reason that the proponents of the current ICC support the current ICC and not
domestic courts applying international criminal law on their own is that the current
ICC ensures that the location of the trial will not impact the substance of or the
manner in which the law is applied, and allow for a completely transparent
proceeding. Even though a Roaming ICC trial could take place in Mongolia or
Chile, the Roaming ICC framework would also ensure the consistent application of
the same rules and laws, and provide a transparent trial for the whole world to
witness.
First of all, a Roaming ICC proceeding will not be completely left to the
devices of the State Party, for every Roaming ICC proceeding will include the
prosecutorial and judicial participation of the Roaming ICC Presidential and
Regional Authorities. Secondly, given that each Roaming ICC proceeding will
apply the exact same substantive law wherever the trial takes place, there will be
no concern that a genocide trial in Sudan, for instance, will apply different
substantive international criminal laws against genocide than the laws applied at a
genocide trial in Laos. The manner in which a Roaming ICC proceeding occurs
will not be of concern either, because the same procedural standards and practices
-for instance, rights of defendants, pre-trial process, etc.-will be used during
every Roaming ICC investigation, pre-trial, trial, and appeal regardless of its
geographic location. Moreover, a future Roaming ICC trial in Nicaragua can use a
past Roaming ICC trial in Indonesia for guidance, because every Roaming ICC
Judge, Prosecutor, and Defense attorney will know that it can rely on Roaming
ICC case law in light of the standardized laws and rules applied at every Roaming
ICC proceeding. In light of regional and international officials participating in
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many facets of a Roaming ICC proceeding, all Roaming ICC proceedings will
supply a level of transparency that is not provided to the international community
attempting to monitor a domestic State practicing international criminal law on its
own. Such a level of transparency will deter Roaming ICC State Parties from
actively undermining a Roaming ICC proceeding as well. Even if a State Party did
disrupt a Roaming ICC proceeding, the level of transparency afforded would give
the international community opportunity to bear legal and political pressure on the
State Party to alter its harmful policies.
All of these above attributes, which are very important to proponents of the
current ICC, are only realized if all the world's States agree to the substantive and
procedural laws to be used by the Roaming ICC framework, and subsequently
enact them into every State Parties' domestic law. Yet, the hard work and years
that it might take to accomplish such a task will ensure legal consistency within the
Roaming ICC framework, and accordingly, alleviate any apprehension that
Roaming ICC judicial proceedings will be varied and unfair.
V. CONCLUSION: APPEASES BOTH SIDES OF THE DEBATE
As this Note has traced the development of international criminal law,
specifically the international institutions trusted to adjudicate and enforce them, the
consistent theme throughout has been the battle between sovereignty and the
international rule of law. No matter what the answer to the riddle on enforcing
international criminal law may be, it is undeniable that the conflict between
sovereignty and the international rule of law sits squarely on top of the answer.
Regardless of the approach, the clash between sovereignty and international rule of
law has to be resolved in order to reach the solution.
For centuries, the dominant thought on enforcing international criminal law
assuming that countries even agreed on what international criminal law is has
surrounded compromise. How far can we push sovereignty on the creation of an
international criminal system without sovereign States walking away from the
table? How far can we undermine international rule of law in creating an
international criminal enforcement mechanism until those that support
international criminal law walk away from the table? The magical middle ground
was sought, but never to be attained. The focus must switch from compromise to
engineering an international criminal enforcement mechanism that does not need to
stomp on either sovereignty or the international rule of law in order to become a
reality.
The Roaming ICC has, at the very least, made strides towards achieving this
engineering feat.412 Tallying all of the advantages of the Roaming ICC, both
proponents of sovereignty and proponents of the international rule of law will get
an international criminal system that will appease both sides.413 For the proponents
412. Obviously, the Roaming ICC proposal is in a rude, preliminary form as offered in this Note.
Yet, the theory still has the potential to accomplish what it claims it can accomplish.
413. Throughout this Note, the proponents of sovereignty and the opponents of the current ICC are
one in the same. Conversely, proponents of the international rule of law and the proponents of the
current ICC are one in the same as well.
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of the international rule of law, the Roaming ICC will be an effective,
comprehensive, and transparent international criminal system that is capable of
delivering consistent and fair judicial proceedings to every corner of the globe.
More importantly, the Roaming ICC will provide advantages, such as ability to
avoid disenfranchising the local population and a better ability to sustain a judicial
proceeding, that international rule of law proponents wish were included in the
current ICC. For the defenders of sovereignty, the Roaming ICC will not be a
foreign entity bent on snatching their citizens away to a far away court. Rather, the
Roaming ICC will hold judicial proceedings right in the sovereign State Party's
own territory and allow their own Judges and their own Prosecutor to assert
influence over every prosecutorial and judicial decision. Most beneficial to the
proponents of both sovereignty and the international rule of law is the
jurisdictional solution offered by the Roaming ICC, for the Roaming ICC
jurisdiction to adjudicate will either be grounded in a Roaming ICC State Party's
territorial jurisdiction414 or vicarious jurisdiction,4 15 thus creating a quasi-
universal jurisdictional system that both sides of the divide will embrace.
Many of the components of the Roaming ICC proposal may not be earth-
shattering concepts in their own right, but the Roaming ICC is a conceptual
amalgamation of these components that is truly unique. 416 The Roaming ICC takes
many of these already used ideas, and extrapolates on them. The Roaming ICC
seizes on many of these already discussed concepts, and institutionalizes them. The
end result is a coherent system of international criminal enforcement that ensures
the highest level of realistic certainty that sovereign States will work with the
international community to fight international crime on a consistent and uniform
basis, wherever such crime occurs.4t 7
Finally, the reality of creating a Roaming ICC is not far-fetched, for the
substantive law necessary to create the Roaming ICC is already in existence. True,
time will be needed to fashion a set of procedural laws that all Roaming ICC State
414. Pleases the opponents of the ICC.
415. Pleases the proponents of the ICC.
416. For instance, international criminal prosecution via universal jurisdiction is not a ground-
breaking concept, but accomplishing the end result of that concept through an agreement that codifies
an alliance between the use of territorial and vicarious jurisdiction is a ground-breaking idea. Hybrid
tribunals is not a revolutionary idea, but creating an international criminal enforcement mechanism that
would allow for the creation of hybrid tribunals overnight through an agreement between sovereign
States and the international community is revolutionary.
417. Another way to think of the Roaming ICC is that it is a structural guarantee on the promise of
suppression convention. In an ideal world, suppression convention would be all the world would need
to fight international crimes, because every State would prosecute international crimes that occurred
within their territory or extradite the international criminal to a State that would prosecute them. Yet,
sovereign States were free to disobey their obligations set forth in these suppression conventions,
because there was no real consequences for disobeying. The Roaming ICC creates a framework
agreement between all sovereign States and the international community that gives motivation to
sovereign States to allow for the joint adjudication of international crimes by the State itself and the
international community-represented by the Presidential and Regional Authorities-within their
territory, and further ensures that these adjudications will always takes place, and always be fair and
consistent.
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Parties will accept, and even more time to allow the adoption of the entirety of
Roaming ICC's laws into the domestic law of each nation. However, the time
necessary to accomplish these feats is a small price to pay if the end result is a
system that both proponents of sovereignty and the international rule of law will
support. And an even smaller price to pay for a system that is capable of and
designed to eradicate international crime in a State-centric world of international
law.
